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Kokoshin on Level of Foreign Threat

91UM0001A Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Oct 90 p 3

[Report on interview with A. Kokoshin, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute, by TRUD military correspondent B. Badurkin; date and place not given: "Is There a Threat to the Security of the USSR?"]

[Text]

[Badurkin] Andrey Afanasyevich, I would like to begin our interview with a clarification of an issue that, judging by the letters, greatly interests many of TRUD's readers: Is there in our time a military threat to the USSR?

There are many contradictions in today's evaluations of the military-political situation in the world. Some people declare that there is no danger to the country and that, consequently, military spending is a sheer waste of money. Others maintain that we have gone "too far" in the disarmament process.

In addition, the problem now is not only political and economic but also moral and psychological. The editorial office was recently visited by several young officers from the Transbaykal region. They were concerned: If no one is threatening our eastern borders and if relations with China are entirely normalized, what is the point of them and their families serving under the difficult conditions of taiga garrisons?

[Kokoshin] We need, in my opinion, to separate the immediate danger of war and the military threat in a more general and longterm respect. The immediate danger of war is for us appreciably diminished—both thanks to our foreign policy and thanks to the existence of immense military potential, nuclear included.

As far as the long term is concerned, however, things are, I believe, more complex. For decades assessments of the military threat were in our country, as a rule, of a highly simplistic nature and were ideologized to the utmost. They were frequently overstated, and in many cases, I do not rule this out, with the best intentions. This proceeded from the political leadership and the party's top ideology officials and then at the military command level acquired its specific features and its own "venerableness," despite the simply heroic efforts of certain military intellectuals....

This simplistic nature of the estimates of the military threat long since ceased to satisfy a large part of our society. It brought about a rejection of talk on this subject altogether, particularly now, when the people are worried primarily by domestic economic, social, and political complexities. I believe that this is a reason for the decline in the authority of the armed forces. And, as a result, considerable numbers of the population have the impression that there is no longer any military threat at all.

The vast majority of both domestic and foreign specialists agree that both nuclear war and a big conventional war between the United States and the USSR and the Warsaw Pact and NATO are highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. There will be a general military threat, however, as long as there are large nuclear arsenals and powerful military machines in states with which serious political conflicts are potentially possible. And this should be optimally balanced by sufficient military power on our side. In the future, we also will have to keep a close watch on the nature and scale of the activity of various extremist forces and groupings in countries whose foreign policy could affect the interests of our security.

In my view, the tendency toward a diminution in the role of the military factor, which has shown through in relations between East and West, between countries of the so-called developed North, will, most likely, continue in the next decade. But this does not mean that power pressure can be wholly ruled out of international relations. Strength is simply acquiring a different content and symbols. The economic, social, scientific and technical, cultural, and, if you will, even moral-ethical components of strength have acquired higher status. Today possession of one's own supercomputers is the same symbol of the prestige and might of a state and society as, say, the possession of ships of the line was in the first half of the 20th century. There has, accordingly, been a radical change also in the nature of the threat to our country's security.

Nor should it be forgotten that the role of the military factor remains very high in the zone of the developing countries, where the possibility of the use of armed force is at least not diminishing in both interstate and domestic conflicts. The most recent confirmation of this is Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

Nor can it be ruled out that unless sufficiently strong barriers are created, nuclear or chemical weapons could in the 1990's be employed in some such conflict. And in a number of cases, what is more, this could have a most direct impact on the USSR's security interests. For this reason a particular role for us is attached to constructive interaction with the United States and the European countries and with our neighbors in Asia in the solution of regional conflicts.

[Badurkin] I was recently going through accounts of President Bush's tour of the United States and his speeches in Wyoming and Virginia. There had to be, unfortunately, arguments "from a position of strength." How else, for example, can one evaluate the following words of his: "American power is, as before, the supreme force for peace...." After such statements by the head of the strongest state, one involuntarily wonders: Are these just echoes of a sorry past? Such statements cannot fail, evidently, to put us on our guard. Even if they were connected primarily with conflicts in the "Third World". It is thus, incidentally, that the U.S. Government is now operating in the Near East.

[Kokoshin] Let us take a look at what has been happening with the U.S. Armed Forces of late. A process of reducing the military budget in real terms, in constant prices, has been under way in the United States for several years now. And, what is more, it has been stepped up noticeably as of this year. The administration proposes reducing military appropriations 25 percent by 1995, and a substantial part of Congress, by half. The personnel level of the armed forces is being cut back, a number of major arms programs is being curbed and certain military bases (secondary ones, chiefly, it is true) are being closed. For example, the U.S. Defense Department has proposed a reduction in the latest B-2 heavy bomber (Stealth) program from 132 to 75, and the House Armed Services Committee has voted for there being no more than 15 of them. Whereas just a few years ago a program for the building of a 600-warship U.S. Navy was being considered, it is now a question of less than 500 ships. Sizable reductions in the armies of other NATO countries, including the Bundeswehr and the British Army, are planned also (although it cannot be ruled out that the process of reductions that has come about could be negatively influenced by the present Near East situation). France, which is officially not a part of NATO's joint military structure, so far is lagging behind in this respect. Nor are any changes in sight in the nature of Japan's military preparations.

Despite the fact that there has been a considerable improvement in our political relations with the United States, much of what continues to be done by the United States and its NATO allies cannot fail to arouse in us rejection, a negative attitude and guardedness. I consider absolutely unacceptable the policy of "modernization" of the aerial component of America's tactical nuclear forces in Europe—the creation and deployment of TASM [tactical air-to-surface missile] missiles. Seeking to ensure that it abandons this armaments system, as it recently abandoned the Lance II new-generation operational-tactical missiles, is in the interests of general security in Europe.

Many of our specialists are calling attention, and perfectly justifiably, in my view, to the fact that the United States is endeavoring to secure for itself an advantage, thanks to an upgrading of highly accurate conventional arms also. Nor can we fail to be alarmed by its policy of developing so-called "third-generation" nuclear weapons. This is, it is rightly believed by domestic and foreign specialists, the main reason why the U.S. Government is refusing to conclude a general and total nuclear test ban treaty. For our part, there are a number of other complaints about the United States' military activity also.

But it has to be said that all the estimates of what the United States and its allies are doing and, particularly, what they are planning, are of a very limited nature since we have as yet virtually no basis for comparison. How many of the latest heavy bombers is our Defense Ministry planning to have? How many missiles of various classes do we manufacture annually? What are our plans for modernizing tactical nuclear weapons? Our state

authorities are not publishing this information as yet. Nor are the kind of arms programs that the USSR has, what their overall cost and the cost of each unit of armament is, and how these programs are being modified under the conditions of a reduction in our military budget being reported. Yet all this is elementary information, without which our community simply cannot in any way reliably evaluate the degree of outside threat and provide its armed forces with the necessary moral and material support.

[Badurkin] I entirely agree. Without a thorough, sober reassessment of our own potential and the threat to security from outside we will succeed neither in properly reforming our armed forces nor in providing an objective idea of their role in society and the state.

[Kokoshin] As far as the latter is concerned, I believe that a sufficiently powerful and flexible armed forces common for the whole union and under the dependable control of democratic institutions are for us essential. Not cheap forces, as one of our generals recently put it. I hope that it was simply a slip of the tongue. We need an army and navy that is not burdensome to society and the state, but by no means ones that are cheap, despite the gravity of our present economic situation. They must be equipped with the most modern combat and support hardware. Each serviceman—officers, warrant officers, sergeants, privates—all must be worthily compensated for difficult work and should be provided with everything necessary in a social amenities respect. Of course, this is possible only given a considerably lower overall manning level of the armed forces and a reduction in the "gross" purchases of military equipment.

In reforming our Army and Navy we must first and foremost look to the future, not idealizing and not oversimplifying their past. There is in the history of the USSR and Russia, specifically, the rich intellectual heritage of military theorists of the Red Army of the 1920's and the start of the 1930's. Unfortunately, it is still better known overseas than in our country. They include a star of world magnitude, Aleksandr Andreyevich Svechin, whose complete works are already being prepared for publication in the United States, and also Lebedev, Zayonchkovskiy, Verkhovskiy, Neznamov, Novitskiy and a number of other names.

A key component in the reform of the armed forces is, in my view, the restructuring of the military education system. Leading civilian scientists and lecturers could be enlisted more extensively in the higher military educational institutions (the number of which undoubtedly needs to be reduced), which was done successfully in the past in both Russia and the Soviet Union.

[Badurkin] To conclude the discussion I propose that we return to the question of the military danger. Some of the newspaper's readers are voicing concern in connection with the fact that our society has recently been swept by a wave of disarmament euphoria. And demands are even being heard, what is more, for the immediate unilateral

elimination of all arms, primarily nuclear. Our good example would in this case, it is said, be followed by all civilized countries. But, first, many countries with far from democratic regimes have or could have nuclear weapons in the very near future. Second, no one in the West is even, for one reason or another, in any hurry to announce in the wake of us a moratorium on test nuclear explosions. Third, the theory of nuclear deterrence actively propagandized by, in particular, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is finding an ever increasing number of supporters. What is your attitude toward this?

[Kokoshin] Nuclear deterrence—deterrence by means of intimidation—has since the time we acquired nuclear weapons in response to their acquisition by the United States been a most important component of our policy. But it has not, as a rule, been our custom to admit this. Although the instances of employment of the threat to use nuclear weapons on the part of the USSR are considerably fewer than on the part of the United States. It should be mentioned also that upon reaching the condition of military-strategic nuclear balance with the United States the Soviet Union behaved more circumspectly in this respect than prior to having reached this condition.

It cannot be ruled out that under the conditions of a substantial reduction in the personnel level of the armed forces, we will have, in averting a whole number of types of aggression, to rely to a greater extent on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. We need for this our own theory, developed in depth, of nuclear deterrence with its corresponding realization in military doctrine. And this by no means contradicts the task of a staged reduction in nuclear arms, which would ideally lead to the destruction of nuclear weapons and their prohibition. But the main foundation of our security here should be a strong and dynamic economy and a stable democratic political system, upon which is based a flexible and creative foreign policy.

From the editors: In publishing the interview with A. Kokoshin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, we hope that there might be opponents to him. We are prepared to afford them also an opportunity to express in the newspaper their opinions on these complex issues, which disturb everyone.

Military Journalists Concerned Over Media's 'Negative' Course

90UM0687A Kiev LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian
14 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Nikitenko: "Dip the Pen in Truth"]

[Text] To whose advantage is it to defame the Army? This became the main theme at a roundtable discussion of LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA journalists and the leaders of USSR KGB Border Troop newspapers.

The discussion's theme was not chosen at random. The complicated processes which the country has endured have also affected the Armed Forces. Great changes are taking place here. It is impossible not to notice them today. It is so annoying to see the increasingly frequent attempts of some of the mass media to present Army life only in a lopsided and negative light for the purpose of promoting its own popularity without pointing out real changes.

The meeting's participants thought that this is occurring both in the central and in other regions of the country. Journalistic incompetence is far from always the culprit. Frequently an open attempt to undermine the Army's prestige and gratify readers with distorted facts prevails.

Speaking about the inadmissibility of this approach, establishment of much closer contacts with "civilian" publications, and objectivity in coverage of Army life, LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA Editor-in-Chief Lieutenant-Colonel V. Chikalin referred to the work experience of the press center at a recent KVO [Kiev Military District] troop operational-tactical training exercise at which foreign military observers were present. Representatives of PRAVDA UKRAINA, RABOCHAYA GAZETA, SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, and other publications reflected the course of the training objectively and thoroughly and they truthfully described the soldiers and officers who manifested outstanding stamina, diligence, and military skill.

At the same time there were also those who had little interest in the events that were occurring and who preferred to impress everyone, figuratively speaking, from "a black operation." This concerns, first of all, IZVESTIYA's own correspondent S. Tsikora and several television journalists. For some reason, the latter were primarily interested in the reservists' slovenly outward appearance and other less attractive subjects. It never occurred to them that people who had dug sand out of hundreds of meters of trenches and communications trenches and who been summoned to the field of battle for a 48 hour period and not to a holiday parade would not be able to look at it in a different way. It must be said that this endeavor caused righteous indignation from these same reservists and they decisively objected to such pictures.

Maj V. Bilan gave examples of similar "selectivity" in the work of some journalists in the article "Maneuvers. Radiation. Latrines," to which roundtable participants referred. That article is a press survey for the period of the exercise. It is easy to see from it who and what they wanted to see and write about after visiting regiments, battalions and companies. Some reported about the heroism of Senior Lieutenant E. Strizhakov who risked his life while shielding a subordinate from a poorly thrown live grenade with his own body; others concerned themselves with writing about latrines that were set up for the foreign observers.

You analyze all these facts and instinctively think, what are they bringing to the reader? What feelings are they arousing in them? It is hardly a feeling of respect for the Army. Rather the opposite.

Many have said that society's attitude toward the Armed Forces is changing for the worse because of similar articles. But KVO Political Directorate Department of Propaganda and Agitation Deputy Chief Colonel M. Vertushkov cited the most disturbing facts.

"Cases of attacks on servicemen have become more frequent," he said. "Not long ago KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported that 59 officers were killed because of this during the past year alone."

Colonel M. Vertushkov cited another alarming fact. During that same period, 100 officers and warrant officers were victimized and hospitalized in the Kiev Military District. Such a situation compels us to take serious steps to defend the honor and dignity of servicemen.

Having touched upon the issue of strengthening ties with the civilian press, those who spoke said that the military district's political directorate had created the press center for that purpose. Three press conferences were recently conducted for journalists and there are two "open telephones" to KVO Headquarters. The military district military soviet is preparing a meeting on this issue.

"All of this is being done," Colonel M. Vertushkov stressed, "so that the mass media will more competently and truthfully cover Army life."

The words "truth" and "truthfulness" often resounded during the course of the roundtable meeting. They were the common thread that ran through all the speeches. And it was understandable. The time when truth was glossed over at all levels is irrevocably left in the past. Therefore, every news organ that is worried about its own prestige and increasing the number of subscribers should primarily stress this Leninist principle in their work.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Kartashov, a representative of the border newspaper from Khabarovsk spoke about this in particular. Moreover, he pointed out that the sharp statements of the civilian press often help fight against negative phenomena in the Army. Those like "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts], protectionism, and employment of a service position for personal interests. Many roundtable participants shared this point of view.

Nevertheless, the greatest interest was caused by the speeches of journalists who had arrived from "hot" spots like the Baltic and the Transcaucasus. Maj P. Kalikin of the Baltic Border District, one of the editor's guests, talked about the specific features of working under conditions of exacerbation of nationalism and political adventurism.

The journalist said further that today in Lithuania the leaders of Sajudis and the NFL [Lithuanian People's Front] are struggling to attract the republic's Russian speaking population to their side and they are intimidating many people. Very few are deciding to openly speak against the newly appointed "leaders" of the nation, fearing persecution from their supporters. Many Party organs are also assuming a passive position. They have practically been excluded from the power struggle.

Speaking of the border newspaper's editorial position, the officer self-critically admitted for the first time that it had not always kept pace with events and had not corrected its work right away. Right now particular emphasis has been placed on revealing the historical truth about the events of 1939-1940 and demonstrating the true aims and designs of those who are against internationalism and for Lithuania's secession from the Soviet Union. This demonstration of what went on is finding understanding and support among a significant portion of the population of the Baltic republics and also among border troops.

The complex political processes taking place in a number of republics require the rapt attention of journalists' and balanced and considered assessments. Today newspaper reporters cannot draw rash conclusions and recklessly divide everything into black and white. Colonel B. Kovalenko, deputy director of the USSR KGB Border Troops Political Directorate Department of Propaganda, and Major V. Bilan, Department of Propaganda chief for the KVO Newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, warned the roundtable's participants against such a simple approach when covering events.

The latter, in particular, shared his work experiences and also his observations on where Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika] is going and what goals it has set for itself. The opinion was expressed that representatives of the Party committee, newspapers and magazines, law enforcement and other organs should boldly enter into an open, constructive dialogue with Rukh leaders. This dialogue must help perestroika.

During the conversation, the military journalists reached a general consensus: The times are compelling them to leave the defensive trenches and truthful positions to decisively defending the honor and prestige of our Army.

Correspondents from TASS, PRAVDA UKRAINA and RATAU [Ukrainian News Agency] participated in the roundtable meeting.

Regiment Party Secretary Discusses Primary Party Organizations

90UM0620A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 90
(Signed to Press 23 Apr 90) pp 15-18

[Article by Regiment Party Committee Secretary Guards Lt Col V. Lukasevich, Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "Listen to the Primary"]

[Text] This past fall the communists of the regiment elected me as their party secretary for the eleventh time. I would think that I should be filled with pride over such a high trust, but, then, as now, entirely different feelings were at play. There is no end to attacks on the party, political organs, and Army and Navy political organizations. Primary organizations are suffering a loss in prestige. Voices calling for depoliticization of the Armed Forces are shouting with increasing loudness. In this difficult situation, some communists do not know what to think, while others are on the verge of abandoning their former ideals.

Let us admit the truth: Our party house has long been enveloped by the flames of a fire that was skillfully set. The impression exists that we are all attempting to extinguish the flames by chanting verbal invocations, whereas we should have applied radical measures long before this. In this regard, a definite amount of optimism has been engendered by drafts of the Central Committee platform and CPSU Regulations that have been submitted to the Central Committee Party Plenum for extensive discussion. In my opinion, not all the provisions contained in the documents should be accepted as written. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the main goal has been set—placing the primary party organization at the center of party life of communists, so that they are offered the widest possible opportunities to participate in developing and implementing a party policy.

It is true that the primary organization never did suffer lack of attention in the past. What high-sounding terms were used to describe it! "major"—"most important element"—"fundamental" unit of the party—"the center"—"political nucleus." Be that as it may, in the main the primary has been nothing more than an expression. The primary organizations then and now did not possess actual independence. It is a rare secretary who will not agree, even though primary party organizations have recently been granted greater authority. For example, there is the authority to examine at party meetings cases of transgressions committed by communists in management positions; participation in the operation of certification commissions; and deducting a portion of monthly dues for use by the primary.

That is insufficient, as we can see. In addition, I am convinced that this "authority" merely creates an illusion of authority. Take the case of primary party organization of examination of violations committed by managerial communists. This authority is set down in the materials of the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU. Our Army and Navy organizations became empowered by direction of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. However, still in force is paragraph 18 of the "Instructions for CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy," which states that matters pertaining to violations committed by communists occupying managerial positions are to be taken up directly by party commission at the superior political organ, at the discretion of the chief of that particular political organ. The end result is that authority

is and is not granted. There is a reason why the paragraph of the Instructions is often considered to be "at the top of the stack." KOMMUNIST VOORUZHEN-NYKH SIL has written on this subject, incidentally.

The draft Regulations resolve all these problems. Nevertheless, to tell the truth, I would not be surprised if the Instructions were published in an altered form so as to provide "clarifications" or "explanations." Is it possible that we will finally reject that unrepresentative document?

Now the problem of finances. Three percent for our party amount to 20 rubles a month. This is insufficient to pay the fee of a speaker from the Znaniye society or an actor from the local drama theater. There is no question but that primary organizations are in need of financing. For example, the company party organization secretary works on a voluntary basis, conscientiously shouldering service and party chores. Why not offer the man an incentive in the form of a small sum of money, in addition to the usual document? And another situation. Assume that an active communist is about to celebrate a personal anniversary: 20 years of party service. Who can argue against rewarding him with a valuable gift financed by dues?

The idea presently proposed involves setting aside up to 50 percent of the total amount of dues collected, to be used to pay primary organization expenses. Note that the wording is "up to 50 percent." This may be 30, 10, or even five percent. Where is the guarantee that a superior organ will not decide that half of the total receipts is too large a slice, therefore let us cut it. An excuse will always be found. Would it not be better to prevent possible misunderstanding by deciding on an exact deduction? Or perhaps come to an agreement whereby the primary party organization makes an independent determination of its expenditures, which should not exceed 50 percent of the dues amount collected? In addition, it would be necessary to simplify the collection procedure as much as possible. It presently is quite unwieldy. Why unnecessarily maintain bookkeepers on the payroll? Would it not be better to set aside the 50 percent for use by the primary as soon as the amount is collected?

I will not dwell on how the party organization exercises its authority in another area—participation in the work of certification commissions. Alas! there is nothing to be proud of here. One could of course reproach primary party organizations for their failure to exhibit steadfastness and a principled approach to expressing their opinions. To a great extent such a reproach would be justified. However, let us look at the situation in a realistic manner. The draft Regulations state that party organizations and committees fulfill a personnel function by recommending the most competent and capable communists and non-party members for appointment to particular positions. In the Army it is the commander who makes recommendations for promotion. All the party organization can do is agree or disagree. The commander is free to take the advice of communists or ignore their

opinion. Once more we have the same situation: There seems to be authority, but in reality what there is, is quite illusory.

What is the solution? Let us have a closer look at the duties of Army and Navy party organizations. There is no end to their responsibilities! Combat readiness, discipline, nurturing of personnel, everyday affairs, and much more. One would think that in our military collective there are no commanders, political workers, deputy commanders for technical affairs, or rear service officers. Nevertheless, in taking on all these responsibilities, we find ourselves in a strange situation. The duties of the above-mentioned officials may be set down in the General Military Regulations, but those of the party organization secretary are not.

What I am leading up to is that as long as there is no special section entitled "The Commander and Social Organizations" included in the General Military Regulations, many aspects of authority and the duties of primary organizations specified by the CPSU Regulations will continue to be nothing more than words on paper. Everything will depend upon the relations established between the commander and secretary.

I believe that paragraph 26 of the CPSU Draft Regulations should go beyond stating the need for close ties between the party committees and primary organizations on the one hand, and military councils, commanders, and political organs on the other, to include an exact determination of the status of secretary. Nothing is being done to develop this status, in spite of all the talk of so doing. Under present conditions, a time when plans are being laid to differentiate between the functions fulfilled by political and party organs, the need for this is greater than ever. Otherwise, it will not be long before another instruction will be required. For that matter, I am of the opinion that there is an advantage to develop more fully in the Regulations the authority and responsibilities of party committees and their secretaries.

I must admit that the Draft Regulations as published do open up broad possibilities for increasing the independence of party organizations. I believe that most communists will support suggestions related to authority granted primary organizations in the matter of admission into the party and imposition of penalties. It is high time that they are granted such broad authority. In this connection, a number of the provisions give definite cause for concern. For example, I cannot concur in dropping the requirement for recommending a person for membership in the CPSU. Since the pre-admission trial period is done away with, meaning that there will be fewer opportunities to check the candidate's performance, the recommendation process assumes added importance. Also the period of preparing the person for admission into the party, and especially the time immediately following admission. We recently heard young communists, officers N. Rusakov and Ya. Savoteyev, give an account of their situation. We invited Majors Yu.

Sedov and Ye. Volkov—the comrades that recommended them—to the party committee meeting. The discussion was useful and effective, due largely to Rusakov's and Savoteyev's sense of responsibility in recommending the young communists and helping the latter to become established.

There is another consideration related to the proposed procedure for cancellation of membership in the CPSU. In all my years of work in elective capacities, I cannot recall a single instance in which communists committed an error in their disciplining or justifying a comrade. The following is a definite example, one of many.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Zavertaylenko committed a serious transgression. The party organization weighed all pros and cons and came to a conclusion: a severe reprimand for Zavertaylenko, with entry made in his registration card. However, the party commission considered this action as too moderate, opting instead to remove the communist from CPSU membership. The officer was forced to file an appeal with superior party organs. The matter was a source of agitation of people for the almost two months that it was under review. Justice finally triumphed. Lieutenant Colonel Zavertaylenko's CPSU membership was restored as a result of finding that the first decision was proper.

The above example once more illustrates why party organizations should maintain their priority in this kind of situation. In reading the Draft Regulations, I see that it is stated in one passage (par. 18) that primary organizations are to act independently in questions of acceptance into and exclusion from CPSU membership, whereas in another passage (par. 5), it is specified that removal from CPSU membership is a function of the party primary organization or superior party organ. It is a case where one hand gives while another takes away. So let us trust the primary organizations if we have indeed decided to delegate to them the majority of authority functions that previously were the province of the "upstairs."

Primary party organizations are presently reproached for their declining prestige in military collectives. There is no denying that the reproach is justified. Cited as a major cause of this is the apprehension being experienced by primaries in their overcoming of the barriers imposed by the time of stagnation. What do I mean by saying that? That the party organization should back communists and non-party members all the way, defend their interests in a skillful manner, and make stringent demands of those who act indifferently, exhibit rudeness in their treatment of people, or are guilty of unethical behavior. I recall the case of officer P. Byakov. He requested the military authorities a number of times that he be transferred for family reasons to another location, each time running into a wall of indifference. Our party organization came out in defense of the communist. A solution was not easy in coming, but we were finally able to help Byakov. People thought well of this outcome.

Take another case. At one of our party meetings, communists entered justified complaints against Lieutenant Colonel A. Osipik, deputy regimental commander for rear services, who, starting with his assumption of duties, exhibited aloofness, arrogance, and even caddishness in his treatment of subordinates. A direct and open discussion at the meeting set the communist straight. Once more we heard kind words expressed relative to the party organization.

Speaking of party organization authority, I must express another thought. Its declining authority is often due to dead wood. I am not hiding the fact that there is plenty of that in our party organization. Always present along with active communists are those who exist in a constant state of complete indifference and some kind of hesitation. The usual procedure is to arrange for them a face-to-face discussion and request them to speak of their situation. There is a reason for that. However, what should be done about those who derive absolutely no benefit from discussions or disciplinary actions? The Draft Regulations specify that behavior that brings discredit upon the CPSU is a cause of exclusion from the party. However, what can be said about a person who has done nothing to bring discredit but at the same time has done nothing useful whatsoever? I see a solution in resolutely getting rid of those who—to put it mildly—have long lost interest in their party membership. In that case there will be fewer of us, but we who remain will be true advocates of perestroika, people who take the interest of the party to heart.

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Soviet Reaction to Lithuania's 'Anti-Army Campaign'

90UM0673A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 90
(Signed to press 21 May 90) pp 59-60

[Article by KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL Magazine Political Observer Lieutenant-Colonel V. Gavrilov, Vilnius—Moscow: "Voyenkomats... Under Lock and Key?"]

[Text] "Repeal of the Law on Universal Military Obligation and the announcement about the dissolution of voyenkomats [military commissariats] very nearly became the first political acts of the leadership of Lithuania. How do military commissariat workers feel in this very complex situation?

Major V. Kurotsapov Order of Lenin Moscow Military District"

Lieutenant-Colonel V. Gavrilov, KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL Magazine political observer, visited the capital of the Lithuanian SSR soon after the Republic passed legislative acts of an anti-Soviet and anti-Army nature that contradict union legislation.

Having met with Colonel Konstantin Grigoryevich Golubev, chief of the military commissariat's political department, Lieutenant-Colonel Gavrilov asked Colonel Golubev to discuss recent events and provide an assessment of the situation that has developed.

[Golubev] I must admit that the Republic Supreme Soviet session's decision made a distressing impression on us, the voyenkomat officers, and also among a large portion of the population. Although if we proceed based on the policy to which the leaders of Sajudis adhere, the adopted legislative acts are only the connecting link in a long chain of adventurist activities of these so-called defenders of their people's rights. I will only touch upon the military problems. Recognizing prior to this that border defense and protection issues are within the jurisdiction of the central government, Landsbergis and his confederates, having just come to power, are hastily repealing the Law on Universal Military Obligation, are announcing that they will defend Lithuania's borders with their own forces, and that they are "abolishing" voyenkomats. These can hardly be called serious and carefully thought out steps. This is sooner evidence that Vayshvila, Yasukaytite, and other Sajudis activists who are responsible for military issues are, putting it mildly, poorly informed about them.

We conducted a general meeting of personnel immediately after local television reported the decision of the republic's new government to dissolve voyenkomats. We adopted the following resolution: "As a result of the first session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet of the 1st convocation, representatives of the Lithuanian SSR Military Commissariat express their concern and alarm for the fate of the residents of Lithuania and demand the immediate conduct of a referendum on the issue of the competence of the decisions made that contradict the Constitution of the USSR." We sent this resolution to the 3rd Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

On 14 March, we contacted V. Landsbergis' receptionist via telephone and asked her if Mr. Landsbergis would receive a delegation of servicemen. In accordance with the mission of the District's military soviet, we had to deliver an official protest to the chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Three of us went: Colonel V. Uskhopchik, Vilnius garrison commander; Colonel R. Yukhnovichus, garrison commandant; and I. We arrived at Gediminas Prospect at the appointed time and immediately entered the field of vision of journalists. They bombarded us with questions that we did not have time to answer. We had to wait a while in the Supreme Soviet secretariat and later we were invited in to see V. Landsbergis. From our first glance, it became apparent that the republic's new head was very upset. This was also noticeable by the way he accepted the folder with the text of the protest from Colonel Uskhopchik. Having rapidly glanced at the protest, it is true that Landsbergis became somewhat agitated: I do not know what he expected from our visit.

Afterward, he proposed that we talk a bit. He pointed out that military issues are complicated and that they cannot be resolved immediately. He said that much actually depends on the central government. But he immediately assured us that each of his government's steps was carefully thought out and all approved legislative acts are explained by just one circumstance—Lithuania has never been Soviet. He could not answer our question about what they plan to do with the tens of thousands of young men whom they plan to "withdraw" from the Armed Forces. But then he promised to appeal to the Lithuanians on TV and radio to maintain their loyalty to servicemen, not to damage the honor and dignity of members of their families, and not to infringe upon their interests. Actually, that very evening Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Deputies Moteka and Laurinkas delivered this appeal on the "Volna vozrozhdeniya" [Wave of Revival] television program.

Of course, it is hard to predict the results of the actions of the republic's new leadership. But cases are piling up that inspire definite reflection. Military unit commanders from various military districts are continually calling us at the voyenkomat and asking us to help search for Lithuanian soldiers who are absent without leave from their garrisons. More than 50 men deserted from the Army in just three days in our Baltic Military District. In Alitus, a local Sajudis leader, a certain Kolesnikovas, demanded that gorvovenkomat workers begin negotiations on disbanding the commissariat and transferring its building to the gorispolkom. Attempts to disrupt voyenkomat operations were also undertaken in a number of Lithuania's other cities and rayons. Conscript registration was immediately impeded. According to our assessments, from 50 to 70 percent of young men could not report to conscription sites in April, thus evading service in the Armed Forces. Incidentally, the Commission on Questions of Military Service for Young Men of Lithuania under the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium that was created in May 1989 took under its wing Lithuanian soldiers who had deserted from the Army. They intend to use these soldiers to create "border" subunits that also allegedly must defend the Republic's borders. They are already talking about how to deploy an entire network of "border control points" along the borders with neighboring republics. M. Misyukonis, the new Lithuanian Minister of Internal Affairs, stated this in particular.

Workers at our voyenkomats did not panic. They continue to accomplish their service obligations. But, understandably, many are experiencing alarm about their future fate. Therefore, we think that we need to meet more with people and explain the situation to them. For example, I drove to Kaunas, Kedaynyay, Ukmerge, and Ionava and I talked with military commissariat officers and warrant officers. Although there have not yet been any particular excesses by the local authorities or representatives of informal groups, their spirits are uneasy. Threatening phone calls have been occurring more frequently and leaflets with inciting texts appear from time

to time. Both Party and government organs adopted Landsbergis' position practically unconditionally and they are giving the impression that voyenkomats no longer exist. Thus we are not anticipating any help from them during registration and the draft. We need to rely on our own forces and work more aggressively among the population. Although some of the workers of Vilnius and certain other Lithuanian cities collectives have reacted negatively to the new government's actions. We need to look for allies among them.

In recent days, interest in the Army and toward military commissariats in particular among journalists has noticeably increased. We willingly seek contacts with representatives of the press, radio, and television.

Despite its protestations of peace loving and statements that "Lithuania does not need an Army," the republic's new leaders understand very well that they cannot get by without armed forces. As a matter of fact, Sajudis activists have been conducting work for a long time to form their own militarized detachments. An "army without weapons" was created with their blessing under the command of self-styled General Raudonis (internal service reserve captain). On May 14, 1989, "soldiers" of this army took "oaths" in Vilnius' Nagornyy Park with great pomp. A Union of Reserve Officers of Lithuania also exists in the republic which not without basis is considered to be the "reserve officer corps of the future national army." Young men are being drafted to enter into various paramilitary organizations with quite murky goals. Let us say that right now an appeal is circulating throughout all of Lithuania for "detachments to defend the kray." Whom are they planning to defend and from what? Right now emotions have not clouded the reasoning of a significant number of young Lithuanians and the republic's leaders must think about what kind of precipice they are pushing their own youth toward....

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Letters from Refugees Illustrate 'Critical' Problem

Military Spouse Denied Work

90UM06184 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 May 90 First Edition p 1

[Letter to the Editor from Svetlana Shinkareva, Yalta: "I Am Not Asking for Charity...."]

[Text] My husband is a serviceman, a battalion commander serving in Baku. We lived in that city for more than 20 years. I was forced to leave Baku on a military transport aircraft on January 22 with my mother and my 12 year-old son. Like hundreds of other people, we did not become refugees of our own free will.

The three of us managed to reach Yalta where my mother's parents live. I enrolled my son in school. I myself found work in my specialty—I design automated

control systems. Naturally life in Yalta seemed like paradise to us after months of horrible nervous tension. But, as we found out, our trials are not nearly over.

I went to a reception at the Gorispolkom in order to resolve the residence permit issue and Deputy Ispolkom Chairman A.A. Voloshin met me like I was a swindler. In his office I learned that we refugees present a social threat for the city, we are sowing unhealthy interethnic relations, etc. Say thank you, said Comrade Voloshin, that you were given [ration] coupons for sugar and soap, that we temporarily made you comfortable, but do not count on anything more!

And now I think, why did we deserve such humiliation and what are we guilty of? Maybe, we should not have left Baku? But during the last days (and we lived near Salyanskiy Barracks) we literally did not get up from the floor—unabating battles were occurring right outside the window. Fear for my child paralyzed my consciousness. Well, what did I say then, God forbid I once again endure something like that! So, just who today deigns to condemn me, a mother, because I do not wish to risk the life of my child any more? And such people really exist.

Now about housing. I well remember that Yalta is not a city where they greet apartmentless [homeless] resettlers with open arms. But the fact is that the three room apartment (42 square meters) in which two 80-year-old people live could also allow us to receive a residence permit. Yalta is not a strange city for me. I was born here. Both my parents and my husband also lived here. Thus, why do they need to suspect me of seeking the easy life? What kind of "easy life" is there when I have to reconstruct my own corner and once again seek my own place in life at 35 years of age. I am already not talking about the constant anxiety about the husband and father whom we left behind in Azerbaijan.

I would never have decided to write to the newspaper if I could rely on my own efforts to handle my troubles. But after the meeting with Deputy Ispolkom Chairman Voloshin, I gave up....

Maybe, some head of a Russian enterprise is interested in a computer equipment specialist. I worked with YeS-7920 display equipment, designed ASTsTP [not found] for gas fields, and I know system programming. I am not asking for something as a gift or charity. I am offering my knowledge and experience in exchange for humane living conditions.

Svetlana SHINKAREVA

You can get S. Shinkareva's address by calling telephone number 941-24-40.

Family Forced To Live in Jail

90UM0618B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 May 90 First Edition p 1

[Letter to the Editor from Privates Agiyaddin and Rovshan Gakhramanov, Baykonur Cosmodrome: "A Life Sentence?"]

[Text] Two brothers, Agiyaddin and Rovshan Gakhramanov appeal to you. We are Azerbaijanis. We are currently serving at the Baykonur Cosmodrome. And although our duties require a total effort, all of our thoughts are about home and about our parents.

By the way, we have not had a home since 1988. We lived in Armenian SSR in Azizbekovskiy Rayon in the village of Gemur until February of that year. But when our Republics began to clear up relations, we had to abandon our home, garden, and cattle and move the entire family to Agdamskiy Rayon of Azerbaijan. There, they temporarily settled us in a... jail in an empty cell. We then began to live—parents, 14-year-old brother, eight-year-old sister and us—in a small room with a barred window. Six people in a cement patch. Without residence permits and without work. Side by side with convicted people.

We both came to Ivanovo to earn something for the family. We received 200-250 rubles per month. We kept enough for food for ourselves and sent the rest to our parents.

We were drafted into the Army in November 1989 and our parents and younger brother and sister's situation worsened. No matter where they turned, they were greeted with indifference everywhere.

My father learned that Armenian refugees from Baku had settled in the home we abandoned. They told us the address of their two-room Baku apartment. Father went to Baku but they would not even begin to talk to him there. Although it would certainly be just to move into the apartment of people who are living in our home in Armenia. All the more so since they do not object. But today it seems like no one is concerned about our family's fate. And how can we feel since our parents are already living among thieves for the third year. What is the reason for this fate? They have not murdered anyone, they have not burned houses, and they have not robbed stores. They have worked honestly their entire lives. What are they guilty of?

We are honorably carrying out our military duty. And just how is our Homeland carrying out its duty to people who find themselves in difficulties that they did not cause?

Private A. GAKHRAMANOV Private R. GAKHRAMANOV

Veteran Fears Eviction from Home

90UM0618C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 May 90 First Edition p 1

[Letter to the Editor from R. Agadzhyanov, Krasnodar Kray: "How Do I Get a Residence Permit for My Own Home?"]

[Text] I am a Great Patriotic War veteran, twice wounded and awarded 10 orders and medals, and I

currently have bitter thoughts. I think: Maybe my Homeland does not need me, I am a foreigner to it, and maybe I need to move to other countries in my old age?

Yes, I am a refugee. With my wife and daughter and we also managed to take what we could carry in our hands. Our belongings and furniture, we left everything there.

We bought a ruin of a house with our hard-earned savings in Krasnodar Kray in Apsheronsk. And we rejoiced—we did not have to roll up in some strange corner. But we rejoiced too early. It soon became clear that they could not issue us residence permits in these parts. They frankly told us at the militia: It is not authorized. Well, we are living from hand to mouth anticipating when representatives of the authorities will arrive and throw us "illegals" out onto the street.

Where is the promised assistance, where is justice? Just when will our powerful and great State notice me, its own old soldier? Or should I not wait for it?

R. AGADZHANOV

Widow Pleads for Shelter

90UM0618D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 May 90 First Edition p 1

[Letter to the Editor from G. Shakhgeldyan: "If I Had a Roof Over My Head"]

[Text] I am 62 years old. I worked at the Novo-Bakinskiy Oil Refining Plant imeni V.I. Lenin for 35 years. I have AzSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Certificates. My husband and I gave our best years to the Republic—my husband worked at Bakinskiy GRES [State Regional Electrical Power Plant] imeni Krasina for 48 years.

On January 13, on the day of the tragic events in Baku, my husband, Gurgen Sarukhanovich, was brutally murdered before my eyes. I myself was taken to the naval hospital with five knife wounds. From there, they sent me to the Institute imeni Silifosovskiy in Moscow. My daughter and grandson had previously been evacuated to a Moscow suburb. Like myself, my daughter is a chemist. She has ten years of work service. Why am I writing about this? Well, because our stay at Gorki Rest Home is coming to an end and we do not know where to head to next.

I lost everything I had in life at 62 years of age. But even in this situation, I have never had thoughts about seeking good fortune from strangers. I have been and I remain a communist. But we cannot experience this uncertainty forever. We need a roof over our heads and work. Can no one really help us?

G. SHAKHGELDYAN

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Editorial Comment

90UM0618E Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 May 90 First Edition p 1

[Editorial Comment: "From the Editor"]

[Text] While publishing these letters (there are numerous such letters in the mail), we are pursuing one goal: to simply reveal that the refugee problem was, is, and judging by everything, will remain one of the most acute, painful, and shameful problems of our society for the near future.

Monetary grants and a temporary roof over one's head at rest and retirement homes.... All of this was a real help during the first days of homeless life. But the fifth month has already passed since the time when the first stream of refugees poured out of Azerbaijan and to this day thousands of people are fighting for survival alone while attempting to somehow get the State to pay attention to the fates of its own citizens. And if we consider everyone who had to abandon their homes due to interethnic enmity, we are talking about the fates of hundreds of thousands.

Furthermore, refugee status has not even been worked out thus far. That is, this category of citizen does not legally exist in our country. Although, as we see, there are such people. And to our shame, their position remains serious. The country's Supreme Soviet needs to find the time to discuss this acute and complicated problem.

Studies Indicate Deficiencies in Veterans' Services, Benefits

90UM0614A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by S. Lvov, under the rubric "From Competent Sources": "How To Repay Our Debt To Veterans"]

[Text] The USSR People's Control Committee jointly with the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Veterans' and Disabled Veterans' affairs checked up on the implementation of USSR Congress of People's Deputies Resolution 1, associated with improving services for veterans and disabled veterans of the Great Patriotic War, as well as for individuals entitled to the same benefits as veterans.

Here are only a few facts and figures from the investigation conducted by the People's Control Committee (KNK) and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee.

There are 6.15 million veterans and 1.1 million disabled war veterans and 720 thousand families of fallen servicemen in the USSR today. Out of these almost 8 million USSR veterans, 575 thousand are on the books as being in need of housing. And the chances of moving into a new apartment or house, as paradoxical as it sounds in a time of revived charity, are decreasing in many regions of the country. Thus, in two years, disabled war veterans in Dnepropetrovsk were given only 1.5 percent of newly built housing, and in Kiev Oblast—only

2.1 percent. In 1989, veterans in Tatariya were allocated one and a half times fewer apartments than in 1988, and veterans in Krasnoyarsk Krai received half as many quotas for housing.

The matter is even worse among soldier-internationalists, one hundred thousand of whom are on interminable waiting lists for housing. For example, when will the list come to an end for "Afghans" in Vakhitovskiy Rayon, Kazan, if no one out of the 48 people on the waiting list for the last six years has ever received an apartment? The "Afghans" in Novomoskovsk have celebrated only one housewarming in three years... As a result, the number of citizens that is entitled to, but has not been provided with housing, has declined very little. And in Kursk and Crimean oblasts, for example, the number is increasing. It is noted in the investigation and calculations show that "at the existing rate of housing allocations...disabled war veterans will not be provided with housing until five or six years from now, and war veterans—10-11 years from now".

The allocation of plots of land for the construction of private homes and the establishment of housing construction cooperatives would reduce the severity of the problem somewhat. But even here there is no special understanding on the part of the authorities. How else can one explain that in Simferopol, out of 59 applications to join housing construction cooperatives not a single one was secured, and last year in Kokchetav Oblast, only 20 out of 140 of these "petitions" were approved. It turns out that even for a considerable amount of money disabled war veterans and veterans are not able to take advantage of the free benefits which they are authorized.

Installation of telephones in apartments. In 1987, out of 1.7 million new telephone numbers put in service, veterans received 360 thousand and in 1988, 330 thousand out of 1.9 million numbers... Just as before, the majority of veterans living in villages do almost without telephones.

Commercial services. The inequality in supplying foodstuffs and goods in various regions of the country and also between villagers and city dwellers is a very sore subject. Some receive 5 kilograms of meat a month and others receive nothing at all. Depending on geography alone, the assortment of products for the "beneficiaries" varies from one to twenty items and the periodicity of purchases varies from twice a month to two-three times a year. During the investigation, many veterans asked that they be provided with candy, even if it is cheap, tea, and cereals (they cannot even dream of delicacies).

Health care. In this area the gaps are so great that now and then an extreme degree of cynicism is reached. According to USSR Ministry of Health data, 92 percent of the war veterans are "covered" by comprehensive medical examinations. But in reality, not more than half of the veterans have undergone these examinations. Given the universal shortage of medicines, every third

patient is discharged from the hospital with an inconclusive course of medical treatment. Only 15-20 percent of the disabled war veterans and veterans receive vouchers for rest homes and sanatoriums...

One could continue this list of misfortunes, for each of which there are offenses to people. But what should be done in order to improve the lives of veterans within the next few years? A whole set of measures, proposed to the national government by the republic, krai, and oblast Soviets of People's Deputies and by the ministries and departments concerned, has been elaborated through the combined efforts of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Disabled Veterans' and Veterans' Affairs and the USSR KNK. It would require several typewritten pages just to list them. We will mention the following.

It is time to extend the benefits that are prescribed for disabled war veterans to all veterans of the Great Patriotic War. These people are well past sixty years-old and many of them are ill. In the first instance we should take care of Great Patriotic War veterans considered disabled because of general illness. With respect to them, we should establish everywhere abbreviated time limits for the provision of housing, and so that these limits are met, we should allocate 10-15 percent of all the new dwelling space. And this should be done regardless of the sources of financing and method of construction.

It has been proposed that the Ministry of Trade and the USSR Central Union of Consumers' Societies draw up nationwide recommendations on commercial services for disabled war veterans and veterans; and that the republics' governments and the USSR Gosplan come up with measures in the economic interests of enterprises that ensure the production of goods at low social costs.

A system of common territorial centers for medical and social services and social assistance offices for disabled persons and elderly citizens should be established before the end of next year. As regards the construction and reconstruction of hospitals and special wings attached to hospitals, in the opinion of the two committees, special purpose appropriations will be needed for this. Funds are also needed to purchase abroad prostheses, wheelchairs, and medicines...

The problem is, where will we get the money and everything else required in the circumstances of a budget deficit and economic difficulties. We will not find it—ordinary measures "for improvement" will simply remain good intentions.

Officers Discuss CC Platform, Reforms Prior to Party Congress

90UM0689A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 90
(signed to press 31 May 90) pp 23-32

[Roundtable discussion written up by Colonel V. Varanets and Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Tretyakov: "A Time of Choice"]

[Text] The draft of the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress, after its further work and approval, will become, in essence, a provisional party program. Hence, the nationwide interest in this document and a desire by a majority of the communists to more fully understand its content as well as to clarify and supplement many provisions. The participants in the roundtable discussion held at the editorial offices of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL also voiced their views on the Central Committee Platform. Participating in the discussion were: Major General Georgiy Vladimirovich Zhivitsa, sector chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; Colonel Viktor Gavrilovich Chikin, deputy chief of the Department of Party Organizational Work under the Political Directorate of the Moscow Air Defense District; Colonel Vladimir Sergeyevich Melnikov, instructor at the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin; Colonel Genadiy Ivanovich Demin, senior instructor at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Ananyevich Papakin, unit commander; Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Sergeyevich Shulga, secretary of unit party committee; Major Vladimir Nikolayevich Kuznetsov, formation propagandist; Lieutenant Colonel (Res) Sergey Prokofyevich Zinchenko, chairman of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU. The session was led by the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the journal, Colonel Viktor Nikolayevich Baranets.

[Leader] You, of course, have noticed that the questions concerning the Army and Navy directly have largely been posed in a new fashion, both in the Platform and in the CPSU Bylaws. But before discussing these, let us endeavor to provide a general assessment of these documents. In our reader mail concerning the draft Platform, for example, diametrically opposite opinions are encountered with some feeling that it is a major step forward, a breakthrough, if you wish, while others find it merely a repetition of the past....

[V. Melnikov] It is impossible not to see that the draft differs fundamentally from all the previous party program documents in its sincerity, in the abandoning of many dogmas, in the fact that it is devoid, if it can be so put, of the former sloganing, and precisely describes that society which the party is urging the people to create. This, certainly, does not mean that it is devoid of shortcomings. For example, I do not completely understand the title of the draft Platform: "For a Humane, Democratic Socialism." Can socialism be inhumane? Or undemocratic? Then this simply is not socialism.

[V. Chikin] A predominant majority of the district communists, and I will be so bold as to assert this as I am often in the troops and have repeatedly participated in discussions of the draft, considers it precisely the document which is capable of consolidating all the healthy party forces. It confirms the adherence to the socialist choice, it rejects all attempts to obviate all that is valuable in the more than 70-year history of Soviet

society, and unambiguously states that the party is to remain in the positions of the working class and all workers.

As for the name, actually, at times the communists have voiced perplexity. But let us look at things realistically. How many socialist teachings does history know? A lot of them. Even within the international communist movement, there is no unanimous opinion on the views of socialism. We also called the Stalinist regime socialism. And since in our current notion of this social system, common human values have been shifted to the forefront, the authors of the draft quite validly emphasized by the name to which socialism we are moving, namely to a democratic and humane one.

At the same time, both myself and many other communists are disconcerted by the haziness of certain phrases. For example: the CPSU favors a diversity of ownership forms. And that is it. Hence, it also favors private property? If a comma were inserted and then some explanation given.... This question is a fundamental one. Let us recall Lenin and his view of private property both from the economic and the political viewpoint in his "The Infantile Illness of 'Leftism' in Communism," "On Cooperatives," and in his speech at the 8th Congress of Soviets.... He saw the danger of the restoration of capitalism precisely here, in private property.

One other comment. The draft states that we decisively reject dogmatism, ideological blinders and intolerance of other views and ideas. And again the period. So this means frankly bourgeois ones as well? If we deny the ideas, for example, of the Democratic Union, does this mean that we are in violation of this provision?

Or the following matter: the profoundest democratization is needed in the party and the power of the party masses should be the basis for this. The provision is a very attractive one. It is difficult to argue against it. But then I open the draft Bylaws and see that they are proposing to eliminate the candidate period of membership, cancelling recommendations and strengthening the right for the free withdrawal from the CPSU. Can these measures really raise the authority of the party and reinforce its militancy? I could understand this if these things had been proposed 10 years ago. Then the nation had no real forces which would struggle against the party. But now.... Even in the ranks of the CPSU there is no unity. I have in mind the same Democratic Platform and the other currents which have not yet finally been formed but are striving for this. Under such conditions should we knowingly weaken ourselves in organizational terms? What sort of power of the masses could there be? These masses are certainly far from homogeneous. The accents must be placed more clearly.

[From the Floor] This was done in the recent Open Letter of the Central Committee to the Communists.

[S. Zinchenko] Does a communist really not have the right to his own viewpoint which can differ from the official one?

[V. Chikin] My point is something else. Namely that under the current conditions the party should be stronger, more united, more militant. But those steps which I have mentioned in no way will contribute to this. Just like the line which is being carried out by the Democratic Platform. It, in essence, is the opposite to the Central Committee line.

[S. Zinchenko] Initially, our platform was not an alternative one. We were seeking out ways of consolidation, the possibility of a compromise, but, unfortunately, the further we went the more our line, you are correct, differed from the Central Committee's line.

[From the Floor] Do you consider this a constructive factor?

[S. Zinchenko] I will answer the question with a question. Do you not have the impression that the draft Platform has been written by two hands, right and left? On the one hand, there is the same ideological exclusiveness and adherence to the old dogmas and myths, and on the other, the attempt to draw closer to our actual reality, to look at the world with open eyes and see just in what society we are living. This attempt has been made, it seems to me, not without some impact from our Democratic Platform.

[V. Kuznetsov] (Ironically) That is obvious. In the draft you virtually cannot see the communist idea. The ideals have been eroded.

[S. Zinchenko] I do not completely understand your irony. You will forgive me, but we do not come from another planet. We not only have not disassociated ourselves, as some party functionaries would like to present things, from the CPSU, but have repeatedly emphasized that we are the representatives of the party. Since 1986, there has been a rapid increase in the informal social organizations. The socially most active part of the communists naturally could not remain on the sidelines. Many of them have begun to participate in various discussion clubs and on the eve of the 19th Party Conference joined together in the so-called interclub party group. Incidentally, one of the first of its secretaries—and they have been reelected monthly in the organization—was the current USSR People's Deputy and the Moscow Soviet Deputy, S. Stankevich. From the Memorial Movement there has been one of its organizers, the current RSFSR People's Deputy V. Lysenko....

Before the previous elections we saw that the party's real influence on the voters was dropping. Our representatives turned to the Central Committee with an appeal to convene an extraordinary party congress. Life has shown that at that time we more realistically assessed the situation than did the Central Committee membership.

[V. Kuznetsov] It is easy to put forward an idea, it is more difficult to realize it. It is simply impossible to prepare for a congress in several weeks. It is impossible

to settle hurriedly the problems of such scale which we would have to examine there.

[S. Zinchenko] But we have all the same reached the extraordinary congress and it undoubtedly is an extraordinary one but delayed. The party leadership also initiated further steps with a delay and this led to a further rise of tension in the nation. The current Central Committee membership, in my view, is an impediment as it does not adequately reflect the situation in society and in the party and is incapable of working out realistic measures to stabilize the situation.

[V. Kuznetsov] The entire membership? Completely? This is not the first time that I have pointed out that the representatives of the Democratic Platform are inclined to such generalizations if there are conservatives then these are everyone who is "on top," and if there is blame then it is for the entire party.

[S. Zinchenko] We, incidentally, do not deny that the party is the core of our system and that at present it is the only consolidating force. But, I would repeat, its feedback has been greatly delayed. It is this which has caused us to seek out certain organizational forms. All the documents worked out by us have been submitted to the leading party bodies, starting from the Stavropolskiy Raykom in Moscow, where we work, and ending with the Central Committee. But the response to them has been delayed. For this reason, we again called for the early holding of the congress and began to work out our own platform....

We are criticized for the fact that it does not contain anything about the economy. This program of ours is being worked out. But we feel that the main thing to be raised at the congress is the question of what sort of party we need. The reformation of the party is the key question.

[V. Chikin] No one would dispute that. It is merely that you and I have different views of this process. And fundamentally different.

[S. Zinchenko] You, of course, have in mind our thesis concerning the transition to a parliamentary-type party. Yes, we do feel that under current conditions the type of party which Lenin built and which reflected the needs of the beginning of the century, the party which had to work under Tsarism, under illegal conditions, and which actually needed an iron military structure, complete centralism and controllability is now out of date. But what about now? Should we preserve the "order of sword bearers"? In our view, no. In understanding Leninism creatively, we feel that Lenin would have been on our side. He responded flexibly to any change in the historical conditions and accepted what life suggested without any ideological blinders. The elections have already shown that we need precisely a parliamentary type of party which is capable of struggling for the votes of the electors, of winning a mandate of trust from the entire people and then carry out its scientific program.

[S. Shulga] That has an innovative ring. But no more. Let us assume that we transform the CPSU into a parliamentary party operating under the conditions of a multiparty system. How will it operate? What will this change? Or do you think that all of our internal problems can be resolved by waving some magic wand? You in the Democratic Platform, it appears, do not have the answers to these questions.

[V. Chikin] Allow me one other comment. Recently many have endeavored to put Lenin among their supporters too flippantly. This is no name to defile. Could Lenin really have held the same positions, for example, as Yu. Afanasyev? No! Categorically not! Or with G. Popov? He has repeatedly accused Lenin of virtually being the founder of the administrative-command system.... Let us be more cautious with our fabrications. It makes no sense to hide behind authoritative names.

In your Democratic Platform, much is said about the freedom of factions. Is this also a Leninist thesis? You feel, and I quote, that factions "can be the basis for the rise of several political parties which offer different models of socialism." This, as you know, cannot be permitted by any political party in the world if it is seriously preparing to fight for votes. Or let us take the notion that the party representatives in parliament should be free of the party program and subordinate only to the congress. But what about party discipline? How do you balance your recognition of the need to broaden democracy, the free exchange of opinions and collectivism in working out decisions and at the same time the desire for factional narrowness? It seems you have ended up under the sway of populist illusions.

[G. Demin] Nevertheless, it is not worth, in my view, totally rejecting those ideas set out in the Democratic Platform. Sergey Prokofyevich represents just one of the lines in the party and which can propose its own approach. It has some strong points. I am impressed, for example, by their very realistic assessment of the state of society and the party. Generally, we must work for greater democracy within the party. This, in my view, is one of the ways of maintaining its force and influence. Let there be different platforms, let there be an equal competition of these platforms, and let the communists have an opportunity to choose within their party. Is this contradicted by the decisions of the 10th Congress about unity? Yes, it does. But there was a different situation and this must be recognized. It is time for all of us to learn to be more tolerant and not behave according to the principle of the person who is not with us is against us but rather is with us—this is how the leadership has demanded.

[V. Kuznetsov] But certainly recently, some of the supporters of the Democratic Platform have raised the question of separating from the CPSU. What about that, Sergey Prokofyevich?

[S. Zinchenko] The further course of events will show....

[G. Demin] This would lead to severe consequences. I feel that a split can be avoided. There is every opportunity for this. Certainly you will agree that there is much in common between the two platforms. And certain shortcomings, incidentally, are also similar. I have in mind that both documents lack constructiveness. Viktor Gavrilovich [Chikin] has already spoken about this. The Central Committee draft, for example, has rather clearly set out the goals and tasks of the CPSU. But by what means and forms does the party intend to seek their fulfillment? That is not clear.

Let us take the economic questions. The party, we read, favors the creation of an efficient planned-market economy. How are we going to coordinate a free market and state control, where are the funds to come from for the ecological problem, the program for aid to the countryside and so forth? There is also no clear answer. The question arises of the economic independence of the republics as the basis of their sovereignty, and immediately the phrase: "A modern economy cannot get by without a center." Where is the precise position of the CPSU on the question of the relationships of the republics and the center? Finally, about the renewal of the party. Much has been said about this. But what are the specific ways for establishing the power of the party masses? What role here should be played by the apparatus of the party bodies? Or the primary ones?

In a word, certain sections of the draft Platform are more reminiscent in their style, tone and content to an appeal to the communists. But certainly a program should answer the questions of the people and not evoke them.

[A. Papakin] I cannot help but say a word about the Section on Defense. In the Central Committee Platform, military questions are described in literally two words. Certainly, the army problems at present are very acute. An unhealthy atmosphere is being built up around the Armed Forces and the level of the military-patriotic education of the draftees has declined sharply. An ever-larger portion of the youth going into the army does not have clearly expressed patriotic feelings.... The military reform is knocking at the door, but they merely chatter on about this.

[G. Demin] It is scarcely valid to demand that a small section bring out all the aspects. We, the military communists, are the ones who should work out all the details and propose....

[G. Zhivitsa] I want to say that the introduction of the presidency which was first mentioned in the draft of the Central Committee Platform and which has now become an accomplished fact directly influences the pace, scale and depth of the military reform. Certainly many questions can now be turned over to the President as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Armed Forces. The group of military USSR people's deputies has proposed its own version of military reform. The Ministry of Defense and our General Staff are working out their own concept....

The idea of a military reform did not arise spontaneously but rather out of the logic of the restructuring of society. The General Staff supports this. In truth, we understand it somewhat differently than do the people's deputies. But even here we have heard that the military reform should be worked out by the military. No.

[S. Zinchenko] Poincare said that war is too serious a matter to be entrusted to the military.

[G. Zhivitsa] I would dispute that. The Great Patriotic War has shown what happens when incompetent persons intervene into military questions....

Let us first come to agreement on our terms. Many people confuse too different things: a military reform and a reform of the Armed Forces. The reform of the Armed Forces is an undertaking for the military, no one will do this for us, and I will now describe what prospects await us to the year 2000. But a military reform as a socioeconomic or sociopolitical phenomenon is a legally formulated change in a state's military system.

For what must the Army and Navy be prepared, in what sociopolitical situation will we operate, will there be a war or not, and if it is possible then what sort? Only on this basis which is worked out by the superior political leadership of the nation is it possible to commence a reform and alter the structure of the armed forces. At present, many propose that we should have a professional army, a cutback in the size of the forces and central managerial personnel.... But this is still not a military reform but only elements in it. We feel that a military reform should assume the appearance of a state plan or a juridical law.

Precisely the President and the Defense Council work out the basic directions of military organizational development. At present, the range of persons has been defined who will constitute this Council. Many of the former membership of the Defense Council are not included in it. For example, the commanders-in-chief of the Armed Services. The Defense Council, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet—these are the elements which define the state's military policy.

[G. Demin] Currently, the notion of "security" is an all-encompassing concept. This means security that is economic, technical, scientific, social, political, military, and if you wish, spiritual-ideological and ecological. Secure defense for the nation can be ensured only with such a complete range, without exaggerating the importance of the military component. For this reason, in my view, under the President there should be a National Security Council and not merely the Defense Council. Only then will we correctly understand the place of military strength in ensuring the state's high defense capability.

[G. Zhivitsa] In the context of the presidency, the question also arises: Should the minister of defense be a military man or a civilian? The tradition is that the

military department in our country, with the exception of Trotsky, has always been headed by a military person. If the minister is a civilian, then he will assume only military-political and military-economic questions. Troop training, naturally, will not be his concern. Incidentally, there are also other approaches. These must still be worked through.

I myself, honestly speaking, am amazed by the ease at which people who have very tentative notions about the army judge the reform of the Armed Forces. Just take the disputes over the methods of manning the Armed Forces. A professional army is a very expensive pleasure. Since the times of the Roman Empire, states have resorted to professional armies when an economic boom occurred in them. Now only the United States can allow itself to keep a professional army exclusively. In England, only 62 percent of the servicemen serves under contract. In West Germany, it is 60 percent.

[From the Floor] And what can we allow ourselves?

[G. Zhivitsa] Here are our estimates. Even if the size of the army is cut in half and it is converted to a professional basis, we will have to increase expenditures by 3- and more-fold. And this is just for the transitional period. Expenditures will inevitably arise for the support of such an army.

You may wonder why? For example, an American military pilot spends 240 hours a year in the air while ours spends 80-90. A tank gunner will fire 95 rounds. Ours will do three....

Here is the content of these expenditures: for training, for social and domestic needs.... An apartment. Wages. Creches and nurseries. A job for the wife. All this must be provided.

Over the next decade, we intend to create experimental regiments and convert a portion of the troops which in technical terms are the most complex and armed to a professional basis, for instance, in the Rocket Troops, the Navy and Air Force. Only individual units will do so in the Ground Forces. But this is planned for a decade. While we are establishing the experimental base, let us estimate what the conversion of the entire army would cost. In the near future, we propose increasing the professional grouping from certain categories of junior commanders. The sergeants and petty officers will serve longer.... But correspondingly much more must be paid, from 200 rubles and more.

[G. Demin] Let us pose the question more widely. We are speaking about the deformations of a socialist society. But has military organizational development been deformed or not? In my view, the draft Platform without fail should have taken this up. Or can we theoretically assume the building of socialism in the Armed Forces as in a separate country?

Even now we have still not figured out just how Marx or Lenin conceived of the model of a socialist army. I feel

that we must still work out such a model. But here the questions arise: What should be the procedures in the socialist armed forces? What are the rights and duties of the serviceman? What is the relationship of democratic principles, the rights and liberties of the servicemen and one-man command? Certainly when we speak about the development of democratic principles in the army, then we suddenly remember with trepidation: Wait a minute, what about one-man command? However, it has long been time to pose the question differently: strengthening the democratic bases of socialist one-man command. Precisely thus, the democratic bases of socialist one-man command.

I will permit myself a small digression. For some 6 years now, I have been asking my students one question: Tell me, can your superior insult you? And they have found a pat formula: During the day and not just once. Then the next question: Should a subordinate recover his self-esteem? Of course. And he does. At whose expense? Resentment builds. And where does it go? Against the first-year man. He, to put it figuratively, is turned into the whipping post.... For this reason, the soldiers begin to create their own informal structure for restoring their rights and personal dignity.

My point is as follows. Equipment and weapons are, of course, important. But we must not forget the sociopolitical aspect of the reform. And everyone should be involved in this. For now an attempt has been noticed for the leading center of the Armed Forces to assume complete responsibility for the reform. Let us work it out and give it to you. But we also have powerful centers, just take any academy. The troops also are carrying out very beneficial work.... That is, there must be a democratic mechanism for working out this reform and considering the opinions of the lower ranks.

One other thing. For a long time it has been asserted that the armed forces in a socialist society do not have an internal function. However, recent events—and not only recent ones—indicate that this is not the case. Then it must be said directly whether they have an internal function or not? If they do, then let us agree on this. In what cases, with what means and by what methods?... But we still don't do this. A law on the use of the interior troops has been adopted but there is not a word about the use of the army. Although we are perfectly aware that in Nagorny Karabakh as well as in other places, there were Soviet Army units side by side with the Interior Troop units. But certainly the army has one sacred obligation of defending the fatherland.

[V. Chikin] The troops are familiar with the basic parameters of the reform. There is one desire to carry it out quicker. For example, on the district level, we argue loudly for quality parameters. On the formation level, the discussion becomes somewhat quieter. It is even more hushed. In a subunit it is difficult to even talk with the men on this question. I realize that the army is being cut back. But the troops must be maintained. A soldier goes on detail 14 or 15 times a month. In addition, in the

interval he must be given time for resting. When will he be then trained as a specialist? What question can there be of the intensifying of combat training?

Let me repeat, the lower one goes, the more difficult it becomes to bear. In certain units, our officers also go on detail 10 times a month. Who will look after the personnel? Or take the technical equipping? At a party meeting in one of the units, I heard: Just what do you want from our equipment? The lieutenant working on the equipment is younger than it is. As they say, no comment is needed. And then: we are not always able to get the equipment we would like. We take what they provide. Clearly there should be some competitive basis or feedback. These questions must be settled on the highest level. This is why I feel that the draft Platform should at least briefly set out the tasks of military organizational development and the military reform in particular.

[A. Papakin] Just like the questions of the social protection of the servicemen and their families and the housing problem. There have been certain changes in the area of the Ministry of Defense, but it alone is unable to decisively alter the situation. It would be a good thing if concern for the army were a matter for everyone, from the President down to the local soviets. As of now, the city and rayon authorities wave us away: the problems of the military compound are your problems.... And we all affirm that our army is of the people, flesh and blood, as they say.

[V. Melnikov] As a state body, the army needs state regulation. At the March Central Committee Plenum it was stated that the personnel of the Armed Forces has responded enthusiastically to the social program for the development of the Army and Navy. I do not know if there was such a program and clearly this was the desire that it be worked out. The military reform must be commenced with this.

[S. Shulga] In our regiment we have not heard not only about such a program but also about the concept for reforming the Armed Forces. When, in discussing the draft of the Platform, we reach the section on defense, then we enter a blind alley. Incidentally, this also raises the question of glasnost. Any reform, any details of it should be first worked out in the lower ranks and begin by a study of the situation there, the needs of the company or platoon commander and the soldier. Do we have reform for the people or people for the reform? We all talk here about the higher echelons but ultimately everything relies on that officer or soldier who sits at the wheel of an infantry fighting vehicle or works at a missile launcher.

[V. Chikin] The one thing I do not want is for the reform of the Armed Forces to begin with the reform of the political bodies. At present, in the wave of political contention, it has become very fashionable to propose eliminating these. This is what the representatives of the Democratic Platform want.... Once Article 6 of the

Constitution has been abrogated, then let us eliminate the party organizations in the Army and Navy, in the ministries and institutions.... Of course, things have not gone this far, but to change the functions of the political bodies means to take a step in this very direction.

[S. Zinchenko] That is already a misrepresentation. If you were acquainted with our platform, you would see it is a matter not of eliminating the party organizations but rather the political bodies. We submit that after the congress we have had two parties. Whose interests will be carried out by the political bodies?

[G. Zhivitsa] For now, our army has no representatives of other parties.

[S. Zinchenko] Precisely so, for now.... Realize that we are not saying that a vacuum should be left in the place of the political bodies. There must be a sociological service, there must be personnel for the social protection of the servicemen, educational and cultural services....

[Leader] We have cultural and educational workers and lawyers. What do you mean by services?

[S. Zinchenko] Nonparty, extraparty structures. In the draft Regulations worked out by us, we have therefore written: "The party members serving in the Armed Forces, the Interior Troops of the USSR MVD, the Border Troops, the bodies of the KGB and MVD working in the law enforcement bodies, that is, in the procuracy, the courts, the state bodies and institutions, in their work are to be guided solely by the USSR Constitution, the Union republic constitutions, the laws of the USSR and the Union republics, the enforceable enactments regulating the activities of the troops, the state bodies and institutions."

[V. Chikin] Hence, they cannot be party members?

[S. Zinchenko] Why? But in their work they are guided not by the instructions of the Central Committee, but rather by those state documents which regulate troop service, the activities of the courts, procuracy and so forth. The question arises: Where will the communists be registered? We feel that in the territorial party organizations and only in the absence of such can primary party organizations be established at the place of service. Then everything falls into place. Please, assemble for the meetings and discuss the questions of your party's policy. And I emphasize your own, for in the unit there could be two or three such party organizations. In a city, let us assume, the servicemen will be registered with the territorial party organization. In a remote garrison, for example, at a border post, who would forbid the communists from discussing the program of the communist party, the social democrats their own, or voting and conducting agitation among fellow servicemen for the program of their party? But as for service matters, definitely not. The army is a body of the state.

[S. Shulga] And each military collective, as a single organism, will move in its own direction? Some will call

for higher combat readiness while others, as pacifists, may deny the need for this. This is inadmissible in a military organization. That is one thing. Secondly, let us be realists: under the current conditions to abandon party influence on combat training, discipline, on the process of educating the personnel would mean to seriously weaken the combat readiness of the units and subunits. Again, forgive me, you are taking leave of this world. Please clarify just what principle for the organizing of the party you would propose?

[S. Zinchenko] Anyone. Let the communists decide. Not the territorial and the production, as is stated in the draft Regulations, but rather the territorial, production, specific, functional or any other. If there are communists in a billeting unit and they want to organize a party cell, then let them. In a fisherman and hunter society, let them.... I am frequently asked: What will the party turn into then? And I reply: Into a political organization which works in all strata of the population. Where there is a voter there also is a party cell which works with this category of voters, carrying out its ideological and political line.

[Question] You mean you are not against having party organizations exist in the Armed Forces?

[S. Zinchenko] No. Incidentally, the shifting of the party activities outside the troop unit, in my view, will merely help to strengthen one-man command. An army in which democracy reigns is not an army. How can a democratic state show some democracy in the army? I feel that this is in the social protection of the servicemen. So that the officer is provided with everything necessary and feels himself to be a citizen with full rights. So that he does not lose anything upon his discharge: he can find a job, receive a good pension or when necessary undergo retraining courses. He should be completely assured that if his commander has insulted him or in some manner violated his rights, then he will be punished. In a word, a special mechanism is needed.

[From the Floor] This mechanism should be worked out in the course of the military reform.

[S. Zinchenko] Quite right. And it seems to me that in reorganizing the political bodies, they should be entrusted with precisely one main function of the social protection of the servicemen.

[V. Melnikov] Let us not forget that the army cannot remain outside of politics. If one were to speak about the basic function of the political bodies, then this should be to explain state policy and the propagandizing of this to the personnel. This is why the constant attempts to remove precisely this portion—political—from the name of the political bodies, seems to me, to put it mildly, shortsighted.

At present, the most diverse proposals are being made on the reform of the political bodies. There is not complete unanimity either on the Chair of Political Work at the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin. Allow me

to briefly set out an approach which a majority of our scientists prefers. This is the scheme. On the level of the Armed Forces, there would be the Main Directorate of Political, Educational and Personnel Work headed by a USSR deputy minister of defense. In the services and districts there would be the appropriate directorates. In the formations there would be departments of political, educational and personnel work and the chiefs of these would be deputy commanders and deputy chiefs.

On this level, the changes, as we see, would be small. But in the units, clearly, more decisive changes are required. First of all, in virtually each of these it has long been time to have a representative of the legal service independent not only of the commander or the superior chief but also generally not subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. Without fail, there must be a deputy commander for political, educational and personnel affairs. Under him, there should also be an information officer, a psychologist-sociologist, instructors for working with the youth and for working with the personnel as well as a chief of the recreational service.

What is the purpose of these changes? To transform the existing system of political bodies as the leading party bodies in the Army and Navy into bodies for carrying out state policy. On the one hand, this provides an opportunity to take into account the particular features of the transitional period to a multiparty system in the nation and, on the other, to maintain party influence on the troop collectives, since CPSU members are and, I am confident, will be the absolute majority in the Armed Forces.

[Leader] Georgiy Vladimirovich [Zhivitsa], what place is to be assigned to the political bodies in that general plan which has been worked out by the General Staff?

[G. Zhivitsa] Different variations are being worked out. For example, initially it was assumed that the structure of the GlavPUR [Main Political Directorate] as before would alter its functions. It was also proposed to convert the GlavPUR into the Main Directorate of Cultural Educational Work and Legal Education. The idea was examined of adopting a so-called trunk system with a trunk of party work, an educational trunk, youth or cultural trunk. Other proposals also were put forward. I feel that a final approach will become apparent after the party congress.

[G. Demin] Let us not go to extremes. The political body has always been subordinate to the commander. It is a different question is the chief of a political department in wartime had a number of control functions.... In any army, armed force has never been uncontrolled. And it will not be in our army, even with a multiparty system. Let me repeat: any state apparatus exercises clear control over its armed forces. Through what mechanisms it does this—this is a different question.

[G. Zhivitsa] Through the commander!

[G. Demin] Possibly, through the commander....

[G. Zhivitsa] Through the commander without fail.

[G. Demin] But there is a party organization next to the commander. And now the officer assembly is emerging also next to him. And after some time we cannot exclude that there will also be a council of rank-and-file.

[V. Kuznetsov] And a warrant officers council.

[G. Demin] Practically in any army such a democratic procedure arises for supplementing the commander's power. For example, in the West German Army there is a council of rank-and-file.... Or the following example. The commander takes a decision to arrest a subordinate. In our army the request is filled out and he goes to the brig. But they have something like a court of rank-and-file and officers, elected and appointed. The commander submits a report that he intends to arrest a subordinate. Both are present before the court.... And it decides. In essence, it acts as a body of the state. This is the issue. This applies to the question of the democratic bases of one-man command.

[V. Chikin] Have we not gone too far? From the very outset I have said that it would be a bad thing if the military reform starts with a reform of the political bodies. Why? Because this precisely emphasizes the nature of the current processes in society. What name is to be given to the political bodies—this is a detail. Let us take a look at the essence. The essence is the struggle for power. Just look what a struggle is underway for the soviets? What is the situation in the party? In this situation, it is very tempting for certain forces to shake the positions of the CPSU in the army. Terribly enticing. So Sergey Prokofyevich is concerned: a multiparty system will come and what then for the political bodies? As they say, the bear has not yet been killed but we are beginning to split up the skin.

It seems to me that many are enticed by the very word "reform." Just what do we mean? In the first stage, we would separate the political bodies from the party organizations as this is set out in the draft Regulations. What sort of proponents of party policy would we be if we were completely deprived of an opportunity to influence the communists? Plus those innovations which I have already mentioned: the elimination of the candidate period, free withdrawal from the party, the halting of membership in it.... Or Paragraph Seventeen where the possibility is mentioned of creating discussion clubs, centers and seminars in the party.... In truth, it is stated below that factions are not allowed. But you will admit that any club has its own organization and discipline and develops its own views. Tell me, just how would it differ from a faction? The Democratic Platform also emerged from a club.

Dues.... It is proposed that up to 50 percent will be left for the needs of the primary organizations. This means to cut the budget in half.

[G. Demin] Why? Certainly the money remains in the party.

[V. Chikin] But it remains on the spot.

[G. Demin] That is a good thing.

[V. Chikin] Let me explain. It is not the primary organization that organizes the instruction of the aktiv...and what about the organizing of interparty ties? Party enterprises? I can mention many other spheres of party activities where the centralized distribution of funds is indispensable.... All of this looks like taking pot shots at the staffs.

[S. Shulga] In our unit, many communists support these proposals. This is also true of the candidate stage, the right of the primary organization to finally settle the question of admission as well as dues.

[S. Zinchenko] How do the army communists feel about being deprived of the right of direct elections of the congress delegates?

[V. Kuznetsov] A majority favor elections by party districts.

[V. Chikin] That is not so easy. We have analyzed and calculated all the possibilities. It doesn't work out.

[S. Zinchenko] Do you not agree that in the army it is much easier to organize a party district than in civilian life? That the elections of the delegates are to be carried out in the old manner I see as a desire of the personnel in the political bodies to keep the entire campaign under their control.

[V. Chikin] The elections have alternative choices. The voting is secret. What sort of pressure could there be?

[Leader] I did not want to terminate the discussion in an off-key. Our discussion again confirms how widespread now is the range of opinions among the army communists. This is a good thing for it shows that the era of feigned unanimity is passing. But only an honest, exacting analysis of the state of affairs in society, the party and the army on the eve of the congress will help in seeking out the truth. In all the current disputes which undoubtedly will be continued in the 28th Congress, the main thing all the same is: Do we want the party really to become the vanguard force in society or are we working to weaken its positions? Success will not be achieved without positive ideas and without constructive actions.

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Maj Gen A.V. Gorbachev on Future of Party Organizations

90UM0693A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 90
(signed to press 31 May 90) pp 33-35

[Unattributed interview with Major-General Aleksandr Vasilyevich Gorbachev, chief of the Directorate of Party

Organizational Work under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The 'Yesterday' and 'Tomorrow' of the Primary Party Organization...."]

[Text] Sharp debates over the drafts of the Central Committee Platform and the CPSU Rules, a self-critical assessment of what has been achieved, a broad range of opinions concerning the ways for overcoming the stagnation phenomena, and the desire of the communists not only to voice their judgments about the processes occurring in society and the party but also to define their own role and place in them—all these features of the previous report-election campaign clearly show that the life of the Army and Navy party organizations is beginning to move into a new channel. Reflecting in a conversation with our correspondent on what lessons must be drawn from the current reports and elections is the Chief of the Directorate of Party Organizational Work under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Maj Gen Aleksandr Vasilyevich Gorbachev.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Vasilyevich, what, in our view, has distinguished the current report-election campaign from the previous one?

[Gorbachev] The main particular feature, and if one is to be frank, the main difficulty of the previous reports and elections was that along with their own, very complex problems the party organizations also had to discuss the drafts of the Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress and the CPSU Rules. I should say that the pregress documents in a majority of the party collectives were subjected to a careful analysis, a close scrutiny and at times sharp criticism. Such activity undoubtedly is for the better. In our directorate we have received and continue to receive even now hundreds of critical comments and proposals on the drafts. Many communists are demanding the "deciphering" of the provision concerning the power of the party masses, incorporating in both documents a specific mechanism for realizing this, and are voicing dissatisfaction over the fact that the Platform touched on military questions only in passing. There have been proposals to abandon the candidate period, to broaden Paragraph 26 of the Draft Rules, having pointed out that in practice elections will be held starting from the formation party committee and ending with the All-Army Party Committee. Valid fears, for instance, were voiced by the members of the party organization where Captain Second Rank V. Kazniyenko is registered: What would happen if under the conditions of a multiparty system organizations of other parties arose in the units? In this instance, what would be the role of the political bodies? Need one say these are difficult questions. Political life is developing rapidly and we cannot find the answer to everything as we go along. Ultimately, one must set out one's position. And we must be ready to do this.

At the same time, one cannot help but be alarmed by the attempts of certain communists to show the falaciousness of both documents and "accuse," on the one hand, of conservatism and, on the other, that they "cross out

our socialist values and ideals." In these unfounded attacks on the drafts of the Platform and Rules, the adherents of dogmatic views and the "superradicals" have joined hands. The latter have endeavored to put the Democratic Platform in opposition to the draft of the Central Committee Platform, in stubbornly refusing to see that the program document with which the party is approaching the congress opens up broad opportunities for the renewal of the party.

In a predominant majority of the party organizations, such attitudes have not only not found support but have been sharply rebuffed. Nevertheless, one cannot help but be concerned that the feverish activities which have led to the isolating of a portion of the party members and which, as was pointed out in the Open Letter of the CPSU Central Committee "For Consolidation on a Principled Basis" have been initiated by certain persons acting on behalf of the Democratic Platform and these have had an impact on the minds of a number of Army and Navy communists. I would like to tell those who have fallen under the sway of pseudorevolutionary phrases: it is time to realize that the logic of the political struggle has brought us to a situation where for the survival of the party and its future it is vitally necessary to set ourselves apart from the forces which deny the socialist choice of the Soviet people and the fundamental ideological, theoretical and organizational bases of the CPSU.

[Correspondent] You have said that the party collectives are confronted with acute problems which were extensively discussed during the reports and elections. What precisely did you have in mind?

[Gorbachev] First of all, there is the problem of separating the functions of the political bodies and the party organizations. At many meetings discussions developed over how relations should be organized between the political directorates, the political departments and those party structures which are to be established from the bottom up in the near future. Certain workers of the political bodies were rightly criticized for the fact that they have been slow in ridding themselves of the administrative-pressure style of leadership, they have curtailed the initiative and activeness of the communists and as before are more concerned with paperwork than people. The political departments were sharply criticized for a slow response to the numerous comments and proposals from the communists.

At the meetings the question was sharply posed of recognizing that it is time to put an end to "abstract" party work, that is, talking a bit, urging the men to work conscientiously and taking a decision.... If there is not a tangible influence on the quality of combat training, the level of discipline and education of the personnel, the communist said, the primary party organizations will not have any authority. But at the same time, almost everywhere the ideas were voiced that the previous methods of pressure and party rebukes have outlived

themselves. At present, an effect can be achieved differently: by seeking the advice of others, by supporting initiative and by relying on those who are capable of thinking in a nonroutine manner and acting independently.

Let me say a word about ideological work. The communists quite correctly have voiced concern over the question that at present this is largely organized along the old lines and basically comes down to routine and boring measures. Actually, we greatly lack an offensive spirit in the ideological education of the personnel. Just words were voiced at the report-election meeting in the party organization where Maj V. Razikov is registered: the numerous informal organizations are conducting a planned attack against the party, they are revising Marxist-Leninist teachings while we hold on to the "deep defenses." In this context, I cannot help but point out that the draft of the Central Committee Platform must state clearly and unambiguously that the party will decisively defend communist ideals.

The report-election campaign has shown that the people are tired of the street appeals, the dubious slogans and the groundless rebukes directed at the "superiors." They want to see a real return from party work. In particular, they are expecting a stronger influence of it on the social sphere. However, many party organizations, unfortunately, avoid these problems and have little impact on those communist leaders who due to their official duties should investigate the social and domestic problems of the personnel. As an example, let me mention the party collective where Capt V. Gorelov is the secretary. When the unit was moved to a new location, the question immediately arose: Where could the officers, the warrant officers ("praporshchik") and the members of their families find furniture, electrical appliances and other commodities which are now classified as scarce. The party organization secretary was forced himself to go up the line of command. He turned to the political directorate, but there they shrugged their shoulders and advised him to go to the local executive committee. Again the result was negative.... So the party leader was "dispatched" from office to office while his fellow servicemen merely shook their heads: our party organization cannot do anything and it has no "weight." In a word, this problem is not a secondary one, as certain communist leaders are accustomed to feel. Without concrete concern for the men the party organization will not have real authority.

As the previous meetings have shown clearly, organizational changes are also required. Proposals were heard to make all the secretaries of the primary organizations full-time, to abolish a number of staff and administrative party organizations, to hold elections of the party leaders only on an alternative basis and by direct secret balloting, not to establish party groups in the subunits and so forth. It is impossible to agree with all these proposals. But they do provide food for thought.

[Correspondent] The readers have written to us about negative aspects inherent to the current report and

election campaign. Has this concerned you? What lessons, in your opinion, must be drawn for the future?

[Gorbachev] Let me begin by saying that the report-election meetings showed that certain workers from the political bodies and party activists are not ready to counter the demagogic procedures of various noise-makers. In hiding behind the slogan of a pluralism of opinions, individual communists have rushed to accuse the party as a whole and their party organization in particular of "inertia," "bureaucracy" and "a hopeless falling behind the democratic processes." It is not a question of criticism. We vote with both hands for constructive, valid criticism. But the rostrum of the party meeting can scarcely be turned into a place of contest of loudmouths who are striving for just one thing, to strike a stronger blow at our weak spots. And the most shameful thing is that they have not been properly rebuffed. Either being in a muddle or unable to dispute on equal footing under "uncomfortable" conditions, the political workers and the party leaders often kept silent or at best said something about an "improper tone"... At present the times are such that we do not have the right to sit things out in the trenches hoping that the hail of unjust and invalid attacks on the party organizations will end by themselves.

Another lesson is that many authoritative, experienced communists under any pretexts have endeavored to avoid being elected to the party committees and bureaus. One can name all sorts of reasons for this. At present, party work has become unusually complicated. Certain CPSU members have simply been unprepared for working under the new conditions. Others have assumed a wait-and-see stance.

Of course, this seems paradoxical: against the background of growing politization among a significant portion of the rank-and-file communists, the experienced party cadres are excluding themselves from the social life of their units and subunits. Here there is only one way out and that is to more boldly involve new forces in the aktiv. According to our data, around 150,000 new members are working in the elective bodies. It is important to help them from the very outset to choose the correct course and define the most important areas of work.

In my view, there is the alarming symptom of the attempts by certain communists to put the blame for personal flaws, a lack of initiative and inefficiency in their work on the "superiors," and by referring to the general crisis in the party to justify their own idleness. This was clearly apparent in a whole series of report-election meetings. Understandably, the situation in society and those difficulties which we are currently experiencing cannot help but have an influence on the work of the primary organizations. But it is unforgivable to turn the general problems into an unique indulgence for oneself personally.

The stereotypes of previous years have remained viable. At certain meetings, formalism and over-organization

were not avoided. The personnel out of their old habits recited previously prepared papers, they were careful with criticism and the debates often assumed the nature of reports on oneself.

The well-trod rut of course if familiar but it leads into a blind alley....

[Correspondent] What conclusions follow from all this?

[Gorbachev] The new Party Rules which will be adopted by the 28th CPSU Congress and the change in the party structure in the Armed Forces will provide the opportunity for the primary party organizations to fully utilize their very rich potential. But only under the condition of the authentic interest of the communists in the end results of their labor. Freedom to discuss all urgent problems and unity of actions—this is the path which leads to increased militancy and authority of the party collectives and to their greater influence on the pace of renewal in all aspects of army life.

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Interview with Maj Gen M.S. Surkov

90SV0085A Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 11, Jun 90 pp 1-3

[SOVETSKIY VOIN interview with USSR People's Deputy Major General M.S. Surkov by G. Karapetyan: "Our Young General"; date and place of interview not given; first two paragraphs are SOVETSKIY VOIN introduction]

[Text] Major General Mikhail Semenovich Surkov became famous as a result of a speech delivered by poet Ye. Yevtushenko at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. His being addressed with the sarcastic "dear young general" offended not only military persons, but also those who have never worn a uniform. Letters poured into the editorial office. This is what they said: "How could someone not like Surkov, a person serving in Armenia, which everyone knows is a "hot spot.""; "I liked the speech Deputy Surkov delivered at the Congress for his comprehensiveness and extreme considerateness, as opposed to the poet's emotional monologue. Can SOVETSKIY VOIN tell us something about Surkov, who is not only a "dear general," but also "young."

To satisfy the readers' requests, G. Karapetyan, our unofficial correspondent, interviewed USSR People's Deputy Major General M. Surkov. Below is the text of the interview.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Mikhail Semenovich, has there been any change in your feelings toward poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko as a result of the verbal "duel" that took place at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies? Judging from the enormous number of letters you are receiving from all parts of the country, with most of them

starting with the phrase "Our dear young general," many people must be interested in this.

[Surkov] I am not that young, as you can see. However, in my youth, as now, after our controversy, I am still an avid reader of Yevtushenko. You will recall that in my second speech at the Congress I made it a point to suggest that we show greater respect for each other, especially for our colleagues of the country's highest forum: the Parliament.

Often asked is the question: Who is in the right? The letter writers differ in their opinions, with half of them supporting me and the other half Yevtushenko. I am willing to show the letters to anyone that is interested. However, I suggest that we put an end to this. I can only say that—contrary to what the respected poet said—I had no intention of driving a wedge between the country's leaders and the intelligentsia, among whom I have quite a few friends and good acquaintances.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Can you name some of them, so that our readers do not conclude that this is merely a hollow statement?

[Surkov] Certainly. USSR People's Deputy publicist Zoriy Balayan. He and I hold regular dialogues on Armenian television. On one of my previous assignments I developed very good relations with RSFSR People's Artists Nikolay Kunayev and Vladimir Gordeyev, artistic directors of the song and dance companies of the Leningrad and Moscow military districts, and RSFSR Merited Artist Aleksandr Pavlov of the Theater imeni Vakhtangov.

During my tour of duty in Armenia I became fairly well acquainted with USSR People's Artists Sos Sarkisyan and Frunze Dovlatyan, and with writer Karen Simonyan. I must say in this regard that my personal feelings of friendship do not preclude our having opposing views on how to resolve the problems facing the republic.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] The most important of which most likely is the process of rebuilding the disaster area, where the Leninakan voters cast their votes for you, a representative of the Army, thus showing their appreciation for your participation in the resolution of the republic's major problems. As far as I know, the meeting between deputies from the earthquake area and Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov that you proposed in your speech at the Second Congress has not yet taken place. If it is held, what do you intend to say to the head of the Soviet government?

[Surkov] Almost 18 months have passed since the enormous tragedy occurred in Armenia, but reconstruction work is going very badly. There is a multitude of causes. They include economic blockades, poor coordination of plans, and excessive autonomy of builders.

What specifically do I propose? Since representatives of many union republics are working in the disaster area, I propose that we immediately organize a permanent

group of USSR people's deputies that would maintain contact with their fellow countrymen to elicit their opinions and render an influence on the state of affairs.

And something else. Your newspaper colleagues refer to the disaster area as a revival area. In my view, it could become a kind of training ground for renewed international education of youth.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Mikhail Semenovich, statistical data indicate that in the disaster area there is as yet no appreciable construction of housing, schools, kindergartens, polyclinics, and moving picture theaters; the electric power situation is poor. What kind of contribution are military builders actually making?

[Surkov] The objective truth is that military builders are the only ones in the earthquake zone that are working according to plan. Judge for yourself: As early as last year they completed more than 1,000 apartments and two schools. In addition, they restored and turned over for use some time ago barracks that had been previously damaged. Few people know that no one died in buildings that had been erected by military builders. Victims were found in the ruins of the "killer" houses, something which should weigh heavily on the conscience of the unpunished civilian builders.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] The word "general" and the possessive form "general's" (as applied to dachas, food rations, and pay) are often used in a negative sense. Do you not agree that it is reasonable to ask the question: Just who is it that attains the rank of general?

[Surkov] I am a peasant from Kaluga; my parents have been living in Obninsk for some time. I was several months short of 15 years of age when I stepped up to a lathe at the Omsk Plant imeni Karbyshev. Then I moved to Leningrad, where I completed evening school and worked, making rigging lines. During vacation time I climbed my way around virtually all of the Urals and Altay and became involved in seven kinds of sports, even completing a school for athletic trainers, becoming a candidate of master of sports in sambo.

I was drafted into the Army when I had spent a little time studying at the Engineering Economics Institute imeni Tolyatti. I served on various assignments: Group of Soviet Forces in Germany; near Novgorod; in a Taman Division; at the shores of the Barents Sea.

My monthly pay after 20 years of service (650 rubles)—no higher than that of a skilled factory worker with the same length of service—is less than that earned in one month by any member of a cooperative. I do not wish to complain or appear hypocritical, but I merely ask that in considering my household budget allowance be made for three women (my wife and two daughters). Everything else (apartment, car) is provided by the service, meaning that it is temporary.

Yes, our command element until recently did have dachas in the resort Tsakhkadzor. We all on our own

initiative gave up our dachas to the first refugees to appear in Armenia almost two years ago.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] A people's deputy has said that, in spite of the reductions, there are more generals in Moscow alone than in the entire U.S. Army. Is that so, Mikhail Semenovich?

[Surkov] If I knew the exact figure, I would certainly tell you. In this connection, I cannot fail to say something about the level of competence of some correspondents. It borders on the comic. While the First Congress was in session, a television journalist asked a grandmother on the street: "Do you think that 70 billion rubles is enough for our defense?" She answered, "Yes, it is, my dear boy." Is that what is meant by a public opinion survey?

I wish to be understood correctly: We, the military, are not strangers to our society. Let us not set the man in military uniform against a person wearing civilian clothes. We in the Army also have our problems, faults, and chronic troubles. Nevertheless, we always stand for the people; we have no other goal.

Background Information. To date the Surkov family has moved 11(!) times. Elder daughter Olya attended nine schools; she is presently at the end of her fourth year at Yerevan University. She started university in Petrozavodsk, but now (in only two years) is able to communicate with her fellow students without an interpreter.

Incidentally, the general learned of this by accident a year ago. At that time, the entire Yerevan State University, led by the head, USSR People's Deputy S. Ambartsumyan, was preparing to lay flowers at the foot of the memorial to the genocide victims of 1915. Mikhail Semenovich, together with his comrades, was keeping order on the route. Now try to imagine a scene in which the father noticed that his daughter in the column of university people was conversing with her fellow students without an interpreter.

Larisa, who is the younger, at age 13 is able to understand her "teacher" - neighbor's son Mikael—fairly well. His wife, Leonarda Tikhonova, a schoolteacher who has "served" all these 20 years alongside her husband, has I would say no complexes common to a "guest," such as in her dealings with neighbors and merchants. However, the family head due to lack of time and tiredness can find time before bedtime only for reading the republic press and books on history of the Armenian people. The Surkovs are very conscientious in observing their rule of learning the local language.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Your two years of service in the area have always been associated with stressful events. To take a look backward, have you experienced any extraordinary occurrences in your interrelationships with the local populace?

[Surkov] Of course, the image painted by the mass media of these times of glasnost, as a result of the well-known events that occurred in Tbilisi, has been somewhat

tarnished. Then there is the article published in the magazine SELSKAYA MOLODEZH (No 3 for last year) reporting on alleged looting by soldiers in the Armenian disaster area. That is nothing but an absurd falsification, to put it mildly. It has cost us quite a bit in effort to restore good relations with the local labor collectives, scientists, intelligentsia, and youth. The republic's leaders pay military units fairly frequent visits to keep abreast of all happenings relative to our military personnel. Today as before we resolve all difficult problems by combined effort.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Let us discuss a particular incident. In the beginning of May of last year thousands of Yerevan residents took to the central streets to hold an unauthorized meeting. You will recall that the situation was becoming more heated by the hour. The Matenadaran, which the people chose as their gathering place, was encircled by soldiers...

[Surkov] ... who, I must say, were not equipped with clubs and shields.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Yes, that is true. The situation was very tense; who knows how it could have ended had you not stepped in front of the crowd to speak. You convinced the people not to violate the state of emergency in effect at that time in Yerevan, to leave in peace. How have you been able to communicate with the cold feelings the crowd had toward the military after the well-known incidents occurred?

[Surkov] To begin with, they were people, not a "crowd." I was dealing with large and small groups. Then again, it is necessary to prove a point, to convince; people see through a demagogue in no time. Finally, as far as that particular event was concerned, I was not alone as I spoke. Accompanying me were the gorkom secretaries and a number of unofficial leaders of the Armenian National Movement. There was a dialogue, and collective wisdom prevailed.

Several days later, the military commandant of Yerevan authorized a requested meeting, which became an open exchange of opinions. Participating were party and soviet workers, unofficial representatives, military personnel.

Also, I can illustrate by citing the following fact that the people and Army are one in Armenia. It is generally known that weapons were taken from rayon locations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and militarized guard posts during the difficult events of January. To date more than a third of the "captured" weapons has been returned. The major complaint of the local residents that formed the spontaneous self-defense groups was the introduction of military units into the area along the Armenian borders. The fact that the weapons were surrendered is an indication of the trust the Armenian people bear toward the Soviet Army.

If the full truth is to be known, I must tell you that weapons often do fall into the hands of criminals,

extremists, and young boys that are still wet behind the ears. This furnishes grounds for unfortunate incidents, some of which have a fatal outcome. Things will take a turn for the better in the area when everyone starts to go about his own business, with the Army protecting the country's peace and the people doing productive labor.

More Background Information. It was May of 1988. Several persons announced a hunger strike on Teatralnaya Ploshchad. The 15,000 Yerevan residents surrounding them demanded an explanation as to the whereabouts of their fellow countrymen, then suddenly started to move toward the building of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee. The situation became explosive, with no telling of how it would end, if the people were not stopped by a high metal fence, and ... a colonel, who stepped out resolutely to speak with the people. In spite of angry shouts and threats, he was able to relieve the tension with his confidence-building tone of voice and direct them back to the square. After the people noticed the concern with which he spoke with the hunger strikers, they gradually quieted down and went home. At that time few people in Armenia knew the 42-year old M. Surkov, who only three months previously had been appointed political section chief of the Yerevan garrison.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Some publicists, discussing with ever-increasing frequency the Army's role in that "hot spot", have started to speak of a new "internal Afghanistan, with a Lebanon to boot." What is your opinion on that?

[Surkov] The Army is always forced to interfere when there is a real threat to the lives of Soviet people. Also in the case of accidents and tragedies claiming human victims. At those times we—the military—are the last hope, the lifesavers.

However, our ideal role is noninterference in such interethnic conflicts. This in spite of attempts on the part of leaders of certain aggressive groups in the area to portray us as some kind of blood-thirsty monsters. In reality, our purpose is most humane: To prevent escalation of conflict between neighboring peoples and avoid bloodshed.

It is for this reason that since January of 1990 our combined units have been stationed on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Also a source of serious concern is the large number of weapons taken last winter.

The minister of defense, his deputies, and a number of generals are occupied daily with functions that are little noticed but not strictly peculiar to the Army: keeping the Baku-Yerevan railroad line open and hauling food, medical supplies and newspapers to mountain villages of the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region], which is virtually devoid of these supplies due to gun-fights and local blockades. Night and day our officers are risking their lives, serving at "hot spots," providing the local populace with law and order, with security, in the final analysis.

I must admit that when I was appointed to this position, I had no idea that it would be necessary for me to participate in declaring a curfew and an extraordinary occurrence. Now there are new tasks, ones unusual for the military: organizing and carrying out discussions between representatives of unofficial organizations and those of official organizations.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Nevertheless, Mikhail Semenovich, it still seems that many parliamentary decrees and recommendations that were passed to cool down the interethnic passions in Azerbaijan and Armenia are not working. Why not?

[Surkov] There are many reasons. I will cite a few.

First. Sensible resolutions passed by the center are not followed up by applying consistent and well-thought-out explanatory and organizational measures. It is no secret that party and soviet leaders of both republics are still in the habit of "taking the wrong track." They have not taken any decisive steps, due perhaps to fear for their jobs or simple ignorance.

Second. The healthy forces of society, of perestroika supporters, have not gotten together, either in Armenia or Azerbaijan.

Third. Whatever resolutions are passed by the center are doomed to failure if the opinions of all conflicting participants are not taken into consideration. We—the deputies of the country's Supreme Soviet—must remember that any wise decision the center may make should be given a "trial run" among the various population groups of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The truth—bitter though it may be—should ring out in any resolution or communication. Believe me when I say that experience tells me that all half-measures and half-truths are associated with nothing but dire consequences.

In my opinion, it is necessary to maintain the widest possible dialogues—"round tables," with official and unofficial organizations of both republics participating. Preliminary and ongoing developments of the talks must be made public for its consideration. Extreme importance attaches to mutual wisdom, to patience in listening to the point of view of a rival, but not of an enemy. And something else. Each participant must possess the wherewithal to make an honest attempt at hammering out a reasonable compromise. The latter is essential at the present time.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Thank you for a frank discussion. As far as I know, you have not refused a single journalist—Soviet or foreign—an interview. Can this be that you do not wish to develop poor relations with the press in this period of glasnost?

[Surkov] Quite simple. My parents impressed upon me as a child the idea of always respecting someone else's labor. However, the main point is that in today's environment I should hope that every objective publication helps people understand and learn the truth from people

who are intimately familiar with the situation in the area. For that reason, I am trying in answering all questions to shed light on the interethnic problems, with complete consideration of all aspects.

I should hope that our conversation will also help SOVETSKIY VOIN readers achieve a clear understanding of the circumstances attending the tragic events that have occurred in the two brotherly republics. This will compel some people to reflect and arrive at the appreciation that the term "Union" is more than a word: It is our life.

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Committees Formulate New Proposals on Veteran Privileges

Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 23, 04-10 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by V. Gerasimov: "In the Prison of 'Frozen' Benefits"]

[Text] Essentially, Great Patriotic War veterans and the disabled, as well as other people in their benefit category, frequently go without in many parts of the country. This fact, now obvious, evoked acute criticism at a joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on the Affairs of Veterans and the Disabled and the People's Control Committee of the USSR.

A total of 6.15 million war veterans, more than 1.1 million disabled war veterans and 720,000 families of servicemen who lost their lives are entitled to priority support and services in our nation. The state has established deserved benefits for all of them. It has been unable fully to guarantee the provision of these benefits, however.

During the past 8 years five decrees and two laws of the USSR have been passed to improve the lot of veterans and the disabled. How are they being implemented? The matter received serious attention at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. Afterward the People's Control Committee of the USSR and the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for the Affairs of Veterans and the Disabled made on-site investigations to determine how veterans were cared for in a number of regions of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the Uzbek and Kirghiz SSRs. The findings were discussed at a joint session of the two committees, with the participation of responsible workers of the VTsSPS [All-Union Central Trade Union Council], the State Committee of the USSR for Labor and Social Issues, the leaders of central ministries and departments, republic, kray and oblast soviet organs and journalists.

From the investigation documents:

...The allocation of housing for war veterans and the disabled and individuals in their benefit category is being cut universally. The number of families in these categories of citizens provided with housing dropped by a factor of

1.5 last year in the Tatar ASSR compared with 1989, for example, and they were provided with only 498 apartments in Krasnoyarsk Kray, compared with a target of 805. A total of almost 2,000 families awaiting improved housing received apartments in Kokchetav Oblast, while only 21 of 600 war veterans and disabled people received them."

The housing problem is an extremely acute and urgent one. Particularly for old people who have not years but months or days left to live. This is what M.Kh. Khasanov, deputy chairman of the Tatar ASSR Council of Ministers, had to say in his speech about the housing situation. A total of 13,000 people are on the preferential waiting list for housing in the republic. It will take 522,000 square meters of housing to meet their needs. And this amounts to one fourth of the total housing completed for occupancy each year in Tataria. In order to provide war veterans and the disabled with comfortable housing we need to allocate for them not the 7% currently specified by law but 10-15% of the housing completed in the republic.

The Tatar ASSR Council of Ministers recently adopted such a decision. The matter is now being held up by a minor matter: obtaining the consent of higher Russian authorities for this.

Our soldier/internationalists have a hard life practically everywhere. An investigation has shown that in Vakhitovskiy Rayon, also in Kazan, not a single apartment has been allocated for the 48 people on this waiting list. The situation may soon be altered fundamentally, however. This will occur if the republic "fathers" keep their word and give half of an 80-apartment building under construction for the Tatar ASSR Council of Ministers to the soldier/"Afghaners."

Migration has greatly exacerbated the housing situation in the Crimea. As a result the number of people on the preferential waiting list for housing in Crimean Oblast has not decreased but actually increased by 35% over the past 4 years. It was painful to see the bewilderment and hear the note of desperation in the speech delivered at the session by T.A. Krasnikova, deputy chairman of the Crimean Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies. One could not help wondering when strict and objective calculations—and not to the detriment of war veterans and the disabled—finally begin to determine the essence of and prospects for decisions.

From the investigation documents:

"...Personal meetings and talks and a study of complaints and statements showed that most war veterans and the disabled are not satisfied with the way the food supply system is organized. Social justice is not served by the sharp differences in the established norms and the procedure for issuing the food among different rayons, cities and areas. War veterans residing in rural areas are particularly poorly provided for...."

We interrupt the quotation in order to back it up with specific facts. In Krasnoyarsk Kray norms for issuing certain food products in the rural area have been cut to approximately half those for the city. The disabled and veterans of Kursk, Lvov, Osh, Surkhan-Darya and other oblasts have been forced to suffer this injustice.

Why is this happening? Who is to blame? What specific steps are being taken to avoid such outrages? No answers were forthcoming to these questions, simple but vitally important to the disabled and war veterans. Deputy USSR Minister of Trade V.S. Savchenko, who spoke at the session, did not burden himself with self-criticism or an analysis of the situation but boldly presented an impeccably smooth report, which one of those present described as "a fraud which insults everyone." Is it any wonder that the deputy trade minister cleverly avoided the dangers of all sharp "reefs"—whether the discussion was about waiting in preferential lines for refrigerators, vacuum cleaners or motor vehicles, about the absence of inexpensive goods at socially low prices for the elderly or about the still persisting and proliferating system of putting aside and squandering scarce goods intended for veterans?

Nor was light shed on the matter in the speech by V.P. Rakitskikh, deputy chairman of the Tsentrosoyuz [Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives] board. Among other things, he informed those assembled that the consumer cooperative system is capable of providing goods at socially low prices to three out of... 100 veterans. An eloquent admission, no question about it.

From the investigation documents:

"...According to statistics of the USSR Ministry of Health 92% of the war veterans received medical examinations in 1989. A selective check by experts, however, showed that no more than 50% of the war veterans received medical examinations, and only isolated individuals among the soldier/internationalists.... The examinations are frequently unskilled, a formality, and are simply sloppy in some cases."

...During a medical examination in 1986 war veteran A. Alshevskiy was diagnosed as suffering from "gastrointestinal bleeding." Neither then nor subsequently, however, was this old and ill man hospitalized. He is still not only not receiving any treatment but is not even being monitored by medical personnel.

The situation is made worse by inferior medical equipment and supplies at the preventive medicine facilities, the universal shortage of medicines and the large turnover of medical personnel. USSR Deputy Minister of Health A.D. Staregorodtsev described the situation of medical services for veterans in such vague and general terms and in such isolation from the agenda that G.V. Kolbin, chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee, expressed doubt as to whether the respected second speaker is familiar with decisions coming out of the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the implementation of which has been looked at and is now

being discussed. Those assembled received with understanding the proposal that the USSR Council of Ministers consider the suitability for their jobs of certain heads of ministries which are failing to implement the programs for caring for the disabled, veterans and soldier/internationalists.

People's Deputy of the USSR A.I. Golyakov, first deputy chairman of the All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans, and Mar Avn A.P. Silantyev, chairman of the Soviet War Veterans Committee, told about the results of the review conducted on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Victory for purposes of improving the material situation, services and living conditions of war and labor veterans, expressed criticism and introduced a number of constructive proposals based on principle.

..In another time the author would probably have refrained from making these subjective assessments. It is another matter today, however. I will admit that I do not particularly like the ponderous title adopted at the session for the final document: "On Serious Shortcomings in the Implementation of the Decree Passed at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR on Increasing Attention to the War Veterans and Soldier/Internationalists and Giving Priority Consideration to Their Urgent Problems." The important thing is not the title, however, but primarily the essence and the boldness of the changes outlined. We are publishing only a few of them, those which we consider to be the most substantial.

After carefully studying the results of the joint investigation, the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on the Affairs of Veterans and the Disabled and the People's Control Committee of the USSR, among other things, recommended that the USSR Council of Ministers consider the following proposals coming in from different locations:

- that all the benefits for disabled war veterans be extended to cover Great Patriotic War veterans; that Great Patriotic War veterans certified as disabled as a result of a general illness be placed into the same benefit category as disabled war veterans;
- that the ispolkoms of local soviets allocate 10-15% of all housing for improving the living conditions of war veterans and individuals in their benefit category, regardless of the financing or means of construction;
- that it be suggested to the USSR Ministry of Trade and Tsentrosoyuz that they work out a unified Statute on Trade Services for the Disabled, War Veterans, Soldier/Internationalists and Individuals in Their Benefit Category; ensuring an equal and socially fair approach to trade services for this category of citizens in both the cities and rural areas;
- taking into account the opinions of people's deputies of the USSR, that the law be supplemented with the requirement that the labor collectives take a greater part in providing essential social and living conditions and medical services for war and labor veterans after they become pensioners, using their own means and the capabilities of enterprises and organizations.

In addition, it was decided to accelerate the development of the drafts of two new laws of the USSR, on the disabled and on veterans. It was also deemed essential to request in the name of the two committees, assistance from USSR President M.S. Gorbachev for resolving urgent problems of the disabled and veterans.

Army, Guerrilla Conflicts in Armenia Causing Political Tensions

90UM0674A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 16 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Special Correspondents A. Ganelin and V. Filin: "A Man with a Gun: What Does He Bring to the People—a Sense of Security or Alarm?"]

[Text] While everyone has been arguing about whether or not we need national military formations, they have already appeared and are even fighting in Armenia. Not much remained until the battle that had erupted between internal troops and armed Fida'in detachments would be transformed into a war.

On the morning of May 27, guerrillas attempted to disarm a sentry near the train station who was resting after escorting the Kafan-Yerevan Train. Six guerrillas were killed and 10 servicemen were wounded.

After this, obviously fearing that the Army would enter Yerevan to introduce a state of emergency and to disarm them, the Fida'in blockaded the entrances into the city and the approaches to military units. As internal troop representatives explained later, a column of military vehicles was moving at precisely that time which contained personnel being returned to their unit after combat duty. Seeing that the road was blocked, the soldiers attempted to negotiate the obstruction. The guerrillas opened fire. Military personnel returned fire, having requested reinforcements by radio. Servicemen in combat vehicles drove out to assist from the unit. An engagement broke out among residential buildings. It grew larger when someone began firing on the military unit from the nearest high ground.

The day's tragic total: 24 people had been killed, including one serviceman and one woman. Official sources reported that the remaining 22 were guerrillas. Fifty-nine people were wounded, including 17 servicemen.

A day of mourning was announced in Armenia. Black cloth hung, crosses stood, and candles burned on the street where the engagement occurred. People carried flowers. Everyone was asking questions. Who attacked the sentry, members of which organization? And who needed an engagement in the city?

Let us leave these questions for the investigation. Let us attempt to answer the main question—could the May 27th tragedy not have occurred?

In our opinion, something similar definitely would have occurred if not on that day or not at the train station. What occurred was simply automatically predetermined by the entire course of preceding events. Just as automatically as bullets fly out of a Kalashnikov one after another.

Everything had begun not at the train station but much earlier when the republic began to arm itself. Particularly aggressively after reports that the border had been violated at Nakhichevan. This fact was perceived in Armenia in one way: "This means arms have been sent to Azerbaijan from Iran." You cannot convince anyone otherwise here. Furthermore, local newspapers were constantly reporting about guerrilla attacks from "that side." The opposite was also being reported "on that side." Few believed that the Army could protect Armenia: It really is always late, this Army, when the matter concerns interethnic conflicts, although not through its own fault. Therefore, we must protect ourselves. We need to create self-defense detachments, our own national army. But where will we get arms? Massive thefts of grenades and pistols, flak jackets and automatic weapons, vehicles and field guns began. The thieves practically did not encounter any serious resistance anywhere. Two militia men tried not to turn over weapons and they were killed. Those wishing to resist became fewer and fewer. We are talking about how the entire Yerevan city militia department was disarmed! The military tried not to use arms. And the guerrillas were going after precisely weapons at the train station, hoping to take them away from the sentry and not intending that soldiers would be shot.

They stole a saber from the museum of history and a sword from the Armenfilm warehouse.

Armenians love history. There is a special, real regard for it here. They describe battles and engagements that occurred especially at the beginning of this Century as if they had ended this morning. Some even think: They have still not ended. Sparks from blows of sabers and swords still arouse emotions today. And the Fida'in are also today's Armenia.

"The Fida'in are the protectors of the Homeland like the gayduki [freedom fighters against Turkish domination at the beginning of the 20th Century]," a young bearded lad in a paramilitary uniform told us.

He is racing a vehicle through the streets that, like all vehicles of the military formations, does not have any numbers which is a violation of the law. Militia? GAI [State Automobile Inspection]? What are they, suicide cases who stop a vehicle without a number? Traffic regulations? What traffic regulations if life has come to the point that camouflaged vehicles carrying armed people openly travel throughout the city.

We know from the neighboring republic's official communiques and newspapers that the Fida'in are furiously attacking her. "No, we are only protecting our own villages and borders," explains the bearded young man.

"The fact is that they are always attacking us." He immediately refutes the slightest doubt in this statement with indignation.

Everything is as always. Everyone has ministries of defense but no one has ministries of offense.

"Why do you need Fida'in if there is a regular army? Are you not convinced that it can protect you?" we asked. And the people we were talking to once again reminded us of history.

"We already had the Russian Army in our country and we fought alongside them during the First World War. Afterward, a revolution occurred in Russia and the Army left. We were left alone. Right now there is once again a revolutionary situation in Russia. What will happen if we are once again left alone?"

The soldiers and officers who are in Armenia are terribly tired. And they increasingly pose the question: Why are they here? To protect the population? Then why are they attacking military personnel? If you do not surrender your weapons to the attacker, then you need to shoot them. Peaceful citizens can also die in battle. And once again the soldiers and officers will be blamed for everything. How many soldiers lives do we have to pay for the political crisis. And not only soldiers lives?

And the political crisis in Armenia is at hand. Government authorities do not have any power in the republic. What prestige and power can we talk about if for example they recently beat up the Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman and not one of almost 500 militiamen who were there attempted to protect him? Therefore, the political situation in Armenia right now is obviously being determined as follows: Government authorities—without power. Informalists—power without authority.

As a result—anarchy.

An enormous number of the most varied people have become involved in politics in Armenia right now. Many informal organizations, and there are already more than 60 of them, want to have their own armed formations. Many are acting independently, refusing any sort of subordination. There are more "generals" than soldiers. It is fashionable to be armed. A man who as we all know has the habit of shooting enters the political arena with a gun. In a situation of anarchy, everyone understood—power and therefore authority is on the side of those who have more armed people. Arms are beginning to make policy. They told us that the Party raykom secretary had his own armed formation and the rayispolkom chairman had his own. They began to feud among themselves.

The situation is being aggravated by that fact that quite a few weapons have ended up in the hands of criminals. Covering themselves with the ideas of protecting the republic and under the guise of Fida'in, they are simply robbing. In one of Armenia's rayons, two groups who did not share half a million rubles began a real war. There are

dead on both sides. Many people in the republic remember: The more such "patriots" "defend" the Homeland, the greater the danger the republic finds itself in. Right now it has become practically impossible to control every gun barrel. Or each finger on the trigger. What is next?

The headquarters of the Armenian National Army (ANA) is in the center of Yerevan in the former building of the book lover's peace society. Near the gates are a camouflaged UAZ [vehicle manufactured by the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant] and other vehicles. People are at the gate: Some are in paramilitary uniforms and some are in civilian clothes. Some with pistols and sawed-off shotguns and some with assault weapons.

We are sitting in a room where representatives of the "army special department" present the ANA program to us:

"We are not Fida'in but army soldiers. Our organization does not belong to any political party. No party should have armed detachments or resolve political tasks with their help. We have one mission—to protect the borders. Those who violate public order or who are thieves will be disarmed and sentenced by the ANA military court. We are subordinate only to the democratic multiparty parliament of Armenia.

A minor detail: There is not yet a democratic multiparty parliament and no one knows when there will be one. Under conditions of universal arming, it simply cannot meet....

After May 27, Yerevan residents began to become agitated: What are armed people doing in the city, they are not defending the republic's borders here. Then the armed detachments left Yerevan. However, it did not become calmer in the republic.

A vehicle without numbers has been found on a Yerevan street and there is a corpse with bullet wounds in it. Six armed people entered a shashlik house, they killed two people, and they fired at a bus. Attacks continued against military personnel and militiamen with the goal of seizing weapons and vehicles. In Yerevan, they fired at a military hospital, the ZVEZDA Hotel, and the headquarters of the Armenian Pannational Movement [AOD].

There are still no guarantees that May 27th will not be repeated. Resistance remains. On one hand, internal troops and the Army. On the other hand, informal organizations' armed detachments. They all have frayed nerves. They are all in a state of heightened combat readiness.

Until now, no one has assumed responsibility for the attack on the sentry and the train station. Many people in the republic are convinced—this was a provocation. But who is capable of assuming responsibility to prevent future clashes.

The authorities see one way out—disarmament. "The arms seized must be surrendered to republic authorities

and the sooner the better. There is no other way," said Armenian CP Central Committee First Secretary V. Movsisyan in an interview in a local newspaper.

"We will not surrender our weapons," answer the ANA fighters and the Fida'in.

Therefore, we need to disarm them. But how? By introducing a state of emergency. But republic authorities will not resort to this. Obviously the Central Government also does not want to. The arguments are clear: If we begin confiscating weapons using force—they will begin to shoot. How many peaceful citizens will die during this? How many soldiers?

A military political impasse? But it is dangerous to [let them] keep their weapons. And they are afraid to disarm....

Many people propose establishment of a Soviet of National Security in the republic that would control all armed groups. Then weapons would be surrendered at common warehouses and would be issued to the people's militia when necessary to protect citizens and to maintain public order. Those same groups who refused to subordinate themselves to the Soviet would be declared to be outside the law and would be disarmed by militia forces. But once again, where is the guarantee that the neighboring republic, having learned about this, would not establish its own people's militia? And would not the "armed forces" of Armenia and Azerbaijan then immediately begin with a war?

"On the contrary," one of the AOD board members told us. "Remember Cain and Abel. Why did Cain kill Abel? Because the former had a knife and the latter was unarmed. If Abel had also been armed, Cain would have thought it over before attacking."

Two years worth of attempts by the Central Government to resolve this problem while playing the role of an arbiter have thus far been unsuccessful. Gradually, the Central Government is increasingly being transformed from a judge into the accused by both parties.

In Azerbaijan, they are convinced that the "Armenian lobby" has achieved the greatest advantage. In Armenia, they are convinced that the Central Government supports Azerbaijan while playing up to the influential Moslem world.

In Azerbaijan they think: The Central Government "has closed its eyes to the fact that Armenia is arming itself" while confiscating all weapons here.

And the longer this lasts, the less confidence there is in the Central Government and the less power local authorities have. The man with the gun is acquiring ever greater significance. He has already entered into the political struggle. How can it end? It is sufficient to recall our own not too distant past.

Maj Gen E. Nechayev on Post-Chernobyl Medical Issues

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[Interview with Maj Gen Eduard Aleksandrovich Nechayev, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Military Medical Directorate, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Yelena Agapova: "Responding to an SOS"]

[Text] In the last issue of VSTRECHI, on June 2nd, 'cesium garrisons' SOS sounded from the newspaper pages. This is precisely the title of the material about the striking problems of servicemen's families who after the accident at Chernobyl were compelled to live in radiation contaminated garrisons. Women and children, who found themselves behind the departmental fence and not of their own choosing, have essentially been deprived of elementary social protection from the aftermath of the horrible catastrophe in many places. Due to this same pursuit of narrow departmental interests, they, as a rule, do not fall under those same protective measures that have been developed on the State level for the population who live in areas contaminated by radiation.

How do we change the situation in the very near future? What can we do? The newspaper has not left this theme unattended. But today it is as if the possibility has emerged to alleviate the seriousness of certain problems that were the result of Chernobyl's nuclear fire. Minister of Defense Order No 190 dated May 14 1990 defines measures to improve medical services and social security for servicemen, members of their families, and Soviet Army and Navy workers and employees. It protects the interests not only of those who are currently living and serving in "cesium" garrisons but also everyone who participated in the clean up of this unprecedented technological catastrophe from the very first days. Our correspondent asked Major General E. Nechayev, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Military Medical Directorate, to comment.

[Agapova] Eduard Aleksandrovich, allow me to begin our conversation with one episode from September 1988. Construction of the enclosure for the damaged unit had been completed. Work was being continuously conducted. But suddenly everything came to a standstill. The roof was the problem. After the accident, highly radioactive products remained there. They needed to throw them into the ruins of the 4th reactor. But how? No one knew if a man would even be able to work there at all, within what time limits, or what kind of protection would be needed? Robots malfunctioned on the roof. Military Doctor Aleksandr Saleyev took the risk. He met his unknown fate head-on with a dozen dosimeters. He measured the radiation levels and tested the reliability of the protective systems on himself for the sake of those officers and soldiers who would later be faced with carrying out this colossal work. This case is one of many.

But it is typical. Military personnel always go to the hardest and most dangerous work in emergency situations....

[Nechayev] Thousands of people in military uniform have passed just through Chernobyl. Three hundred forty thousand servicemen and service obligated personnel have worked in the zone. Of them, more than 20,000 are officers and warrant officers. At the end of 1986, The All-Army Register was established based on the Military Medical Academy imeni S.M. Kirov where they began to send registration cards for officer personnel exposed to radiation after this accident. Exposure doses, calendar work periods, and results of medical examinations are recorded on them. To this day, 17,189 officers and warrant officers have been registered. Unfortunately, this list is not complete. Many personnel arrived on temporary duty for several days. They received doses but they are not listed in the register. Therefore, the order obliges commanders to find all servicemen who participated in operations to clean up this accident in units, institutions, and military educational institutions prior to July 1st. I will list the address of the All-Army register: BMedA im. S.M. Kirov [Military Medical Academy imeni S.M. Kirov], Leningrad, 194175. Registration cards must also be filled out for compulsory service servicemen. The cards will be maintained at unit aid stations until servicemen are released into the reserve and afterward they will be sent through Voyenkomats [Military Commissariats] to local public health organs. Right now all of this information is being verified. In the near future it will be sent to the USSR Ministry of Health for inclusion in the All-Union State Register.

[Agapova] Records and identification of people, this is very important but nevertheless this is the technical side of the matter. I would like to know what specifically needs to be done in a purely medical context?

[Nechayev] This year military doctors must conduct supplemental medical examinations and in subsequent years they must establish medical observation of all servicemen who participated in the accident cleanup operations at ChAES [Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant]. We are also faced with organizing medical observation of the population's state of health in restricted garrisons and in those same "cesium" garrisons. They are women and children. Registration cards will also be filled out on them. Children of servicemen who were born after their parents' departure from the accident zone will also receive our medical monitoring in restricted garrisons and in the groups of forces. For total clarity, I will once again repeat: All registration cards for officer personnel must be sent to the All-Army Register in Leningrad. For all remaining personnel, this card must be sent to local public health organs.

Let me say a few words about medical rehabilitation of servicemen exposed to some degree of radioactive contamination. We plan to establish a rehabilitation center for them based at a military sanatorium in the Moscow area.

[Agapova] It is clear that this work will require a great deal of resources and effort. We have already written about the fact that urgent measures for 1990-1992 to clean up this accident in the interests of military personnel, their families, and other civilian population of military posts have been completely forgotten in the approved State union republic program. Of the 16 billion rubles allocated for this program, military personnel will receive nothing! Furthermore, they are continuing their dangerous work in the zone.

[Nechayev] Common sense is really absent in such logic. We do not tire of repeating: Chernobyl is our common pain and problem and at the same time they divide people according to the departmental principle: This one is ours and that one is not ours. Unfortunately, there is neither additional equipment for medical research nor medicines that must be purchased abroad in accordance with this program to allocate to our medical institutions on contaminated territory. And additional staff has not been provided for. Thus we have to count on our own forces for now.

[Agapova] Many of our readers are interested in the benefits for servicemen who are participants in accident clean-up operations.

[Nechayev] Those who participated in clean up operations in 1986-1987 obtain the right to a 50 percent discount for payment of prescription medicines, priority receipt of passes to sanatoriums and rest homes, and also for priority service at Ministry of Defense health treatment facilities. Participants in operations in 1988 now enjoy the right to receipt of passes and service at military out-patient clinics and hospitals.

Those for whom a diagnosis of radiation disease has been established and who are on medical support in accordance with Ministry of Defense policy can acquire doctor prescribed medicines free of charge, use sanatorium resort treatments free of charge, and receive priority service in our out-patient clinics and hospitals. We are talking about cases when a causal connection has been established between the disability that has occurred with the accident and accomplishment of clean-up operations.

People can familiarize themselves with other benefits in USSR Council of Ministers and VTsSPS [All-Union Central Trade Union Council] Resolution No 325 dated March 31 1990.

[Agapova] Questions inevitably arise as a result of this. First—Have there been cases of acute radiation disease among servicemen who participated in clean-up operations? And the second question: Is there a guarantee that

doctors will precisely be able to determine a connection between radiation disease and work in the accident zone?

[Nechayev] Fortunately, there are no cases of acute radiation disease among these servicemen today.

[Agapova] But let us recall the military helicopter pilot whom the newspapers recently talked out and for whom they had to transplant bone marrow in the U.S.

[Nechayev] In this case, we are not talking about radiation disease but about malignant disease of the lymphatic system. Right now many people are inclined to explain any manifestations of a disease with their presence in the disaster zone. Therefore, here we need clear, scientifically-based medical criteria to determine the causal connection of a disease with this accident. This work is being conducted at the USSR Ministry of Health. As soon as we receive these documents, the Central Military Medical Commission will make amendments to the Servicemen's Medical Examination Regulation.

[Agapova] Eduard Aleksandrovich, we wish you success in this important matter. Permit us to recall that tomorrow is Medical Worker Day. We congratulate you and all military doctors on your professional holiday. Our wish is traditional: "Stay well!"

[Nechayev] Thank you.

'Ethnic Military Formations' Urged

90SV0101A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
16-23 Sep 90 p 14

[Article by Andronik Migranyan: "The Army and Interethnic Conflicts"]

[Text] The discrediting of old institutions and values which has occurred during perestroika has been vital to the dismantling of the totalitarian regime. However, it has been accompanied by a mounting crisis of control in every sphere of society's life and activity. These processes have affected the sphere of interethnic relations in a particularly painful way. Consolidation on the basis of national interests left behind the other forms of consolidation among social forces and accelerated the process of the country's disintegration. In one form or another all the Union Republics have proclaimed their sovereignty, announced the supremacy of republican laws over Union laws, etc. The political centre of gravity has started shifting from Union bodies to Republican ones. The shifting of the centre will hardly stop at this—in Russia, for example, a tendency has likewise been pronounced for the centre to shift to regions, cities and districts. The impression is, however, that the redistribution of power going on in the country is not a goal-oriented process, but rather a disintegration of established structures.

The leadership's lack of crystal-clear principles in the nationalities question, its half-hearted and occasionally criminal procrastination in political decision-making go hand in hand with attempts to use the army for settling interethnic conflicts. The army has been placed in a rather delicate situation. Given the continued weakening of the centre of a multinational state, when the relationship between the centre and the Union Republics is unclear, the present-day leadership has been trying to use the army in the "old way": not only for defending the country against an external threat, but also to maintain the empire itself.

Despite the old totalitarian state's loss of prestige and the shift of authority from the Union centre to the Republics, an attempt is being made to preserve the army as a single transnational and transrepublican entity, subordinated to central authority. However, if the idea of the Republics' sovereignty has been accepted in some spheres, it's impossible to arbitrarily deny this principle in other spheres. Reluctance to obey the centre whenever it passes decisions which the Republics see as flying at the face of their national interests must not be limited solely to economic matters. Such a position taken by the Republics also extends to the use of the army. It should also be borne in mind that, in settling interethnic conflicts in the Central Asian Republics and Transcaucasia, use has been made of army units manned mainly with soldiers from Russia, the Ukraine and Belorussia. In complicated, often unclear situations, with passions seething, these soldiers are seen as punitive occupation forces; on the other hand, the mothers and wives of these soldiers (lately supported by the mass media) have come forward against their sons and husbands' involvement in conflicts which are alien and unclear for them. This "lack of clarity" has been furthered by the centre itself by introducing strict censorship on the coverage of interethnic conflicts, sometimes distorting their substance. Even in cases when the centre explained the introduction of troops by the need to prevent massacres (Sumgait, Baku, Osh, Novy Uzen, etc.), the Soviet people could not really accept the army's operation in these regions as humanitarian acts—in Sumgait the army appeared only three days after the beginning of pogroms, whereas it came to Baku only after the massacre and pogroms had practically ceased. No glory will be added to army units by the army's intervention in confrontations between mass movements and party-state structures on the side of the latter, as it was in Tbilisi and elsewhere.

There is evidently a need to take urgent measures to bring the situation in the military sphere into conformity with the general democratic processes underway in the country. The creation of ethnic military formations is imperative today—there is absolutely no need to send Russian soldiers to solve the nationalities problems for other peoples. It's impossible to settle the current interethnic conflicts with the use of military force. There is a need for principled political decisions on the entire spectrum of relations between the centre and national-territorial entities. If, when drafting a Union treaty, the

centre simultaneously issues decrees which can be realized only by use of force, this will not only fail to yield the expected results, but also will undermine the very idea of the USSR's democratic restructuring.

In this connection the President's decree on the surrender of arms and the disbandment of unlawful armed formations is a terrible disappointment. After all, the President has no other means except the army to confiscate these arms and disband the military formations. It means that boys from Smolensk and Zaporozhye will again be disarming local military formations. This will lead to the death of many people, whereas the political effect will be directly opposite to what is expected. The centre will find itself discredited for the umpteenth time; under pressure from the Republics, which have already passed decrees on the establishment of national formations, it will most likely have to accept this situation in the new Union treaty. But on whose conscience will the victims of the ill-considered decree fall then?

CPSU Members Desired as Political Officers

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20 Sep 90 First Edition p 4

[Reply by Major General V. Lashtabega, chief of a department of the Directorate of Organizational-Party Work of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, to a question posed by Senior Lieutenant M. Vereshchagin: "A Political Worker Who Is Not a Member of the CPSU?"]

[Text] Can a political worker in the Army not be a member of the party, or be a member of another party not the CPSU? Why not?

[Signed] Senior Lieutenant M. Vereshchagin

[Lashtabega] As is known, on 3 September of this year the president of the USSR signed a ukase on the reformation of political organs "in connection with changes to the USSR Constitution and policy on the division of state and party functions introduced by the special Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies."

In a three-month period, the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, with the participation of appropriate organs, must submit proposals on new military-political organs in the Army and Navy.

In contrast to the political organs they will have a different status, function, and structure. These will be organs for the conduct of state policy in the USSR Armed Forces and the education and social protection of servicemen. Absolutely new subunits will appear in them—psychology and sociology which, on the basis of the analysis of processes occurring in units, will develop and implement specific measures of educational work and the mobilization of personnel for the resolution of tasks that face military collectives.

Will nonparty people be able to work in them? This is not ruled out, especially for such positions as youth officer, cultural and recreational officer, psychologist, and sociologist. But this phenomenon will not be widespread. It is not likely that a political officer will also be a member of a different party. Inasmuch as party committees, for whom work with officers is the main field of activity, will develop in them a need to associate their destiny first and foremost with the CPSU—the political leader and vanguard among other public parties and organizations of a socialist choice. Although the last will be proven by life and practical work in the future development of military-political organs. At the present time, the party layer among officers in the Army and Navy is 75 percent.

Polyarnyy Mayor on Civil-Military Relations

90SV0102A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA interview with I. Mishin, chairman, Polyarnyy Soviet of People's Deputies by A. Bystrov: "Soviets Assume Responsibility"; date and place of interview not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Currently on the agenda is the issue of soviets of people's deputies' assumption of full responsibility in their local areas. The progress being made in this regard in the garrison town of Polyarnyy is the subject of conversation between Senior Lieutenant A. Bystrov, our unofficial correspondent, and I. Mishin, chairman of the town's soviet of people's deputies.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Igor Petrovich, not long ago all the municipal functions in the town were carried out by Navy men. The soviets were mere onlookers, possessing no ways or means to do anything. Has anything changed since that time?

[Mishin] Three years ago, when I became chairman of the Polyarnyy gorispolkom, soviets did indeed have very little power. It seemed natural at that time of difficult conditions (the garrison town was beset with problems) for the deputies to go begging to the Naval authorities for the slightest reason, be it garbage disposal or snow removal. They fell into the habit of picking up the telephone receiver and ringing the garrison commander whenever any trouble arose, expecting everything to be resolved as if by a wave of a magic wand.

I must admit that even I was tempted to do just that. I was able to overcome this feeling as a result of my being invited by the base commander to attend a meeting related to preparations for the forthcoming winter. When I first was told, then saw the conditions under which the seamen were living, it struck me that it was not a case of soviets asking the Navy for help, but one where it was the latter that needed assistance.

The Naval authorities were plainly tired of having many officers take care of water supply, garbage, and roads,

instead of devoting themselves to working with missiles and rockets, ships, and Naval duties. That kind of situation was also no longer acceptable to the gorispolkom, since people were coming to expect action on the part of soviets.

Incidentally, the recent elections showed that many of my colleagues that sat in their offices working with their papers and refusing to have anything to do with vitally important problems (since the Navy was there to take care of things) did not survive the elections. That is understandable: The bank of trust was empty; people are expecting their representatives to do something.

And so, I can now say with fair conviction that both the gorispolkom, which carries out the will of the deputies, and the base authorities are presently guided by common sense, not some kind of departmental interests, with the Navy occupied with combat training and the ispolkom with its municipal affairs.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Is the above situation reflected in definite activities on the part of the soviet of people's deputies?

[Mishin] We do not wish to praise ourselves, but the objective truth is that much in Polyarnyy has changed for the better. An example is the initiation of housing construction, something that the gorispolkom previously did not undertake at all. Polyarnyy residents in the last three years have been provided with about 100 new apartments that were funded by the municipal authorities. Another building, of 72 apartments, will be erected by the end of the year. The first attempts—successful ones at that—have been made to set up state trade to compete with the military commissary's monopoly. The gorispolkom has taken over the boiler house and its network, which previously was operated by several dozen seamen.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Igor Petrovich, one gains the impression that virtually no problems are being encountered in the process of power transfer from the military to the soviet.

[Mishin] That unfortunately is not the case. It often happens that we must contend with sometimes open and other times passive resistance to turning power over to the soviets of garrison towns. This even reaches the height of absurdity. A case in point was when we and the base authorities agreed that the gorispolkom would take over an old structure of 15 square meters that previously served as a checkpoint. It developed that this would require the permission not just of any person, but none other than the USSR deputy minister of defense for construction and troop billeting.

The above is not the sole example. Eighteen months have passed since the Northern Fleet commander decided to transfer the Vayenga Hotel located in Polyarnyy to the gorispolkom so that it could house the municipal polyclinic. This was not a gift. The gorispolkom, realizing the difficulties the Navy is experiencing in this time of

reductions in the military budget as well as manpower, offered to pay 680,000 rubles for the hotel (which is almost 1.5 times the hotel's remaining value), backed up by resources and building materials. However, in spite of the obvious advantage of this offer (the health care situation is quite difficult in the town), there has been no progress made.

Are you not surprised by a situation whereby Admiral Gromov is granted complete trust in running a most modern fleet, but is refused "from above" when it comes to disposing of a Navy building? A person would think that a deputy minister located in Moscow is better qualified to know whether or not a polar garrison will benefit from transferring a former checkpoint to a soviet.

There is no way I can understand that. Nor can I understand the capital construction policy of Severovoyennormstroy, whose chief cannot get it into his head that he cannot erect residential buildings on military bases without making at least some kind of minimal arrangements for providing cultural and communal facilities. Much has been said about this, but nothing has changed. Look at what is happening now: In Polyarnyy there is a new microrayon under development—two residential buildings have been filled with occupants and two others are rising. However, no one is even concerned about where the occupants will be able to buy bread and milk.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What do people of the oblast think about the fact that authority of soviets of people's deputies in Polyarnyy is growing, in spite of the troubles?

[Mishin] I attended a recent meeting of the oblast soviet of people's deputies. Honestly, I was shocked and dismayed at the attitude of some of the oblast-level officials. They all say that they support the transfer of complete authority to local soviets, but in the same breath state that there is no point to accepting responsibility until the Navy accomplishes complete repair of housing, trade, roads, boiler houses, and pipe services.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How much of a hindrance to progress is that?

[Mishin] Let me cite you an example. The Polyarnyy gorispolkom for some time now has been literally struggling to assume control of several nonresidential buildings. They actually belong to us. One of them houses a motor vehicle service shop that has been in operation almost two years, the other a heating system enterprise. Nevertheless, the Murmanskoblzhiikomkhos stands in strong opposition to this.

Someone else who does not want additional worries is Comrade A. Zorin, chief of the oblast Construction and Highway Administration. He is very much against our assuming responsibility for the road between Polyarnyy and the neighboring town, on the grounds that the military did not observe all construction standards and that it should be used by the military only. The point here is that it is not submarines that use the road! Also.

the Navy has no funds for operation and repair. What are we waiting for, a bus to turn over?

Not much progress is being made in transferring sewage facilities, even though everyone knows that they are in a good state of repair. Why not? There is only one answer to that question: Oblast authorities wish to squeeze several million rubles more out of the Ministry of Defense, which they say is rich, after all.

There are also cases of what I may call "constructive" resolutions of state-level sore spots relative to garrison towns. A group of oblast officials recently met with Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov. They discussed local problems, naturally. What happened there? The chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers assigned to the minister of defense the task, one not backed up with money or resources, of taking additional measures to improve the quality of life in garrison towns. How does the soviet system fit in?

We all should stop fearing problems, pretending not to see them, and unite our forces to resolve them on a daily basis, thus transforming the "heroic" efforts of garrison town residents into normal, civilized living.

Col Gen Arkhipov Interviewed on Army, Trade Unions' Role

*90SV0103B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Sep 90 First Edition pp 1-2*

[Report on interview with Army General V. Arkhipov, USSR deputy minister of defense and chief of rear services of the USSR Armed Forces, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "The Army and Trade Unions: Facets of Cooperation"]

[Text] More than three months ago, by a decision of the Secretariat of the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], an organizational committee was formed for the preparation and conduct of a congress of trade union organizations of workers and employees of the Soviet Army and Navy. The principle aim is to create an authoritative organ capable of defending the interests of the working person in all Army and Navy structures. There is talk of the Federation of Trade Unions of Workers and Employees of the Armed Forces, which, on a voluntary basis, will unite trade unions organized in all services of the Armed Forces and other trade associations that equate to them.

Many unresolved socioeconomic problems have piled up in the trade union organizations that function in the Army and Navy. That is why, in the opinion of the organizational committee headed by AUCCTU Secretary G. Bash-tanyuk, it is necessary to have a trade union organ that performs as a constructive opponent to the leadership of the Ministry of Defense in resolving social questions.

In this connection the editorial staff asked Army General V. Arkhipov, USSR deputy minister of defense and chief of rear services of the USSR Armed Forces, to answer a number of questions.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What, in your opinion, is the place and role of the Federation of Trade Unions of the Workers and Employees of the Armed Forces and its organs under the conditions of one-man command that operates in the Army and Navy?

[Arkhipov] One-man command is one of the basic principles in building the Armed Forces. In the course of military reform its democratic and legal basis is being strengthened, the formation of new institutions is taking place, for example, the assembly of officers, and the permanent efficiency rating commission is acquiring experience and strength. An orderly system of selection structures will be established in the course of a radical perestroika of party-political organs. I think that the creation of the Federation of Trade Unions of Workers and Employees of the Armed Forces is in line with these processes.

The Ministry of Defense has interpreted with understanding the statement on the self-sufficiency of trade unions, and their independence from organs of state control and military command and from political and public organizations. We hope that the association of Army and Navy trade unions within the framework of the Federation will, first, promote the consolidation of military and labor collectives and reinforce the unity of their actions for a qualitative resolution of defense tasks at all levels of Armed Forces structures. Second, the establishment of independent trade union organs, cooperating with organs of the military leadership on an equal basis, will make it possible for them to more fully defend, and for us to give better consideration to, the legal rights and interests of workers and employees.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In this connection, is it not time to review individual and previously adopted normative acts that affect the interests of workers and employees? In particular, questions concerning the assignment of housing and sanatoria and health resort services. Will there be a change in the procedure for worker and employee use of military medical facilities and the provision of commodities through the military trade organizations?

[Arkhipov] Military legislation, including normative documents concerning workers and employees, are based on all-Union legislative acts and decrees of the government. In conformity with the requirements of these documents, workers and employees of the Army and Navy who live in cities and urban settlements are furnished housing by the local soviets on general principles. Commanders of troops of military districts and fleets have the right in individual cases to grant them living space from the Ministry of Defense inventory. As for workers and employees who live outside towns and urban settlements, living space is assigned to them at the

place of work at the expense of the housing inventory of the military units. Economically accountable enterprises of the Ministry of Defense have the capability to provide housing for workers and employees from their own inventories.

The housing problem is one of the most critical problems for us in the Armed Forces as well. Despite the measures that are being taken, we have not been able to improve the housing situation. Now among servicemen alone there are almost 175,000 families who have not been provided apartments, and, with the completion of the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, their number will increase to 200,000. Nevertheless, last year one out of every nine apartments assigned by the Ministry of Defense was given to workers and employees.

At the present time the USSR Government is developing measures to accelerate the resolution of the housing problem in the country. A national special program was recently adopted for the social support of servicemen and members of their families and persons discharged from active military service. Regulations on the procedures for providing living space in the Soviet Army and Navy will also be revised.

About sanatorium-resort support: Five percent of the passes to sanatoria and three percent of the preferential passes at military tourist centers are now allotted to workers and employees of organizations and institutions of the Ministry of Defense. In addition, starting in 1989 economically accountable enterprises and organizations are granted the right to acquire passes for workers and employees to military sanatoria and rest homes. USSR Ministry of Defense Order No. 205 of 1976, which regulates the organization of sanatorium-health resort support in the Army and Navy, will be reworked during 1990-1991, taking into account new laws on defense and the status of the servicemen.

In all military hospitals 10 percent of the beds are earmarked for the treatment of civilians with complicated ailments and injuries, mainly for members of families of servicemen, and for workers and employees. Workers and employees are also served by military medical organs in closed military facilities, remote garrisons, and groups of forces. Unfortunately, not everywhere in the country has the capability to satisfy these requirements. Therefore it is not possible at the present time to make a fundamental change in the medical service procedure for workers and employees, for example, to assume support for all of them in military medical establishments. Only urgent medical help is given to all personnel, including workers and employees.

As for trade services, it is necessary here that the trade unions fully utilize workers' rights and public control. Regulations concerning these organs were introduced by order of the USSR Ministry of Defense No. 135 of 9 April 1990. The regulations that were previously in effect in this vitally important sphere have been revised in the

direction of reinforcing control over adherence to the principles of social justice in the distribution and sale of commodities.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Pay for workers and employees of the Armed Forces who work in preschool and medical institutions and in apartment operation services is noticeably lower than for similar categories of workers of civilian departments. What are the prospects for eliminating this injustice?

[Arkhipov] As is known, in accordance with decrees of the USSR Government, the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, and the AUCCTU, new salary conditions have been affirmed for workers of nonproduction branches of the national economy, including children's preschool institutions and the housing and utilities administration, and for medical workers. In addition, it is envisaged that an increase in rates and wages for these workers will be implemented at the expense of the resources of the enterprises and organizations themselves, and also to the extent that the Union republics and the ministries find the monetary resources for these purposes.

But the fact is that the workers at our children's preschool institutions and municipal services and medicine are maintained due to budgetary appropriations according to an estimate of the Ministry of Defense. I should say that under conditions of a reduction in appropriations to maintain the Army and Navy, the problem of finding the monetary resources to increase rates and wages is becoming more and more critical.

Considering the social significance of the problem, the Ministry of Defense made a decision to increase the salaries of workers in the housing and utilities administration and children's preschool institutions starting on 1 October 1990. Starting on that date, new rates and position salaries will be introduced for medical personnel, for whom the date of the introduction of the new wage conditions would commence on 1 November 1991. In addition, wages will correspond to the level of civilian ministries and departments.

Moreover, the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems supported the proposal of the Ministry of Defense on retaining the previously paid benefits and compensation that were granted workers before the introduction of the new wage conditions. In particular, the introduced rates and official pay to workers of the housing and utilities administration and children's preschool institutions have been set at a level of the defense branches, or 10 percent higher than similar rates and wages in effect in civilian ministries and departments.

For the purpose of strengthening cadres and attracting highly qualified specialists, by a decision of the government the payment of a percentage increment for continuous work on the order of 25 percent of pay (of rate) has been established for all workers employed in the Army and Navy.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Do you envisage the introduction for workers and employees of the Armed Forces of additional territorial benefits similar to those established by legislation of the Union republics?

[Arkhipov] During the elaboration of the Union treaty, proposals will be introduced on determining the legal position of military units, establishments, enterprises, and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense that are situated on the territory of Union republics. It is contemplated that republic legislation in the sphere of social and work benefits will be applied to workers and employees of the Soviet Army and Navy.

At the present time, benefits and compensation provided for by legislative acts of the Union republics do not apply to workers and employees of the Army and Navy.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] To what degree should guarantees be applied to workers and employees during the transition to a market economy?

[Arkhipov] This is a very important question that troubles practically everybody. I can assure you that guarantees envisaged for workers and employees of the national economy by the laws of the USSR in connection with the transition to work under conditions of a market economy, of course, will apply fully to workers and employees of the Armed Forces as well.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How does the leadership of the Ministry of Defense view the idea of concluding a general agreement with the Federation of Trade Unions of the Armed Forces on the development of the social sphere—expansion of the network of health centers, and the construction of children's preschool institutions, pioneer camps, and sports facilities? What are the capabilities of the Ministry of Defense here?

[Arkhipov] As is known, the draft of the statute of the Federation of Trade Unions of Workers and Employees of the USSR Armed Forces contains a provision that the central council of the Federation conclude an agreement with the USSR Ministry of Defense on questions of organization, conditions, safety, and wages, compliance with labor legislation, employment, price formation, ecological safety, and housing and amenities services for workers and employees. The leadership of the Ministry of Defense is not against the conclusion of such an agreement. However, it must be bilateral. Obligations on the part of the Ministry of Defense in the area of improving working conditions and the social and everyday living sphere must be backed up by appropriate obligations on the part of the trade unions in maintaining work discipline and the quality of work of workers and employees. Trade union organizations, it seems to me, must also scrutinize the production effort and display concern about increasing its efficiency, growth in labor productivity, and compliance with safety measures, and not to permit poor management and wastefulness. More opportunities will appear then to improve conditions of work and to increase its compensation.

The trade unions also cannot, as I see it, stand aside from the education of workers, the development of their work and sociopolitical involvement, broadening their cultural outlook, improving their way of life, and all of those things that elevate an individual as a person. Today as never before, the significance of the creativity and efficiency of work is growing, and, of course, of the activity of trade union organizations in the sphere of social and legal protection of workers and their physical and spiritual development.

This also presupposes the direct participation of representatives of the Federation in the elaboration of draft social programs and normative documents that affect workers, employees, and labor collectives. It is not ruled out that there can be alternative versions of these documents. Sensible proposals and weighty arguments will be considered during the revision of drafts in order to raise the legal and social protection of workers and employees. We have to cooperate more in the search for ways to the best resolution of social problems.

Resistance to Army 'Departization' Viewed

90SV0105A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 39, 5 Oct 90, pp 6-7

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Colonel A. Tsalko and Military Sociologist and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Yu. Deryugin by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Correspondent Z. Filatova: "Generals from the CPSU" under the rubric "In the Light of Glasnost"]

[Text] It is easy to point out that the problem of "departization" of the Armed Forces is currently moving into the center of public opinion and encompasses practically all social strata of our society. Various points of view are being expressed. Which is greater: "For" or "against"?

Our Correspondent Z. Filatova talked with USSR People's Deputy Colonel A. Tsalko and Military Sociologist and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Yu. Deryugin.

[Filatova] I have not been able to prove that the idea of departization and, if you take it from the broader [perspective], depolitization of the Armed Forces is being welcomed by democratic forces. But what do USSR People's Deputies who are representatives of the Army and Navy think about this?

[Tsalko] There is still not a unified point of view on this problem which is becoming increasingly acute among Army deputies. I can say with certainty that the majority of USSR [People's] Deputies-Officers are voting "for" departization and this is simply stated in our concept of military reform. The general officers are categorically against [it].

[Filatova] As I understood it, there are polarized opinions. But I would like to know what, say, the middle rank officer corps is voting for? Do sociologists have this information?

[Deryugin] Yes, we do. It is true that it is election research. Nevertheless, it provides the basis to think that a large group of company, battalion, and regimental level officers see the common sense of departization. If we talk about specific numbers, they are somewhere in the 60-80 percent "for" range. Furthermore, even among officers polled in Moscow (more than 500 people—CPSU members—were polled), 87.3 percent advocated departization.

[Filatova] We previously talked about the Party's guiding and directing role, including in the Army.

[Tsalko] Right now we are saying: Military policy is a matter for all of the people and primarily for its representatives in the country's parliament. Furthermore, it is also important to consider the positions of all parties. As for the educational functions, they must be carried out by specialists-psychologists, sociologists, etc. The question arises, do we currently need to retain one party in the Army?

[Filatova] But how will it then be with freedom of the individual?

[Tsalko] By all means, only during time off. It is important that party affiliation not turn out to be that factor that has the decisive impact on duty and on servicemen's lives. Right now many officers are leaving the CPSU and are immediately ending up in a situation of intense pressure from all sides. For example, they are suspending pilots from flights. Is this not folly?

[Filatova] But what do you say about political organs? Really, there is a Presidential Decree about changing their functions.

[Tsalko] Yes, the functions of political organs are allegedly changing. But how? Essentially things remain as before behind a facade of changes.

[Deryugin] Already right now an active process is occurring to transfer leading Party workers from some chairs to others. The path is well-known: From the CPSU Central Committee State and Legal Department to the highest posts in the political organ system (See the Table).

Instructor Number	Military Rank and Name	Former Position in the CPSU Central Committee	Current Position in the Armed Forces Political Organ System
1.	Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga	Deputy Department Head	Commander of the Army and Navy Main Political Directorate
2.	Colonel General I.A. Larin	First Deputy Department Head	Chief of the General Staff Political Department
3.	Lieutenant General A.I. Maslov	Instructor	Deputy Commander of the Army and Navy Main Political Directorate for Personnel and VUZ's [Higher Educational Institutions]
4.	Lieutenant General G.M. Panin	Deputy Section Head	Commander of the RVSN [Strategic Rocket Forces] Personnel Directorate
5.	Lieutenant General V.M. Timonin	Instructor	Commander of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services Political Department
6.	Lieutenant General V.I. Prokhorov	Instructor	Commander of the General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate Political Department
7.	Major General V.S. Novoznov	Instructor	Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces Political Directorate
8.	Major General P.I. Grigoryev	Instructor	First Deputy [Commander] Air Defense Political Directorate
9.	Major General R.S. Veshchev	Instructor	Deputy Commander of the Army and Navy Main Political Directorate Personnel Directorate
10.	Major General N.M. Bay	Instructor	Deputy Commander for Political Affairs of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Finance Directorate
11.	Major General O.D. Fedyunin	Instructor	Deputy Commander of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Political Department
12.	Major General N.A. Grebenkin	Deputy Department Head	Deputy Commander of the Army and Navy Main Political Directorate Propaganda and Agitation Directorate
13.	Major General B. Gorobtsov	Instructor	Commander of the Political Department of Centrally Subordinated Units

Instructor Number	Military Rank and Name	Former Position in the CPSU Central Committee	Current Position in the Armed Forces Political Organ System
14.	Major General V.A. Khokhlov	Instructor	Deputy Commander for Political Affairs of the Main Artillery Directorate
15.	Major General V.V. Kozharskiy	Assistant Department Head	Deputy Commander of Voenizdat (Military Publishing of the USSR Ministry of Defense)
16.	Major General G.A. Verstelnikov	Instructor	Commander of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Housing Operation Directorate Political Department
17.	Admiral V.I. Panin	Deputy Section Head	Commander of the Navy Political Directorate

[Tsalko] As seen from our table, all of the key high positions in the structures of political organs, beginning from the Main Political Directorate to the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Housing Operation Directorate, are already occupied by former party functionaries from the CPSU Central Committee. But is this only one of the conditions (and a very important one) to preserve one party's monopoly of power?

[Deryugin] There is also a social aspect here. The creation of such a dense layer does not provide the opportunity for advancement of those officers and generals who previously were not in the Central Committee apparat and who were working where troop combat readiness problems are being resolved. Once again the

intense pressure of the apparat with all of the consequences stemming from it: Maintenance of privileges, consolidation of protectionism, etc.

[Filatova] What is the solution?

[Tsalko] If departization is an objective necessity, it must be carried out. It is impossible to take another step without society's control of the Armed Forces and this control must be perceptible. There are two military reform drafts right now: One developed by USSR People's Deputies-Officers with the country's leading scholars and the other by the Ministry of Defense. Both drafts must be submitted under equal conditions and made available for wide discussion.

Lt Gen Katusev on Crime in Military in 1989

90UM0679A Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by TRUD correspondent O. Khripunov: "Will a Soldier Harm a Child?"; first paragraph is TRUD introduction]

[Text] Lieutenant-General A. Katusev, main military procurator and deputy Procurator General of the USSR, speaking at a press conference on the subject of the state of military discipline and observance of law in the Army and Navy, remarked that the incidence of crime rose 14.5 percent last year.

Private V. Plotnikov, in a condition of drunkenness, drove a ZIL-130 truck away from a military unit located in the Siberian Military District without authorization. During his trip to obtain vodka, he collided with a civilian Zhiguli.

Any branch of the GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] can cite many cases such as this. As a matter of fact, many civilian drivers believe in a precept: Watch out for military drivers. All kinds of military vehicles are being driven by insufficiently-trained and often sleepy-headed drivers.

However, it is not only on the road that people wearing the uniform may present a danger. N. Kozlov, chief of the oblast duty unit of the UVD [Directorate of Internal Affairs], provided me with relevant information. He said that servicemen had committed six crimes in Novosibirsk in the last several days, mostly larceny and hooligan misdemeanors.

Colonel-General B. Pyankov, commander of the district and a USSR people's deputy, has this to say: "The Siberian Military District is not the worst in this regard; the situation is about the same throughout the Army."

Not too long ago mothers seeing their daughters off at a railroad station would breathe a sigh of relief if they saw a military man sitting in the railroad car compartment, feeling that their children were protected. Today, however, many people look upon men in uniform in a guarded and fearful manner. The point is that the lion's share of weapons is concentrated in the Army. If lack of discipline, a careless attitude, drunkenness, and drug addiction are causing much harm among civilians, in the Army this can have consequences that are much more difficult to deal with.

There was an incident that occurred in the end of August in the guard room of a military unit located in the Altay. Five bodies were found there: four enlisted personnel that were in compulsory service and a warrant officer, all assigned to the guard. Private B. Veselov, born in 1969, disappeared, along with six assault rifles, two pistols, several grenades, and a case of ammunition. To this date no traces have been found of the soldier or the materiel.

The above case goes far beyond the borders of an intra-Army incident. There is a new threat to the non-military populace: Who knows where, when, and who will suffer from the use of weapons that have been entrusted to the military to protect the Fatherland? In the Siberian Military District, there were 11 occurrences of theft of weapons and ammunition last year alone.

Several years ago I was serving in the Army, here in the Siberian Military District, as a matter of fact. Our artillery battalion was called out on alert and ordered to set up road blocks; three assault rifles were missing from the guard room. Day and night we manned our stations on the roads, stopping all vehicles that were leaving town. If a driver decided to pay no heed to the order to stop and passed us by, all we could do was watch him go off into the distance, since we had neither radio equipment nor vehicles. Even our "weapons" were not up to the occasion: I had stuffed a glove into my holster just to take up space. All of us - enlisted personnel and officers - felt that we were participating in a farce, merely going through the motions, just so that our superiors could report that measures had been taken. What happened to the three assault rifles? Have they been used to commit murder or armed robbery? Will they show up in a "hot spot" in the country? Or has the time not yet come for them to be used?

Military men that are supposed to be in charge of discipline and observance of law in the military often throw up their hands in despair, saying that the Army is a mirror of society and the tendencies affecting the country are penetrating into the barracks. It is difficult to disagree with that, of course. What is the use of asking angrily: What are the commanders and political workers doing? The reality here is that these persons often cannot do anything about the situation; all their energy goes to applying half-measures in a struggle against effects, not the causes. Judge for yourself: The spring call-up in Altayskiy Kray alone brought into the Army 266 alcoholics and 128 (known!) drug addicts; persons with a record of offense comprise up to 80 percent of construction units. With this kind of a situation, is it fair for society to lay the blame on military commanders?

This gives you a different outlook as you look over a list of crimes committed by servicemen. This includes one that occurred in Novosibirsk. It was described as follows by the newspaper VECHErNIY NOVOSIBIRSK of 4 September 1989:

"You have heard that a small boy is missing...Fear has struck the hearts of Novosibirsk residents. Parents are afraid to let their children out onto the streets alone. Elementary school teachers are warning children not to go anywhere with strangers..."

Sometime later posters with information on first-grader Alesha Vakhrenev were displayed all over. A photograph showed a child's face with sad but clever eyes. Men would pass by and frown, while women would stop and look, read the description again and again, and sigh...

The boy's body was found lying in a snowdrift, covered with snow, here in the city, placed there by the hands of an evildoer. The boy would never be given a chance to explain what happened to him on that terrible winter's night..."

There is a popular saying in the Army: "A soldier will not harm a child." Alesha was raped and strangled by Private Yu. Petrov, who was in compulsory service. Several days previous to that he had committed an outrage against 10 year old Dima, whose life had been spared by some miracle. There was nothing to stop Petrov from committing his beastly acts, since he had a vehicle at his disposal (He was the personal driver of the Construction Directorate chief of the Siberian Military District.), with total freedom as far as military chiefs were concerned. The murderer was caught; a military court sentenced him to capital punishment.

"If we do not correct the crime situation in the country as a whole," said Lieutenant-General Ye. Mikulchik, Political Directorate chief of the Siberian Military District, "we will not be able to correct it in the Army. All we have been doing so far is applying half-measures. Some units have gone so far as to station officers in barracks. However, it is impossible to appoint an overseer for every soldier. But is this the solution?"

When I was wearing a lieutenant's shoulder boards for 2 years, I made myself a promise to do what I could about poor treatment of some servicemen by other servicemen, i.e., harassment of young soldiers. I placed my reliance on the best lads I had: Komsomol organizers and Komsomol committee members. One evening I came upon my most trusted lad and two committee members sitting atop new recruits and forcing them to do push-ups. When I objected, they told me that they had been subjected to the same harassment themselves. Yes, this vicious circle is continuing in the Army. Alas! My attempt to break through the closed circle fell through.

Just what is happening to our children behind the fences surrounding military units? Why do they mock each other and raise their hand against their commanders, even against civilians they do not even know? There simply has been no study made of this kind of difficulty in Army life. This is one time when society owes the Army an explanation. The easiest thing to do is cast the first stone by saying that "members of the military ruined the Army." This is when we should ask the question: What have science, society, and the establishment done in the final analysis to study the situation existing in the Army, with the intention of finding workable solutions?

In my conversations with General Mikulchik, officers of the Political Directorate of the Siberian Military District, and soldiers serving in the units, I learned that crimes that have been considered to be typically "civilian" are taking root in the Army. One of these is extortion, which has come to be referred to as the "racket." Men who have been in the service for some

time force new arrivals to write letters home asking for money and scarce items, then they take the packages the lads receive. Ethnic problems are just as difficult in the Army as in society.

The problem of poor treatment of recruits by old older soldiers has not improved. In fact, it has taken new forms. Now there are cases where soldiers of the same call-up commit acts of humiliation against each other. Anything can serve as the cause, such as "revenge" for the material status of a soldier before he entered the service. The excuse could be parents who are well-off, or even poor; this could set off an act of "vengeance." This could be carried to extremes, as in last year's case of Private Zyryanov killing Private Filippov by stabbing him in the heart. Both were called up at the same time; they came from Krasnoyarsk. They had known each other before entering the Army.

We do not send our sons to the Army so that they would become criminals or victims. We have a right to know what is happening to them so that we could do something about it. In this sense, the Army should really become an open structure, one that is accessible to public monitoring.

The country is experiencing severe changes. The Army also has a need for undergoing considerable changes. Much has already been done: conversion, troop and armament reductions. The next step should be carrying out a perestroika within the Army. The question of how to do this is one that draws a large number of opinions. For example, USSR People's Deputy Captain A. Demin agrees with B. Pyankov that we should conduct an exhaustive study of the situation existing in the Armed Forces by appointing a Supreme Soviet commission, with the intent of laying the groundwork of an eventual professional Army. It is their opinion that this kind of organization would improve combat readiness and strike at the root of the military discipline problem. These ideas are topics of lively discussion in military installations. There are many different opinions. This of course does not mean that these ideas should be used to thoroughly shake up or torpedo the Army as it now exists. If someone offers to lay a water pipeline, would it make any sense to start covering over a working well?

The Army is presently in the focus of attention; the eyes of society are fixed upon it, and its internal situation is the subject of qualified discussions. Is it possible that the Supreme Soviet, after it has passed all the highly important laws, will find the time and energy to write and pass one more - the "Law on the Army"?

Review of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Editorial Mail

90UM0636A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Jun 90 First Edition p 2

[Letters from readers: "From the May Mail: What Is Troubling the Readers?"]

[Text] In response to the readers' request to publish a letters column each month, today we are presenting the latest selection for your attention. The editors received a total of around 10,000 letters in May. We have published 253 of them, which is 30% more than for the same period last year. Around 150 letters were used in one form or another in newspaper articles. The readers sent in 1,633 responses to the newspaper's articles, while 903 readers responded to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA articles in May of 1989.

As in April, the May mail is of a clearly defined politicized nature. Congresses of people's deputies of the USSR and the republics, reflections on the CPSU and preparations for the 23rd Congress, specific proposals for the drafts of the party Platform and Charter, events in the Baltic area, the Transcaucasus and Moldavia—these and many other things prompted our readers to take up pen and paper and enter into the discussion of truly fateful issues.

"Naturally, letters from and about front-line fighters, about their current feats and affairs, dominated the May mail in this year of the 45th anniversary of the Great Victory. Thoughts about the historic significance of the Victory stood out in the subject matter of the mail, and there was criticism of those who attempt to belittle it.

The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers show great interest in the Armed Forces and in their treatment. Many letters contain appeals decisively to rebuff those who are set on driving a wedge between the people and the army, those who engage in carping and ranting instead of constructive and objective criticism. This specifically applies to mail on the reform of the Armed Forces.

We thank our readers also for the advice to the newspaper.

Into the Military Reform Program: And the Commanders Are Silent...

There are differing views on the military reform today. The group of people's deputies from the military offer their ideas and solutions, while the USSR Ministry of Defense and the government have their own. Experiments are already underway in certain formations.

Those who work right in the forces, however, are not especially consulted on how they regard the reform or how they view its substance. The commanders at the company, platoon and ship levels themselves are not eager to express their feelings and do not seek a platform for doing so. It is clear, however, that one cannot have a complete picture without knowing the opinions of that large group of people performing the actual work on the line.

I therefore want to express my thoughts on the reform in the Navy.

I feel that when we convert to the professional manning system (and, in my opinion, this is inevitable in the Navy), we must establish large general naval centers with the latest equipment and simulators for preparing specialists. The training period at a center should be a year or a year and a half, depending upon the field. There

should be 2 to 4 months of mandatory OJT on a ship. The centers should be staffed with people between the ages of 18 and 30 years with at least a secondary or technical secondary education.

I believe it would be expedient to set up—possibly at the military commissariats—centers for the reception of new members into the military service and for publicizing and promoting naval service among the public, particularly the youth. We are perfectly capable of reducing the numerical strength of the Navy by retiring old ships which do meet the requirements for modern naval combat. This would unquestionably entail a reduction in the size of the command apparatus and control elements to the extent even of disbanding a number of such structures and replacing them with automated, high-speed command and control systems.

And it goes without saying—how long do we need to discuss this (?)—that we must stop using naval personnel to perform jobs not related to their service duties? It was recently calculated that the warrant officers and officers on our ship spend around 50% of their duty time in the supply agencies. Can we accept that?

The military educational system is in need of significant reorganization. It has been determined that the existing one does not provide the necessary quality of officer training. It is bloated and uncoordinated, which results in a squandering of funds. By reducing the number of military educational institutions we will be able to improve the materials and equipment base of the remaining ones and turn them into strong educational centers for the troop arms and branches of the Armed Forces. We could then achieve a situation in which no more than 30% of the total officer corps would consist of graduates of military educational institutions. The rest would be provided the army and navy by civilian VUZs.

Incidentally, the existence of a large number of "people's" officers in the army and navy would enable us to resolve the problem of "personnel turnover" in the primary positions. The graduates of civilian VUZs, contract officers, would not be burdened by considerations of career "climbing" but could work a long time at the same jobs, performing them on a good professional level.

Capt-Lt N. Avraamov, commander of the escort vessel
Svirepyy

The Position: From One Extreme to Another

This is what prompted me write. On the popular television program "Serving the Homeland" on Sunday, 20 May of this year, a journalist (not shown) commenting on a military parade at a Baltic garrison stated about Soviet soldiers and the army that despite the critical attacks on them, they bear no guilt before the Soviet people. He concluded the statement with the words: "...or before God."

It seems strange to hear such words in a program devoted to the army and its problems. Some time before that a guitarist on the same kind of program sang songs imbued with profound pessimism and appealing to the heavenly powers, to God.

Does the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, one asks, have anything to do with the preparation of the program "Serving the Homeland"? It is also strange that the Communist Party leadership has declared its adherence to a Marxist-Leninist outlook but has now essentially curtailed the promotion of scientific atheism, and the draft CPSU Platform regards the church (and therefore religion) as an assistant in establishing mutual understanding among people. Is this not a retreat from its philosophy?

Please understand me. I am certainly not advocating a return to the times of infringement of the rights of citizens to freedom of conscience and religious belief and the ignoring of the sensitivities of believers. But why go from one extreme to another?

Col (Res) A. Kiyanenko, Moscow

A Biased View: Where the Army Is Losing

I entered the army with joy. I served three years and returned a sergeant with all the badges of military valor. My son served two years. He was recently released into the reserve. I asked him: "What did the army give you?" His reply: "Those who have not served in the army have lost a great deal. Those who have served have lost even more." I was not happy with that reply. In some ways I understand my son, however. This is why. Our sons begin their service at assembly centers. They are immediately given to understand that they are no longer at home. The "homey" attitude has to be changed, to be sure. But why substitute rudeness for strictness? For my son the army revealed one of its negative sides precisely in this way. Once the order "Fall in!" was given. Everyone took his backpack and placed it before him. And my son happened to place his guitar beside the backpack. The officer smashed it. The musical instrument, the friend, with which the kids had from the third grade traveled the tourist paths and sung songs around the campfire was no more. The guitar had been played at send-offs into the army. Friends had autographed it and inscribed their best wishes for the service on it. Now its performance was ruined.

When my son was in training, I visited the site for a concert (I work in a philharmonic). I met my son. He and some other soldiers were dressed in service blouses which had just been washed and wrung out. "We had nothing to change into...." And this was in October.... I also witnessed the performance of discharge procedures. Lord, how difficult and disordered it all was! Now this was lacking, now that; now the supply room was locked; now the stamp was missing; now they had everything, but the commander was not present....

A year later a tour took me near my son's new station. Naturally, I visited him and gave a concert. A general, the division commander, was expected that day. What a mess! There were orders, yelling, cursing; everyone was running about; things were being washed, polished, swept. But things should be kept clean everyday and not just when the commander is coming. So why the turmoil?

I was offended for the army, which I had known as something different. That one was different from us deficient civilians in that it had been able skilfully to organize a large body of people, direct them rapidly and intelligently and arrange them all where they belonged. What has become of all this? And how did the army get the nonregulation relations and ethnic clannishness (I shall not bring up the subject of how my son suffered considerably because of them). Where did the rude, unintelligent officers come from? I decided to share these thoughts with you, respected comrades. I want our army to be a school for the young people. A school not just of military affairs but also of culture, order and organization.

A. Lunin, Rovno

A referendum Is Needed: Open Letter to Members of the LiSSR Supreme Soviet

We are Lithuanian soldiers serving far from home, in the Central Group of Forces. We are deeply disturbed by the course of events in our homeland. We believe that you have passed a number of laws which are inconsistent with the interests of all the peoples residing within the republic and ignore the opinion of many thousands of citizens, including Lithuanians, who absolutely oppose separating from the USSR.

One cannot in an instant sever the political, economic, social and simply human ties which bind us Lithuanians with the entire Soviet people. While unconditionally supporting our right to self-determination, even to the point of state separation, we call upon you strictly to observe the Law on the Procedure for Resolving Issues Pertaining to the Withdrawal of Union Republics From the USSR passed at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Only a national forum should decide the fate of the Lithuanian people and peoples residing within the LiSSR. We call upon you strictly to follow and observe the provisions of the USSR Constitution and laws of the Soviet Union before withdrawing the republic from the USSR.

Arturas Aleksandravichyus, Arnoldas Virvilas, Daryus Karnavichyus, Arunas Kasperavichyus, Virgilius Minas

There Is a Question: Do the Ships Have the Right Names?

There have been frequent reports in the newspapers that the two largest aircraft carriers of our Navy, presently under construction, have been named the Tbilisi and Riga. In light of what is occurring in the nation today,

this decision evokes bewilderment and protest. Our position is based on the following.

We consider it inadmissible for the most modern ships of our navy and its future flagships, which will unquestionably become things of glory and pride for the nation, to be named after the capitals of republics which permit abuse of the army and navy, where the military draft of the indigenous population is disrupted in a manner organized at fairly high levels, where military memorials are desecrated, where officers of the Soviet Army, Great patriotic War veterans and soldier/internationalists are harassed.

We in no way want to cast aspersions upon all the residents of Georgia and Latvia. Many of them have nothing to do with what we have mentioned, of course, and do not accept it. We still suggest, however, that in the current situation the ships depart for the ocean expanses with different names.

I. Chirigin, dean of the history department at Bashkir State University; B. Khoroshavin, assistant dean; O. Naumenkov, department head;

M. Kulsharipov, instructor (8 signatures in all)

Uzbek Deputy on Deaths Among Central Asian Troops

90UM0798A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 1 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by Karim Bakhriyev, people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR: "'Load 200': Why Are Soldiers Not at War Dying?"]

[Text] Two years ago I wrote an article on soldiers dying in peace time for the republic LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. It was not printed for a long time, because the censor did not want to sign it.

We have a valid saying in the East, however, to the effect that you can't cover the moon with your shirttail. They ultimately had to publish my article.

In recent years soul-numbing "death notices," and not letters from soldiers, have been arriving in the cities and settlements with increasing frequency.

The last zinc coffin this year, number 190 by count, was hauled to Tashkent on 25 July. And a tense situation developed in the city. Numerous times activists of the Birluk people's movement have organized processions through the city with the body of a dead soldier. This time as well, around 2,000 people demanded that the authorities explain the real, underlying cause of the soldier's death (the official conclusion was suicide) and punish those to blame.

The mass-meetings and funerals have almost led to riots and pogroms. This time the police gained control of the situation with difficulty. But this is not the way out, not the solution to the problem! As a people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR, I have visited many subunits in which the

Uzbek soldiers have a bad time of it because of infractions of military discipline and the absence of proper order. Maj Vladimir Zolotukhin, a people's deputy and also from the Uzbek SSR, enlightened me, explaining what the term "load 200" means in military parlance. It refers to a zinc coffin packed in a wooden box, which weighs approximately 200 kilograms.

A total of 430 such sinister loads arrived in Uzbekistan last year alone. I do not need to tell you that this greatly disturbed our parliamentary commission. Was there any place we did not turn? We traveled to Moscow more than once and visited the CPSU Central Committee, the nation's government and the USSR Ministry of Defense. I was part of a large group of people's deputies of the USSR received by Comrade Yazov, the nation's defense minister. At the meeting he made the following comment: "The percentage of servicemen dying in the army from accidents, suicide and hooliganism is approximately the same as in civilian life."

I am well aware that a criminal case was instigated in each death of a soldier, that many officials have been severely punished and that a lot of preventive work is being performed universally in the forces. However,.... Young men continue to die.

One's own sorrow is worse, as they say. We received a detailed breakdown from the USSR Ministry of Defense for the period 1 August through 3 September 1989. A total of 138 Russians, 25 Ukrainians, 23 Uzbeks, 15 Kazakhs, 13 Belorussians, 7 Georgians, 7 Azeris and dozens of soldiers of other nationalities died during that month. The young men died most frequently at construction sites because of violations of safety measures.

Here are the causes of the deaths of those 23 Uzbek youth, however: Four were the victims of premeditated murder, five committed suicide (this large number has to evoke particular alarm), two were victims of automobile accidents, 11 lost their lives as a result of failure to observe safety measures in the performance of various construction and other jobs (!), and one died of an illness while hospitalized....

I know that it is always easy to criticize. There are things, however, against which criticism is not enough; we need to revolt against them. And not just individuals but the entire world. Today, however, I shall not attempt to speak for the entire nation. I want to discuss in detail the "Central Asian version" of the army problems, for they have existed a long time but we have stubbornly pretended that they did not exist. And it would be incorrect to ignore them today in the military reform underway in the nation.

It was learned that most of the soldiers from Uzbekistan who died were in military construction units. And it has been very properly decided to do away with them in the near future.

In my opinion, however, the very principles underlying the induction into the army must be altered. First of all,

we need to rid ourselves of the notorious plan. Many young men were to be drafted from the republic this spring, for example. There was a strict schedule for each oblast. It called for 20,635 young men to be drafted into construction units. Who are they, these uniformed recruits? Recovered alcoholics and drug addicts, young men with records, physically broken young men. And if there were perfectly healthy youth among them, these were not accepted into the construction units, because "they don't understand a thing in Russian."

Whether we want to or not, we must now admit that the army itself sometimes provokes interethnic feuds and tosses the first seeds of nationalism into the still untempered souls of those involved. Flourishing in the worst units are not only the repugnant dedovshchina but also clannishness, whereby whoever is in the majority dictates the way things are done in the subunit. Degradation stems from this, and it is not far from there to suicide.

"The poor caliber of draftees from Central Asia is not caused just by their poor knowledge of the Russian language, but by the environment itself. With respect to Uzbekistan, 3.5 times more toxic chemicals are applied to the soil there than in the nation as a whole. The results: puny boys with congenital diseases to whom a soldier's garb is offered when they attain their majority. How can we draft a young man from a remote rural area into the rocket troops, when we have around 2,000 schools in an emergency state in the republic and many children attend school in two or even three shifts?

The grief of parents who have lost their sons.... What can it be compared to?

Sabirdzhan Khazratkulov was born and grew up in the city of Shakhrisabz. His mother and father saw him off into the military service from there. They were proud that their son was a soldier and was serving in far-off Primorye. Sabirdzhan's letters became increasingly more alarming. One could sense from them how unpleasant the service was for him. However, the parents did not attach any significance to this.

A tragedy occurred on the distant island on 7 October 1989. Two of Khazratkulov's colleagues killed their comrade and burned his body in a bathhouse heater to hide the evidence. So that his parents did not receive even a coffin, but an urn of ashes.

This is a terrible story which makes one cringe. One can not draw far-reaching conclusions from it, of course. Unfortunately, no one has any guarantee against misfortune, against meanness or inhumanity, no matter where he serves. But how does one explain this to the mother of A young Siberian who died in the hands of doctors from a powerful sunstroke suffered during an exercise at a range lost in the scorching Kara Kum sands? What strategic need was there to force her son to serve in the unaccustomed 40-degree heat?

No one can convince me that we need an army which is incapable of ensuring the safety and health of those who

serve in it. I have on my desk a list of names which I cannot read with indifference. In Tashkent Shurkhrat Yakhyayev died of multiple head wounds incurred in a fight. And two young Kazakh men, military construction worker Nurlibek Smanov and seaman Nurzhon Dzhasanbayev, committed suicide.... Karakalpak Zholimbek Torekkyazov and Kirghiz Khotamzhon Dzhiurayev were shot to death by colleagues. And the most terrible thing is that new names are added to my "black list" almost every day.

Names of soldiers frequently end up on my list whom we ourselves have doomed to death, apparently unintentionally. A cursory look shows that many young men die of heart deficiencies, bronchial asthma, meningitis and viral hepatitis (this dangerous disease is extremely widespread in Uzbekistan today...). How has it happened that people known to be sick ended up in the army barracks? Is it not because the medical commissions at the induction centers frequently exist only for the record? And do we not know of cases in which, for a specific sum, certain officials in white robes classify perfectly healthy people unfit for military service, or, on the contrary, send obviously ill people into the army in their place? Probably few people today know that mainly the children of workers and peasants served in Afghanistan. How can one not assume that workers in the military commissariats have their own "rates" for seeing to it that someone's son "does not serve on the other side of the mountain"?

If in some places the "informal groups" hold meetings in memory of a soldier who has died in the army, do not be in a hurry to accuse them "of taking advantage of other people's sorrow for their own narrow, avaricious purposes." I believe they are right to demand that order be established in our army. Order whereby any mother who sees her son off into the military service can be confident that he is completely safe. If some of our sons do have to lay down their lives for the homeland, let the entire people take pride in them as heroes. After all, the main calling of the man in the uniform is to protect the homeland, and not to become a "load 200" innocently and for nothing.

And During That Time

First there was the "Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Ukraine": "...The Ukrainian SSR defines the procedure whereby citizens of the Ukrainian SSR perform military duty. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR ordinarily perform active military duty within the republic and may not be used for military purposes beyond its borders without the agreement of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet."

Then there were the deputy debates about a corresponding decree. They returned to it three times before passing it as a whole with consideration for the comments and additions. We need to hurry. The fall draft will soon be here, and the people's deputies have diverse opinions on the matter.

Igor Derkach, chairman of the Lvov branch of the Alliance of Independent Youth of the Ukraine (SNUM):

I consider the decree, which, among other things, calls for the recall of Ukrainian citizens performing first-term duty in the Armed Forces of the USSR, to be radical and timely.

As chairman of the SNUM branch, I want to state our intentions to conduct agitation work in the military units. We are preparing leaflets in the Ukrainian and Russian languages explaining the need to establish Ukrainian armed forces.

Maj Gen Vitaliy Pavlichenko, Crimean Oblast:

It is my opinion that we should not now spread out our forces among national billets. The situation requires that they remain an integral organization.

I shall repeat once again that the establishment of national armed forces is possible in the future. At this time, however, this is the prerogative of the USSR Ministry of Defense.—O. Musafirova

Col Gen Mironov Interviewed on Officer Cadet Training

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[Interview with Col Gen A. Mironov, deputy chief of the Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by Lt Col A. Dolgikh, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Officer Cadet of 1990: Who Is He?"]

[Text] This summer, as in previous years, the dream of many of our country's young men came true—they put on officer cadet shoulder boards. They put them on with the dream of becoming officers in the Soviet Armed Forces. However, not everyone of them will be able to make it to the "finish." In the process of training, some will be dismissed for lack of progress, some for poor military discipline, and some will leave on their own, carried away by disappointment.

And there are quite a few such people. On average, up to 15 percent of the officer cadets do not become officers. Thus hundreds of thousands of the people's money "are wasted." Then there are the graduates—young lieutenants who, having served not even 1 year and encountering their first difficulties, apply for discharge from the Army or Navy.

In short, there are quite a few problems in training officer personnel. Col Gen A. Mironov, deputy chief of the Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, tells our correspondent, Lt Col A. Dolgikh, how they are being resolved today and what is planned for the future in this context.

[Mironov] The initial cause of many of our problems today is the decline in the level of patriotic education of young people. The heroic past of the Soviet people is

being slandered. The attacks on the armed forces, often heard from various rostrums and from the pages of certain press publications, are also leaving traces. All this, of course, influences young people and their life choice.

Naturally, this does not apply to everyone. Above all, I would very much want to hope that this does not apply to those who have enrolled in the country's military educational institutions [VUZ] this year. What is more, it is namely these lads, who have not succumbed to the anti-army psychosis, in whom I have the most faith.

Incidentally, this year, contrary to predictions, we have had sufficient competition in the majority of VUZ's. Among those enrolling, more than 12 percent have already served in the army before school (warrant officers and extended-service military personnel), about 5 percent are graduates of the Suvorov and Nakhimov schools, and 83 percent are civilian youth. The majority of them are children of workers (48.1 percent). This year, 360 girls also enrolled in the military medical faculties at the Gorkiy, Kuybyshev, Tomsk, and Saratov medical institutes. The vast majority of the first-year students are Communists and Komsomol members.

[Dolgikh] Can a believer now become an officer?

[Mironov] I don't think that faith can be an obstacle in the desire to fulfill a dream. Incidentally, I do not know about believers, but this year considerably more people who are neither members of the part nor of the Komsomol enrolled this year than ever before. There are even such people among the officer cadets of military political schools.

[Dolgikh] What criteria are used to select applicants for military educational institutions?

[Mironov] Whereas before there were two criteria—average marks on the diploma and an overall assessment for entrance examinations, now we study an applicant using five parameters which make it possible to draw conclusions primarily about his personality qualities. These are social activeness, psychological stability, physical preparedness, general education, and health. There is his own approach and his own assessments to each criterion, which the board takes into account.

[Dolgikh] But there were medical boards working before, too...

[Mironov] Yes, there were medical boards, and they checked physical training, but the results of these examinations were still not always a cause for dismissing an applicant, except when a young man was sick or had poor eyesight. There were always some exceptions to the rule in hopes that in the future the lads would straighten themselves out and everything would be normal. Alas, these hopes were not justified in most cases. Therefore, now if a young person does not meet even one of the listed criteria, he will not be accepted at a military

educational institution. Here a heavy load falls on selection groups created at each VUZ. Using scientifically developed tests, researchers check the capability of every applicant to master one or another military specialty.

[Dolgikh] You said every. But, as we know, today a person can become an officer cadet by passing by the school; namely, through the republic military commissariats...

[Mironov] You have touched upon a very important question, and I would like to answer it in more detail. Since 1983 we have been conducting a out-of-competition selection to the schools of individuals who are of the native nationality of a number of union republics. This right takes into account their low competitive capability with respect to those who come from Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia. This year, boards have been working on out-of-competition selection in all republics except for the three Baltic republics. The selection plan was 87 percent fulfilled. Applicant selection went better in Moldavia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kirghizia. Incidentally, Moldavians regularly overfulfill the plan, and subsequently fewer of their applicants are dismissed than the rest.

Of course, such a selection principle may seem unfair to some with respect to the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. They say, they are accepted into the VUZ's right away essentially without any examinations. Be that as it may, it is more difficult for "non-Russian" lads to pass only in the overall group: entrance examinations are given in the Russian language, and not all of them, unfortunately, know it to a sufficient degree. At the same time, many of them are dismissed during the course of studies for various reasons—up to 30 percent of them. But the remaining 70 percent still become officers, reach manhood, and find their place in the overall system. The 7 years of experience of this practice confirms its correctness.

[Dolgikh] A final, traditional question. What is planned for the future?

[Mironov] We have developed a concept, essentially a personnel policy ideology, for the period from 1991 to 1995 and for the future until the year 2000. Its main purpose is to take into account dynamically the changes in the country and the world, as well as the development of science and technology. The base military education will be deeper. In this regard, it is envisioned to consider converting schools to training officers with a command and engineering specialty.

It is planned to create regular and supplementary preparatory courses at the military schools. It is also desirable to expand the network of boarding schools with intensified military-physical training...

[Dolgikh] I heard that they are trying to close such a school in Moldavia.

[Mironov] Yes, and set up a police school on its base. But in spite of this, the Moldavians should still have, in my opinion, a boarding school.

In addition to the above, we are planning in the to expand admittance of women into military schools, especially communications schools and certain others. We are also studying the possibility of holding training assemblies for soldiers and sailors in compulsory term of service directly at the schools in order to give their command authorities an opportunity to better study their future students.

As you can see, there are many changes in store. And they are all aimed at quality training of the future officer corps of the USSR Armed Forces.

Military Tribunals Chief on Campaign Against 'Dedovshchina'

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[Interview with Lt Gen Justice Anatoliy Ivanovich Muranov, chief of the Military Tribunal Directorate, by Maj I. Ivanyuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Military Tribunals and 'Dedovshchina'"]

[Text] The Decree of the USSR President "On Certain Measures To Strengthen Social and Legal Protection of Service Members" was promulgated on 6 September of this year. Among the problems it touched upon were ensuring safety of personnel and protecting the life, health, dignity, and honor of people. All this obliges the bodies of military justice to restructure their work on strengthening legal safeguards of soldiers and sailors who have suffered from illegal actions, primarily actions associated with manifestations at variance with regulations. Our interview with Lt Gen Justice A. Muranov, chief of the Military Tribunal Directorate, is about this.

[Ivanyuk] The Decree of the USSR President contains a fundamentally new provision—the USSR Supreme Soviet is to consider the question of granting service members the right to appeal directly to military tribunals about the illegal actions of officials and bodies of a military administration. What do you think of this?

[Muranov] Today, judicial reform has received perhaps the greatest development of all directions of legal reform. And the decree is its logical continuation. It significantly expands the grounds on which a service member can turn to the tribunal for judicial protection. A special, non-judicial appeal procedure for individual categories of citizens was abolished recently. A rule in Part 1, Article 3 of the 2 November 1989 law "On Procedure for Appealing to the Court Illegal Actions of Bodies of State Administration and Officials Infringing on the Rights of Citizens" continues to be in effect for service members. It states that "actions of bodies of state administration and officials cannot be appealed to the court if legislation provides for a different appeal procedure." For service members, as we know, the Disciplinary Regulations

provide for appeal by way of subordination. Now, obviously, part of these appeals will come under jurisdiction of military tribunals. The decree stipulates that this involves illegal actions going beyond prescribed relations and infringing on the rights and personal dignity of service members.

It is too early to say what these actions are specifically. Judicial practice will show this. But I think they may include not only complaints of service members but also of their parents, for example, about illegal actions of commanders associated with attempts to conceal relations that are at variance with regulations.

[Ivanyuk] How will the decisions adopted affect the work of the military tribunals?

[Muranov] It also has changed noticeably lately. Today, we consider any issue through a prism of legal protection of people, regardless of whether or not they are service members. There are more "not guilty" verdicts—their number has more than doubled lately. The rehabilitation process is increasing. For example, just in the first six months of the year, military tribunals of the districts completely rehabilitated 1,115 people unjustly convicted in past years, including former service members. Judges have turned towards cases of private accusation and also civil cases, which affect the most important and significant rights of service members, workers, and employees of the Army and Navy. Thus, lately tribunals have been settling more than 80 percent of the lawsuits for a wide variety of law violations.

We are approaching safeguarding of rights more exactly in the stage of executing judicial decisions. I have in mind primarily the more effective compensation for damage inflicted on service members and other citizens who are victims of crimes. And this involves millions of rubles recovered by tribunals for their benefit. In short, this involves a wide range of issues of legal protection.

[Ivanyuk] Nevertheless, let us get back to relations that are at variance with regulations. It is no secret that one out of every four or five cases considered each year by military tribunals is linked one way or another to mockery or harassment of young soldiers by senior soldiers...

[Muranov] I know that many people have gotten the opinion that the problem of relations that are at variance with regulations is continually growing and that 'dedovshchina' has swept through all units? Is this true? I can say unequivocally that it is not. In reality, it is not the problem of 'dedovshchina' that is becoming more acute, but glasnost is expanding, which is more and more clearly bringing light to life in Army barracks and Navy crew quarters.

According to data of the Military Tribunal Directorate, 1985 was the peak of convictions for relations at variance with regulations. That year 4,000 people were convicted for these crimes. In 1989, military tribunals convicted 1,990 people for violations of regulations

governing mutual relations. Based on data published in the press on personnel strength of the USSR Armed Forces, the coefficient of convictions for manifestations at variance with regulations is about 50 people per 100,000 service members.

[Ivanyuk] Can you somehow compare this to similar data on convictions for the country as a whole?

[Muranov] It is difficult to do this. You see, civilian law enforcement bodies categorize similar offenses involving violence under different articles. For example, for cases involving hooliganism this coefficient is about 30 per 100,000 people; for cases involving aggravated assault, it is about 10 per 100,000; and so forth. Moreover, more than half of the service members were convicted for relations at variance with regulations, resulting in light bodily injury to the victims or beatings. Convictions of this sort are not counted separately throughout the country, although they are considerable. What is more, many such offenses do not reach the court at all in civilian life.

[Ivanyuk] But isn't the figure of 1,990 convicted for 'dedovshchina' cited by you, figuratively speaking, just the tip of the iceberg?

[Muranov] You can, of course, call in question the reliability of these official statistics. You also can assert that holding officers more accountable for cases of relations that are at variance with regulations leads to their concealment. Indeed, officers do not always report them, and the cases do not always reach the military tribunal. However, unexposed crime is linked mainly to those forms of violence which did not entail significant consequences for the victim's health. The lack of such forms for specific cases could give rise to doubts about the objectivity of judicial statistics. But of the 3,800 victims for cases considered in 1989, 3,000 service members received light bodily injuries or beatings. This is weighty grounds to assert that the absolute majority of cases with serious consequences still end up with not guilty verdicts. In cases when victims suffer severe and less severe bodily injuries (there were 708 last year), it is quite difficult to conceal these crimes. The number of them dropped by more than half in the last 4 years. That is, the dynamics of convictions for the most serious forms of 'dedovshchina' also indirectly confirm that a real process of improving the situation in the armed forces is under way. Data from other research also indicate this. Whereas in 1985, for those five military districts in which the research was conducted, an average of 41 percent of the service members stated that they had experienced mutual relations that were at variance with regulations, in 1990 one-third of those surveyed answered affirmatively to these questions. Furthermore, whereas in 1985 from 50 to 70 percent of the service members in compulsory term of service knew about relations at variance with regulations committed in the units, in 1990 from 80 to 90 percent of the service

members knew. The forms of manifestation of 'dedovshchina' have also grown milder; verbal insults are predominant, but by no means beatings.

At the same time, I believe it necessary to emphasize that the leadership of the armed forces justifiably believes that it has still not managed to eliminate the criticality of the problem. One cannot but agree with such an assessment. The disease has gone deep, and considerable efforts will still be required for complete recovery. In this context, the Decree of the USSR President is quite timely and should play a positive role.

[Ivanyuk] Anatoliy Ivanovich, are the military tribunals conducting any preventive work to eliminate relations that are at variance with regulations?

[Muranov] Certainly. By the way, this was discussed this year for the first time at the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Justice. It was noted there, in particular, that military courts try about 80 percent of the cases at the military units in the presence of personnel. There is a practice of trying such cases at draft boards, in schools, and agricultural vocational-technical schools [SPTU]. This has an appreciable educational effect.

Sociological studies are conducted, including at the initiative of military tribunal judges. Legal propaganda occupies a considerable place in their activities. For example, in recent years judges participated in creating eight video tapes on specific criminal cases about mutual relations at variance with regulations; they are widely used in preventive work.

I want to emphasize that serious, painstaking work is constantly being carried out in this direction. I am confident that the Decree of the USSR President will give it a new, powerful impetus and will expand our capabilities in increasing the effectiveness of judicial protection of service members.

Pay Raises for Civilian Defense Workers

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[Interview with Maj Gen P. Kuchmu, chief of the Directorate of Labor and Wages of Workers and Employees of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "New Wage Terms"]

[Text] Recently the newspaper's editorial office has been receiving letters from workers of housing and municipal services workers of the Ministry of Defense who are interested in changes in their wage terms.

We asked Maj Gen Kuchmu, chief of the Directorate of Labor and Wages of Workers and Employees of the USSR Ministry of Defense, to explain this issue. Here is what he had to say.

Introduction of new wage terms for housing and municipal services workers being financed through the budget or through cost recovery is envisioned beginning 1

October 1990, and beginning 1 July 1990 for those at cost-accounting enterprises using the funds of these enterprises and organizations and as they are procured.

In accordance with this order, only salaries of housing and municipal services workers are raised by 35-45 percent. Payment of a percentage bonus for continuous work has been introduced. For the first time, they will receive an additional payment for working at night in the amount of 35 percent of the hourly rate for every hour of work. Higher bonuses have been established. Funds in the amount of a 3-month wage fund a year are allocated for this.

Salaries of managers of hotels have been set depending on the amount of revenue for stays, and salaries of housing office managers depending on the total volume of area serviced.

With the introduction of the new wage terms, raises and additional payments as incentives for using progressive forms of organization of labor, increasing professional skills, and improving the standards of serving the population are retained.

I will take advantage of this opportunity to inform the readers that this order also introduces new wage terms for paramilitary security, firefighting, and sentry workers. These workers will receive raises at the same times.

Resolution Establishes Fees for Dacha Use

90SV0081C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Unattributed article: "On Use of Official Dachas"]

[Text] Based on the 30 June 1990 resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers "On Regulating the Use of Official Dachas Under the Jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Defense," an order of the minister of defense has been issued which authorizes supervisory personnel to use facilities in jurisdictional dacha settlements and retired or reserve veterans of the USSR Armed Forces to use resort hotels for rest and relaxation, with fees levied for their stay, amortization of furniture, and communal services in accordance with existing norms, rates, and prices.

The operating staff of dacha settlements will be supported through lease payments. The lease contract is to be concluded at least for the period of the summer season (from 1 May to 1 October).

Use of service members to service the dacha facilities is prohibited.

The leaseholder is obligated to make careful use of the facilities and furniture, plants, and fruit trees, and to fertilize, water, prune, and care for them at his own expense. Routine maintenance is also done at his own expense.

Payment rates for facilities during the summer season have been set. Thus, the rates for Moscow, Leningrad, Moscow Oblast, and Leningrad Oblast are as follows: 3 rubles per square meter for Category 1 rooms; 2 rubles 70 kopecks for Category 2 rooms and garrets; 1 ruble 20 kopecks for glass terraces; 60 kopecks for open terraces; and 70 kopecks for garages. The payment is correspondingly lower for leasing facilities in dacha settlements located in autonomous republics, krais, and oblasts.

Signal Officer Notes 45% Shortage of Platoon Officers

90SV0094A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Capt A. Veklich, Turkestan Military District: "Military Reform: Problems and Proposals": "Protect an Officer from the Very Beginning"]

[Text] On the eve of the exercise, Lt Col V. Tokarev, chief of the Field Communication Center, was not in a very good mood. Due to a great shortage of platoon commanders, he had to make quick corrections in the exercise schedule. But, no matter how much he thought about it, each leader still had several training groups with each person having a different specialty profile.

"For several years now we have had a 45% shortfall in our platoon commanders," explained Lt Col Murtazin. "But the efficiency of even those we have on board is not great. Young officers, together with the enlisted men, carry the entire burden of garrison and sentry duties, and for periods of a month or longer are sent on official assignments. There is hardly any time left to train specialists or to conduct individual training with subordinates. Sr Lt Yu. Melnik has been away on temporary duty for over a month now."

Platoon Commander Lt O. Rasulov is in a small unit, but even he has a problem in finding time for training with subordinates: Military training every other day. The rest of the junior officers are not in any better shape. Having acquired experience in carrying out their duties, the communication men naturally lose their professional skills. Instead of improving their skills, they have to make up for what they have neglected.

In any case, even if having duty in different kinds of work details would be somehow combined with combat training, the platoon commander would still not be in a position to completely fulfill everything that is prescribed to him by regulations, directives, and manuals. And here is why.

Sociological research among the troops, conducted by officers of the military district political directorate, showed the following picture: According to the plan for conducting ideological work, prescribed by various official documents, a platoon commander must perform 23 activities in the course of one month; these take 39 hours. The higher command has to perform eight analogous activities with him, which take 15 hours. The total is 31 activities and 54 work hours.

Again, in accordance with official documents for completing the program of combat training, a platoon commander has to conduct 57 activities with subordinates, including participating himself, for which 416 hours have been designated. For "strengthening military discipline," 43 activities and 193 hours have been designated.

In total, a platoon commander participates in 140 activities, comprising 578 hours. If you consider that he has 25-26 work days per month, and take a ten-hour work day as a basis, we get 250-260 hours for fulfilling duty obligations. Thus, in order to fulfill everything that is prescribed, a platoon commander is short by 328-338 hours. This is the sad arithmetic...

In fighting for social protection of officers, we often remain silent about one of its basic items: the normal workday. In a conversation with me, Capt O. Khvostov did not hide the fact that when he comes home he is like a squeezed out-lemon, and has only one thought in mind: to quickly forget about everything during a short sleep. But even a normal rest at home is a great luxury for young officers. As the same analysis showed, platoon commanders spend 8-10 nights at home per month.

Physical, moral, and psychological burdens are colossal. And what do they get in return? Take, for example, Sr Lt V. Barbo. He has been a platoon commander for five years. Soon he will be eligible to become a captain, but he has no commensurate duties. Nor does he have quarters, but is cooped up with his family in a mud-clay cottage for which he pays 100-150 rubles a month.

It is no coincidence that in recent years, not only in the communication center, but also in the [military] district, there has been a sharp increase in the number of requests from young officers to resign from the Armed Forces. It should be pointed out that the decision to take this step is not at all being made by the least qualified specialists. True, as was mentioned at one of the [military] district staff meetings, the tendency of young officers to resign has been stemmed for now. But for how long?

Right now the majority of young officers are placing their hopes on military reform. They expect basic changes in the organization of duties for officers and the creation of necessary conditions to enable them to fulfill their obligations. It is also necessary to have realistic official documents, limit their excessive numbers, dispense with over-organization, and present an opportunity for showing creativity and initiative.

If this is not done, the officer corps in just a few more years may be deprived of its future: the young, promising, superbly-trained specialists who are capable of training and educating their subordinates. Hundreds of requests from young officers to resign, a sharp decrease in the number of those wishing to enter military schools, and a decline in the prestige of military service in the eyes of young people are all factors that call for basic changes in the army and navy as quickly as possible.

Shortage of Judicial Officers

90SV0104A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Letter to the editors and response: "Investigators in Short Supply"]

[Text] There is much talk of the struggle against the hazing of recruits and crimes committed in the Armed Forces. Who is doing something about it? For example, I know an investigator that has about a dozen cases on his hands. What is wrong? Is the Army short of investigators, also?

M. Nesterov, Leningrad

Colonel of Justice Yu. Shaytanov, deputy chief of the Personnel Department, Main Military Procuracy, answers:

Indeed, military procuracies are definitely short of investigators at the present time. Chronic understaffing has risen from 12 to 15 percent of officer personnel. Of this number, many are investigators. Not a single military procuracy in a district, group of forces, or fleet is operating with its table of organization fully satisfied.

There were 59 officers discharged into the reserves in the first half of the year, due largely to their refusal to serve in military procuracy organs. Many officers feel that the heavy workload, frequent travel and associated personal inconveniences, lack of housing, and child care problems are not fully justified by the pay and job satisfaction, thus preferring to work in a civilian procuracy.

Of the few officers graduating from the military institute military justice faculty this year that have joined military procuracy organs, a number have already made known their intention of not remaining in the service. Seventeen percent of the total number of investigators serving in military procuracies are two year officers whose plans do not include remaining in the service.

We are taking decisive measures to eliminate this short-handedness, of course. This includes singling out from service personnel men who possess a higher legal education and determining which warrant officers are credited with this kind of training. We are calling up jurists via military commissariats. In addition, Main Military Procuracy officers have a number of times visited large centers which train persons that will be working in legal organs. Sixty students expressed an interest in the service. However, we will not have the benefit of their services, since the plans of law VUZ's and faculties unfortunately do not include assignment of graduates to military justice organs. We do not have our own military justice academy, although one did exist at one time.

Thus, the shortage of trained personnel continues to exist, in spite of all our efforts. In addition, it often happens that our investigators take positions in USSR Procuracy groups. Military Procuracy officers are required to travel on temporary duty for extended periods of time to service motor vehicle transportation battalions. The number of officers assigned to work in the Chernobyl AES area is approaching 200.

Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties, the vast majority of Military Procuracy officers are carrying out their duties in a conscientious and responsible manner.

Performance, Specifications of ZSU-23-4

90UM0678A Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 6, Jun 90 p 10

[Article by Reserve Colonel V. Knyazkov: "The ZSU-23-4M Self-Propelled Antiaircraft Gun"; first paragraph is VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA introduction.]

[Text] Today's arsenal of PVO [air defense] weapons looks formidable and impressive. It includes everything from fighter-interceptors and surface-to-air missiles to machineguns. A worthy place here is occupied by guns, but of course not the kind that were used in the Great Patriotic War.

Modern combat is characterized by its extremely dynamic nature, extensive battlefield size, large amount of combat equipment, and powerful aviation support. The need to protect units from aerial attack under these conditions gives rise to the requirement for an antiaircraft weapon that is mounted on a wheeled or tracked chassis, covered with armor, and provided with highly accurate radar and electronic controls and fire direction system. The combat concept here is simple: a mobile and highly effective PVO weapon that a combined-arms commander can employ in any situation, when in defense, on the offense, or on a march. This need is fully met by the ZSU-23-4M self-propelled antiaircraft artillery unit. What kind of weapon is it?

To begin with, the ZSU is provided with the 23-mm AZP-23M automatic quad gun. The caliber is obviously small, but there is a saying in this regard: "Great things come in small packages."

Consider one of the specifications - the rate of fire. It is 800 to 1,000 rounds per minute for each gun tube, or 3,200 to 4,000 for all four of them. You can safely say that this is enormous. We are speaking of an artillery piece that fires projectiles weighing 200 grams apiece, after all, not something like an assault rifle, which fires a bullet weighing only a few grams. That is quite a difference. All a person has to do is press the electric trigger for a second to send a burst of 66 projectiles on their way toward an aerial target.

What is the purpose of that? To raise as high as possible the chances of destroying attacking fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft located in the area of their target by firing one or two bursts. Otherwise, PVO would not be of much use! This high rate of fire is made possible by the excellent design of the weapon.

The guns are belt-fed. In each belt there are 50 rounds (there are 40 boxes, such that the total is 2,000 rounds), in two types: fragmentation-incendiary, and AP-incendiary. They all provide a tracer effect to facilitate visual observation of fire with associated adjustment. The weapon is fired in bursts: three rounds for a short burst, 5 for medium, and 10 for long, per gun. Effective range is 2,500 meters. The ZSU can also engage ground targets, if necessary.

Now a few words about the instruments provided the ZSU. The method whereby an observer uses binoculars to try to spot hostile aircraft is no longer suitable to our time. The ZSU-23-4M is equipped with a highly sensitive radar that is capable of early detection of hostile aircraft under all conditions of visibility. The radar antenna has its own special mount on the turret. It consists of a flat cylinder made of radio-transparent material housing the antenna proper, which is shaped like a parabolic mirror.

The crew employs the antenna to conduct active search for aerial targets in a 360-degree zone. If a blip appears on the radar screen, this could represent an aircraft! But is it one of ours? A friend or foe interrogation ensues immediately. If the aircraft is hostile, the radar starts to track it automatically. An invisible radio beam formed by the antenna acts as if it were tied to the target as it follows all of its motions, in so doing establishing the line of sight. At the same time, the radar determines the azimuth, angle of site, and range.

The data generated are fed to an onboard processor - in essence a specialized computer - programmed to do one task: calculate the lead angles. In other words, the computer solves the prediction problem on a continuing basis. This means that the ZSU immediately initiates the conduct of fire for effect without adjustment, since the gun tubes are accurately aimed at the aircraft's future position.

The designers have also endowed the unit with a new combat quality: the capability of conducting aimed fire at attacking fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft while in motion. They accomplished this by introducing into the onboard equipment complex a system that stabilizes the line of sight and the line of elevation. To put this in graphic terms, the system remembers the gun settings and retains them during fire. This means that if the unit strikes a pothole during fire, sensitive sensors instantly record the amount and direction of deflection to issue a command to servo mechanisms that produce the stabilizing moment. The position of the radar and the gun tubes remains constant.

Here are some of the weapon's specifications: combat weight, 20.5 tons; length, 6.54 meters; width, 2.95 meters; antenna height, 3.8 meters; turret height, 2.25 meters. The 280-hp engine is capable of powering the unit at speeds up to 44 kilometers per hour. The rated cruising radius is quite sufficient: 450 kilometers on one tank filling. The unit offers very good turning capability: The minimum turning radius does not exceed 3 meters. Although the unit's combat weight is considerable, the average ground pressure is 0.69 kgf/cm², which is comparable with that of a man. The ground clearance - 0.4 meter - is also good. It is accurate to say that the ZSU "can hold its own" with respect to off-the-road performance. Many natural and artificial barriers are not a problem for it. Here is some proof of that: fording depth, 1.07 meter; angle of climb, not greater than 30°; vertical

wall, 1.1 meter; maximum ditch, 2.8 meters. The four-man crew consists of the following: commander; search operator-gunner; range operator; driver-mechanic.

The ZSU is equipped with many other mechanisms and systems that provide the unit with high reliability and survivability.

In conclusion, it may be said that the tactical and technical specifications are such that the weapon is capable of successful combat against modern aerial attackers.

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Notes On Engineering Reconnaissance Vehicle

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[Article by Maj. Yu. Klenov: "The 'Zhuk' Scout"]

[Text] Recently KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has begun to tell more about our combat equipment. I am glad that glasnost is also penetrating Army spheres; I only wish that these articles would appear more often. Specifically, could you tell about the equipment with which our engineer reconnaissance is presently armed? If it is not a secret, of course... [Letter from P. Yefimenko]

Yes, until recently you couldn't read anything anywhere in the open press about this unusual vehicle, which looks like a beetle. Even the second (1986) edition of the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary mentions the engineer reconnaissance vehicle as if it were only foreign equipment. It says there that an armored, amphibious, off-road vehicle, outfitted with equipment for terrain reconnaissance during combat action, can determine the width, depth, and current speed of water obstacles, the nature of bottom soil, the slopes of banks, the carrying capacity of bridges, etc.

All this also applies in full to our vehicle, which was developed, incidentally, on the basis of the infantry fighting vehicle [BMP] with which many are familiar. But differences from the ordinary BMP immediately strike one. The "claws" of the river wide-swath mine detectors do lend the engineer reconnaissance vehicle [IRM] a very peculiar appearance.

And the different instruments it has! Something borrowed from the sailors, something from the aviators, something from the tankers. The engineer reconnaissance vehicle has an echo sounder which can be used to map the bottom configuration, an artificial horizon to measure the steepness of slopes and evaluate the capabilities of the combat vehicles to emerge onto the bank, a penetrometer to study the soil...

The fuel range of the IRM is 500 kilometers. Speed is more than 50 kilometers per hour. It is simply indispensable, for example, for reconnaissance during the laying of cross-country routes. You see, foreign military experts believe isolation of the battlefield through the mining of routes of movement to be a very effective means of combating the enemy. In this case negotiating minefields leads to delay and concentration of equipment. But in a special tactical exercise that I visited recently, the subordinates of a platoon leader of engineer reconnaissance, Sr. Lt. V. Luchkov, conducted the search for mines right on the move, in the IRM.

I also had a chance to see other capabilities of the vehicle with my own eyes. For instance, a sector contaminated by "toxic agents" was encountered. If this were to happen in a real battle, the protective system would automatically be activated. This is provided for by the design features of the vehicle. It also has fire-fighting equipment, a water-pumping device, propellers for movement afloat... The assault rifles and grenades with which the engineers are armed, and the machinegun on the IRM cupola, are quite reliable protection against reconnaissance and raiding parties.

"It's a good vehicle, reliable," was Lt. Luchkov's comment.

Description of PVO Early Warning System

90SV0103A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Article by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev: "A Bridle for 'Nuclear Racers,' or the Missile-Attack Warning System"]

[Text] The reader seems to know that the United States and Canada have a joint system and a combined command for aerospace defense of the North American continent (NORAD). At the present time, NORAD performs functions not only of air defense but of space defense and antimissile defense as well, and also of warning of a missile attack.

But we journalists have not talked fully about the corresponding tasks of our Armed Forces (of course, not by choice), stating, for example, that PVO [Air Defense] Troops are intended only for combating air targets. But, you see, the structure of the PVO Troops organizationally includes strategic deterrence systems that are available in the USSR Armed Forces—the missile-attack warning system (SPRN), the outer space verification system (SKKP), and the antiballistic missile defense system (PRO) [ABM].

We offer for your consideration feature stories about strategic deterrence systems, whose installations our correspondent visited for the first time. Today's feature story is about the missile-attack warning system.

The panel was suddenly filled with a soft greenish light, and it displayed a row of figures. Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Marukhlenko, the operations duty officer for the long-range detection radar site, cast a troubled glance, and then relaxed immediately.

"Is that not the target you were looking for in the stillness of outer space?" I inquired.

"It is exactly the one. A space satellite is in the attention zone of our radar. For us, other objects are much more frightening—ballistic missiles. We must not let one 'get through...' and, as for the silence... There are more than 20,000 objects in outer space. Just in one day we follow 6,000 trajectories...."

It is interesting to listen to Lieutenant Colonel Marukhlenko. He is a professional, a person who loves his work.

"Very high responsibility prompts one to be professional," said V. Dudarev, unit chief of staff, with whom I came to the site's command post. "We are faced with a most complicated task—to provide the leadership of the country with reliable information on the possibility of the threat of an attack and on the missile-space situation. Take a look at our zone of responsibility. We encompass the Mediterranean Sea, and in addition... At any moment, missiles can be launched from submarines of the Lafayette type. Each has 16 "Poseidons" on board.

The life and service of missile attack warning specialists is compressed into seconds (missiles fly too fast). And not only at sites that are situated in Sevastopol, but also those that have found a home at Riga, Mukachevo, Mingeaur, Irkutsk, Balkhash, and Pechora.

The birth of this system is closely linked with the arms race. Nuclear missile attack systems and the use of outer space for military purposes could not help but entail the development of defensive systems. In the United States the construction of the first over-the-horizon radars (with a visibility of thousands of kilometers) of the future missile detection system began in 1958. In our country the first research work was accomplished three years later. Inasmuch as the only possible concept for the employment of a nuclear weapon by the United States was a massive nuclear missile strike, the main task was to detect the fact of a missile attack, although an estimate of the characteristics of the strike, its target direction, and scale was not required of the system. Another 15 years of intense work were needed for the missile-attack warning system to acquire today's character.

What does it represent? The first one in the harness is the outer space echelon. Duty satellites "do not take their eyes off" dangerous areas of land-based and sea-based missiles. But the capabilities of satellites, it was explained in the main headquarters of PVO Troops, are not unlimited. They "can see" missiles only in the boost phase, and more exactly, they can see the missile plume, because they lock onto the heat emissions of the jet engines. A little later, powerful radars are "harnessed"—the main means of detecting the fact of a nuclear missile attack. They can not only detect strategic missiles at distances of thousands of kilometers, but they can also model their flight trajectories in their missile-attack sectors.

Let us say that a station in Pechora or Sevastopol has attained a bearing on a dangerous target. Through information transmission routes a "fix" will immediately reach the command post of the missile-attack warning system, and there powerful, high-speed (several million operations per second) electronic computers process it and, when necessary, also instantly pass it to the Supreme High Command—the president of the USSR, no matter where he is, the General Staff, and the central command posts of the services of the Armed Forces. And... the decision concerning a retaliatory strike follows.

None of us believes this, believes that a nuclear war will break out and that a general catastrophe will ensue, but here at the missile-attack warning system facilities people have been "awaiting" a missile attack for years. In contacts with officers the question arose as to what motivates those who wait for a missile attack every day, every minute, every second. I raised this question with Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Frantishchik, the operations duty officer.

"You get a taste of alert duty days, you boil for a while in this hot water, and without fail the thought comes up as to whether anyone needs this kind of sacrifice.... Then you reflect a bit and you see: You earn your keep. You see, 'there,' hundreds of kilometers away, alert duty is also being performed, and it is being performed at a strategic missile control console."

Lieutenant Colonel Frantishchik, a typical representative of units of the missile-attack warning system, got to know, as the saying goes, intense heat, freezing weather, sand, and the taiga. He served at a radar site in the east, in the north of the country, in the Baltics, and now in the south. And in all these years, with the exception of training periods in a radio-technical school and a military academy, the main thing in his life was alert duty.

Frantishchik feels that he ran into the most difficult situation during service in the north. "The radar screen flashed with interferences at that time," he explained. "For us this was an indication of the beginning of war. In peacetime, jamming of all technical systems is prohibited, including those of the enemy, which is reflected in the ABM Treaty. Of course, interference can arise accidentally. A jamming warning was immediately transmitted to all command posts, and we ourselves began to search for the cause of it. At that very moment an aircraft had taken off from Leningrad and passed not far from the radar site, and, perhaps, was to blame. It was immediately landed in Murmansk. All technical systems were checked—normal. It took off, and again there was interferences. It landed, but the interference continued, some kind of devilry. And here the thought began to creep in—was it not the enemy, going over to active jamming? And a little later it became clear to us—the interference was caused by our satellite, which was transmitting information to Earth with an unusual 'dancing' method. We called that day the day of 'the dance of the Black Prince'—he gave it to us hot, this prince."

There was no less an alarming situation in January 1982. A ballistic missile appeared in the zone of responsibility. It played on the nerves for the entire nine minutes of flight. Higher headquarters stated: The machine has a malfunction, there are no ballistic missiles in that sector with such characteristics. "A missile is in flight," Lieutenant Colonel Frantishchik insisted. Minutes passed, and it became clear that he was not mistaken. It was Israel testing the "Jericho-2" ballistic missile, which has a firing range of up to 1,450 kilometers, in the radar zone of responsibility.

At the main headquarters of the PVO Troops, Colonel General of Aviation V. Kraskovskiy showed the locations of radar sites on a relief map. The sites of the existing system (incidentally, the Americans know about this very well) monitor missile-attack directions, in addition to the northeast. The Krasnoyarsk radar site was supposed to have closed a defense gap. But it is not the gap that has to be closed, but rather the Krasnoyarsk radar site. Why?

It is evident now that not everything was taken into account when the emplacement point was selected for the new radar site. It was hoped that "it will be in accord" with the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty. The reason that prompted settling on Krasnoyarsk is well known. It is too complicated to build on Chukotsk, for example.

U.S. specialists who visited the site reached a conclusion on the spot—the radar is not a violation of the ABM Treaty: It is deployed up to 1,000 km from the center of Europe, and it cannot be a part of the country's territorial ABM defense system. The experts were greatly surprised as to why we explained the technical characteristics, after the opinion set in in the world that the Krasnoyarsk radar is destabilizing the situation. Our radar became a trump card at the time of the publicity given by the United States to SDI, but, you see, it is a center for tracking space objects, nothing more, a link in the missile-attack warning system.

If the space-based and land-based echelons of the warning system function normally, the officers in the combat control center will correctly estimate the situation with a probability close to 1.0 even in extreme danger. A breakdown of one of the echelons of the warning system will lower the probability of a correct decision, and technical defects will bring it to a dangerous level. So what did the world gain with the closing of the Krasnoyarsk radar site?

And now it appears that the situation is being aggravated. By an order of the Council of Ministers, construction on the Mukachevo radar site has been stopped. Passions around the installation under construction were inflamed a long time ago: It is said that the electromagnetic flow will have a negative impact on the population, and that the site will take a large amount of water, leaving people on a hunger ration, etc. There is even agreement on the fact that there is a nuclear reactor at the site.

The last suppositions bordered on the absurd (residents of Transcarpathia were convinced of this—they were incited with the object of inflaming the sociopolitical situation), but regarding the electromagnetic flow... But here it is the military that is to blame, and more precisely, the system of secrecy. It was under its cover that the negative psychological mood of the population was formed.

Radars like the ones we are talking about are based on the territories of various states. For example, six of them are situated on the continental United States, and, moreover, in heavily populated areas. The permissible medical norms of electromagnetic flux for Americans are 10 times higher than in our country. But nobody is holding rallies there. And all because local authorities, jointly with the military, conduct explanatory work in a timely way.

It seems that the residents of Transcarpathia would assess steps taken to reduce the electromagnetic flux with understanding, if they are undertaken in a timely and

public way. And there was this kind of opportunity—owing to engineering-technical decisions. It is only now (in areas of other radars) that verification groups are being set up that are equipped with technical systems (laboratories on wheels), which will be joined by representatives of the local population. Medical certificates are being drawn up in which all the parameters and characteristics of the electromagnetic flux will be reflected. The concerns of the people for ecological safety are understandable, especially since a majority of the population does not argue against the importance of the sites.

But the Mukachevo radar site is being mothballed, and its predecessor is obsolete and performing limited tasks. Is a new gap appearing in the missile-attack warning system? We should not commit another blunder.

The missile-attack warning system has other problems too. Thus, the people at the radar site that I visited on assignment, who are proud of the fact that the unit collective was decorated with the pennant of the Minister of Defense for courage and military valor, are

troubled by the quality of today's call-up and training of specialists.... Or there is the housing problem. One-fourth of the officers are not provided housing. Families of four are huddled together in rooms that are nine square meters in size. Is it possible to rest after alert duty under these conditions?

...The world is on the threshold of changes. A whole class of Soviet and U.S. missiles is being destroyed. Not far off is the signing of an agreement on a 50 percent reduction of strategic weapons. At the beginning of July, the heads of states and governments of NATO proposed to the member states of the Warsaw Pact to solemnly proclaim that the unions are no longer enemies. Yes, the world is changing, but... The nuclear racers—upgraded ballistic missiles with multiple warheads—MX, and "Trident-2," are still not bridled. And then... Eight states are standing at the "nuclear threshold," and they are waiting to step across it at any moment. By the end of the century the number of those possessing nuclear missile weapons might reach 20. Will the danger become less? Consequently, the brakes must be applied against a nuclear catastrophe.

Problems with Submarine Personnel, Civilian Authorities*90UM0696A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 23 Jun 90 pp 2, 3*

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Correspondent Vladimir Androsenko: "Restricted City: Will Those People Who Are Obligated To Do So Turn and Face the People with a Difficult Fate?"]

[Text] Nuclear submarines cast off from the piers here in strict silence, avidly inhale the surrounding mountains, bays, and starry or overcast gray cotton wool sky without leaving anything behind, and leave for the dim ocean depths. They roam the cold deep or lie on the bottom like lifeless, washed out phantoms, attentively monitoring the surrounding underwater and surface world for months: Alert duty and nuclear deterrent forces.

I am attempting to touch upon a theme that is not very fashionable right now. Currently it is in fact even more acceptable to slander the Army, to calculate the billions that the Armed Forces allegedly spent ineptly and needlessly, and to call for complete unilateral disarmament—really, they say detente has so taken over the minds of all mankind that war already simply cannot be. And I suddenly [am thinking]—about military seamen and moreover with sympathy for them and also with sadness at their disagreeable lives.

That is the problem right now. Despite the upsurge of pacifism, things are nevertheless quite unstable in the world. Of course, nuclear confrontation is diminishing, yes and conventional [confrontation], too. It is wonderful that military plants are more intensively beginning to be included in conversion. There is no denying that people are beginning to have more hope.

And yet, troubling thoughts remain. What path will the united Germany select? Are questions once again not being raised about borders in Europe and in Asia under the guise of concern about national revival? How do we correlate the U.S.'s declared aspiration for peace and democracy with its actions in Panama? These are not idle questions.

Our ideals are currently eroded, we are losing faith in the justice of the existing order, and national discord is weakening the State. I believe that these are temporary phenomena and that this great country can handle the crisis and will rise to its full height. And I think that the Armed Forces should play a leading role in the process of its revival.

Just what is the position [of the Armed Forces] in our society right now? Not seeking a broad generalization, I am attempting to demonstrate it in the example of a restricted city—the inhabitants of a nuclear submarine.

Submariners are regarded with special respect in many countries. For example, in Germany even those senior in rank stand up to greet an officer who has entered wearing a black overseas cap or with a submarine badge on his

tunic. This is a tribute to the courage of the people who have selected the most dangerous of the military specialties.

But they are not simply brave people, they are also high class professionals. It cannot be any other way when lives—theirs and their comrades—depend on the reliability of thousands of systems, units, and assemblies, and when two hot "Chernobyls" are pulsating behind you and missiles are frozen in threatening silence in their crowded tubes.

Their psychology is also different from ground forces military personnel. Many seamen and in particular Sergey Aleksandrovich Zhandarov, a nuclear submarine commander, helped me to understand its specific features.

He is 31 years old. He graduated from Nakhimov School, the Naval Submariners School imeni Leninist Komsomol and, afterwards—command courses. He has passed through all the rungs of a service career. He is lean, wiry, and economical in his movements. The firm direct glance betrays a man accustomed to assuming responsibility. His speech—chary and measured—is also the mark of a domineering nature. His opinions are original and often do not coincide with conventional opinions. Well, like his opinion about the Komsomolets submarine tragedy.

"We perceived the loss of the Komsomolets differently than that of a civilian vessel," he says. "Maybe because we are constantly prepared for such extraordinary situations—they are an element of our life style. And, placing myself in the position of the Komsomolets commander, I think that I also would not have begun sending an SOS like many voices are demanding in the press. Yes, I would fight for the ship's survival and to save the crew until the end—but I would never transmit an SOS. My comrades would also not do it. I am certain that this is also true of American submarine commanders.

"Here we are not talking about disregard for people's lives—we ourselves also very much want to live. But during all times, there are still concepts that have been valued more highly than life. For example, a military seaman's honor. Of course, we also make our own conclusions from these misfortunes and first of all about the specific nature of officer training. You know, there is an interesting fact that has been repeatedly confirmed by life: In serious accident situations, seamen and warrant officers involuntarily gather around officers, look at them with hope, and await their commands. This is not simply just so, there are deep psychological roots behind this. And we must constantly take this into account and include it in officer education. But unfortunately, we are just now beginning to approach an understanding of this need. Our serious misfortune: We are paying too much attention to Party political work and we are completely forgetting about psychology. And really the main thing is psychology.

"Submariners' difficulties begin immediately after leaving the pier. Tension from the consciousness that horrible weapons and nuclear powered boilers are alongside you and that there is a many meter thickness of water over you arises along with your pride at being entrusted with alert duty. This state lasts for a long time and the only saving grace is a day totally loaded down with work.

"It is particularly severe for young people due to the monotony of their duties. There are no bright days (however, what can days be like down below?). And each of the smallest bits of news becomes an extraordinary event. They become overgrown with emotions and our own conjecture. Thus, for example, during one of Zhandarov's last submarine cruises, the short, disjointed reports that the crew intercepted about events in Lithuania directly gave rise to an outburst of alarming fantasies that naturally did not work to the crew's advantage. Yes, everything is more keenly perceived while underwater—both political events and crewmembers' deeds. And here we need a teacher—not simply a political worker—but precisely a teacher and a psychologist.

"The most dangerous time is the final period of alert duty when an unusual, happy-agitated state arises in people. Vigilance becomes dulled, insomnia appears, and thoughts about the shore, family, and home are in one's head. And the most difficult task for a commander in this situation is to once again turn his subordinates' consciousness toward carrying out his orders.

"And afterward the time arrives when the hatch is unsealed....

"You simply cannot know how fresh and fragrant the air is that you are accustomed to breathing," Zhandarov says with restraint, "We also have clean air down below—regenerated. But it is nothing like [fresh air]. But here you inhale and you become giddy. And there is also a purely emotional blow: When we left—there was snow, ice, and cold everywhere, we have returned and everything is green and in flower. Lofty words come to mind against one's will.

"The euphoria passes in approximately a week when daily concerns begin to penetrate through the joyous faces of wives and children. And well it is more difficult to deal with them than with a many month long autonomous cruise.

"Just like all Soviet people, officers have the right to annual leave. But our Constitution does not extend to compulsory service seamen. After the military brotherhood under water, a demarcation occurs on land. So-called housekeeping chores—endless clearing of snow (winter lasts for seven to eight months here), cleaning the kitchen, toilets, etc. awaits seamen instead of relaxation. Sometimes the sadly infamous 'godkovshchina'—this is what the naval version of 'dedovshchina' [hazing of conscripts] is called—occurs on shore (but never at sea!)."

"Still, many current negatives in the Navy are based on canonized and approved from above prejudice against 'the lower strata' and are supported by a miserly salary of seven rubles 50 kopeks per month and by a system of prohibitions against a personal life. Even though there is this feature: An officer wrapped in a cloak stands in front of a formation and before him sailors in identical duck blouses yell 'bravo' while using their bodies to cut off oblique gusts of wind. Is it really from another test to be stuck together and get wet in the rain? Of course, it is but cloaks are simply not proper for them. Since, tell me, can commanders conduct education work among the seamen's masses if life teaches them the opposite? And this really happens."

But how is the main thing—the Navy's combat readiness?

"Our highest leaders assert that professionalization of the Army will cost the country a pretty penny," a submarine commander tells me whose name I am leaving out for understandable reasons. "Obviously they are sending us replacements who are generally unencumbered by knowledge due to a desire to make the Army cheaper. Thus, of 28 new recruits who arrived at my submarine, 11 do not know the Russian language at all. How can I explain the structure of the nuclear reactor to them?"

"I have the latest ship and unique equipment linked with outer space," Surface Ship Commander V. Novikov seconds him. "And people come to serve on it with past criminal records, criminals. They themselves provoke ChP [Extraordinary Events] and disasters. The Army is in crisis, everything in it is entrusted to the old structures and relations of military time. Preserving them is fraught [with negative consequences]. Young officers—the Navy's future—are leaving us. Our sons are already not following their father's footsteps—last year only three applications arrived at military schools from city graduates.

Yes and it is difficult to expect from young people that they would want to experience that same disorder and life style that their fathers and mothers are experiencing. The following are statements of seamen.

A. Nabskov: "There is no club, no bath, not even a simple barbershop at our remote garrison—officers cut their own hair, already not talking about seamen. Our wives sit at home without work and the store is empty."

V. Logikov: "Yes, servicemen are infringed upon but their families and people who have lost contact with military personnel are infringed upon double and triple. It boils down to the loathsome: It is impossible to purchase a sofa for a disabled child and there is one argument at the military exchange: 'We serve only military personnel.' A wife, left without a husband, is subject to resettlement from the apartment—they are also only for military personnel. The weak have only one means of protection—tears. Can this really happen in our Army?"

Many concerned minds are struggling over this cursed question. How to make it strong and at the same time humane, how not to lose those wonderful qualities that it preserves within itself—the ability to cultivate independence and steadfastness in a young man and to inculcate him with loyalty to friendship and contempt for squealing. And it is still extremely important for the Army to be called the mechanism of interethnicity in the ent, of course, that capable officers turn its fly-wheel.

"Right now there are both informalists and nationalists on our crews," says S. Zhandarov. "It is more difficult to work with them but, if they see a strong, intelligent individual in you, your prestige will be increased many times over. Furthermore, they will end up on a well-run, close knit team that will quickly smooth out their rough spots. There simply is no place for nationalism in this human mechanism."

It is healthy that there are people among military personnel who understand the importance of these regulations to strengthen the high moral qualities in a man. It is wonderful that we have quite a few of these people. But what is society's feedback to them?

This city was transferred to the local ispolkom from the Ministry of Defense's jurisdiction at the end of the 1970's. By that time, a bread plant, meat and milk combine, automobile transportation enterprise, a repair and construction administration, an everyday services combine, and a bathing and laundry combine were operating in it. Alas, we can end the list with this. There was no out-patient clinic, hospital, or communications hub in the city, they had practically not created a base for operation and repair of a utilities network, and many other services did not exist that were necessary for normal functioning of city management. An extremely poor situation had developed in housing, schools, and kindergartens and their numbers total 40 percent of the standard right now. Therefore, the joy with which the military department shrugged off its responsibilities for the vital functions of such a troublesome organism is entirely understandable. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense insists on transferring all of the housing and social, cultural, and everyday services institutions to the gorispolkom and informed it that the military will cease construction of a social designation beginning with the 13th Five-Year Plan.

The restricted city found itself at an impasse. Essentially existing in the Ministry of Defense structure, it nevertheless is being forcibly detached by this ministry. The pretext is simple: The military's primary mission is defense of the country but not construction and maintenance of homes, schools, and dormitories. And the oblispolkom here in turn also thinks that it does not have any relation at all to the oblast. As a result, the city does not have one line in the socio-economic development plans. It and its indicators are not taken into account in statistical reports (with the exception of the population census). And therefore this matter sometimes reaches the absurd. Thus, the natural growth of its population has

not been recorded just for this reason. Consequently, children born here are also not taken into account when distributing resources, especially food, which has an immediate impact on worsening people's lives. And really the level of per capita commodity turnover is the lowest in these krays.

In their time, city authorities attempted to rush the city's development and even found support from then RSFSR Council of Ministers First Deputy Chairman V. Orlov and Naval Commander in Chief Admiral S. Gorshkov. However, the planned program was terminated when Admiral V. Chernavin assumed the position of Commander in Chief. And no one has succeeded in swaying this position.

Here are the curious lines from a letter by the city's Party and government leaders to recent RSFSR Council of Ministers Presidium Chairman V. Vorotnikov: "The RSFSR Council of Ministers has reconciled itself with the military department's peremptory disavowal of their obligations to resolve the issues of development and life support of military posts in which other departments do not have any interests whatsoever."

CPSU gorispolkom and gorkom efforts to begin to resolve numerous city problems are encountering a monolithic wall of a lack of understanding and indifference from the Navy and TOF [Pacific Fleet] Command. Many cases are examples of this. Thus, in 1985, the Navy, headed by Comrade V.N. Chernavin, refused to sign for the first time a jointly developed city socio-economic development plan, having spotted enormous expenditures for this department in it. There is also a similar picture right now. At a meeting at the gorispolkom, the Commander in Chief frankly stated that now the Navy Department will only be concerned about servicemen and that this concern will be manifested only while they are on duty. In his opinion, local authorities must assume responsibility for all concerns about their off-duty lives and about their families. And he was not interested in what they have to do this.

They have almost no [resources] to do this. They have no construction base and there is no one to erect housing for military personnel. No one is looking after running water, sewers, or roads and ATP [Motor Transport Enterprise] drivers are already threatening to stop the buses. There is no money. They are saying that the income tax will remain in the gorsovet budget—but this still will not be too soon. But right now? The oblispolkom is now the only bright spot for city residents. Stripped like a lime tree by the Central Government, the very rich but pauper kray allocates several million rubles of its scanty finances to the restricted city for its maintenance: Because military personnel also live there and they are all ours, Soviets, and we feel sorry for them.

And these problems do not trouble only the military departments, judging by the documents being maintained at the Party gorkom. And the questions arises: Are

the highest military leaders not attempting to compensate for the reduction of budget allocations by curtailing social programs and not through structural perestroyka? At the same time, the fact that the main strike is being inflicted directly on the Homeland's defenders is extremely interesting and it is as if the multi-million ruble sums for construction and maintenance of luxurious dachas for the hierarchies of the Army and Navy are not subject to discussion.

And several more perceptions. These notes have been written based on personal observations and conversations with officers and warrant officers—people's deputies. Obviously, the latter circumstance that protects them from the arbitrariness of higher commanders impacted their honesty. Unfortunately, I did not encounter this readiness for frank conversation among the leadership. Rear Admiral V. Rodnonov, who cited a lack of authorization from Naval and Pacific Fleet Command Headquarters, refused me the opportunity to

observe the living conditions of seamen in this same military unit with my own eyes. Of course, I was not interested in military secrets and the Admiral knew this very well. Then what did they want to hide from the press? "Chudilnik [Oddity]," an accurately nicknamed, eternally drunk and noisy barracks for warrant officers and young officers? Bunk beds at the hospital? A school in which seamen's children study in three shifts? I do not think that a conversation about these problems on the pages of the newspaper would undermine the Army's combat capability. On the contrary, in my opinion, revealing actual living conditions of the most restricted part, until now, of society must help awaken concern for the fate of selfless soldiers who are dedicated to their profession, for the future of the Armed Forces, and for the delay of perestroyka processes within them. Neglect of the interests of those who defend us inevitably results in still greater spiritual decline. Will we really follow this path to the end?

Conversion and Enterprise Cost Accounting

90UM0661A Moscow *PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO*
in Russian No 4, Apr 90 pp 100-105

[Interview with V.V. Samtsevich, department head of Belorussian SSR Gosplan; V.A. Baraznenok, deputy general director of the Minsk Production Association imeni V.I. Lenin; Ye.I. Krupenko, head of the planning department of the Minsk Mechanical Optics Plant; and V.R. Penkrat, head of the finance department of that same plant, by S. Rubanov under "Organization and Management" rubric: "Conversion and Enterprise Cost Accounting"; first paragraph is *PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO* introduction]

[Text] Conversion and the transfer of defense enterprises and special shops to the production of civilian output is one of the signs of economic life today. We associate conversion with the transition to the accelerated social reorientation of the economy. This is not an easy maneuver, especially since it has to be done on the march, at the end of the five-year plan and under the conditions of the transition to new forms of management. How is this process taking place in practice? How is conversion influencing cost accounting and vice versa? These and other questions were the subject of a discussion in which the following persons took part: V.V. Samtsevich, department head of Belorussian SSR Gosplan; V.A. Baraznenok, deputy general director of the Minsk Production Association imeni V.I. Lenin; Ye.I. Krupenko, head of the planning department of the Minsk Mechanical Optics Plant; and V.R. Penkrat, head of the finance department of that same plant.

[Baraznenok] In principle, the decision on conversion was correct. But it gave rise to a set of questions. Many of them remain unanswered. Included are very important questions from the point of view of cost accounting. We are feeling the effect of the absence of a unified national program.

The decision on conversion presented the enterprise with an accomplished fact and did not provide time for the preparation of structural perestroika. The time was set to begin in 1990 but the application campaign ended on 1 March of last year. Agreements on the completion of orders were signed and worked up on the basis of the previous plans. And now it is necessary to make some corrections while on the move. This is not easy. Some suppliers accept refusals and others do not. They are delivering the previously ordered materials and we are forced to take them. We purchased them and put them in storage. So in addition to the fact that we are not able to prepare the production of new products, we are loading ourselves down with above-standard stocks.

Besides that, conversion led to a reduction of the volumes of produced output. We compensated for this shortfall in part through the additional release of consumer goods. We began, in particular, to produce electric meat grinders and several radio measuring instruments. But we also ran into another problem. The fact is the

profitability of special equipment was high, whereas it amounts to 5 to 6 percent for the newly assimilated consumer goods. The enterprise thereby lost more than 5 million in profit and accordingly there was a decline in the economic incentive funds. Our calculations show that in 1990 we have only 10 percent for bonuses to specialists instead of the previous 30 percent. This leads to the loss of the best specialists. Urgent measures are necessary. Either we will resolve this question in the ministry today through a possible redistribution of means and a reduction of the branch standard profit deduction or the problem will become worse. We need to get through this difficult transition period in 1990 so that we do not lose qualified personnel.

[Gubanov] Since you made the decision on conversion, then perhaps it was expedient for the period of the preparation of this structural shift to maintain the base level of economic incentive funds at enterprise?

[Baraznenok] Apparently it was necessary to review the economic standards so that the incentive funds in this period do not decline and the enterprises can calmly restructure production without worrying about the stability of labor collectives. I have in mind that this measure would work only during the period of the replacement of some kind of output without another. Such a decision will suit all enterprises. In any case, it should be adopted this year without fail.

A special preparatory period (about a year) is very necessary. This has to do with material-technical supply, with the normative base and with price-setting conditions, that is, with the conditions of the entire cost accounting activity of the enterprise. Today the proper definiteness is lacking here. But it is already necessary to formulate the next, 13th Five-Year Plan. Without precise conditions and standards for price-setting, taxation, financing, the extension of credit, etc., the enterprises are forced to act blindly. At this time we have not even collected applications and cannot determine what relative share of special equipment remains in the products list in the next five-year plan. The figures that we have today will probably change. Conversion will go further. And we, of course, are not waiting. Taught by bitter experience, today we are already trying to process and collect a portfolio of orders for consumer goods so that we will not again find ourselves in a difficult situation and not have excessive expenditures.

[Gubanov] How is production and the distribution of output planned?

[Baraznenok] We receive a state order. But it is planned in rubles rather than in a developed products list. We determine the products list ourselves. The republic Gosplan participates in this work and helps the enterprises. It studies, on the one hand, what enterprise produces what or can produce it and, on the other hand, where there are needs, how great they are, etc. Accordingly, it orients manufacturing enterprises toward what is needed.

[Samtsevich] Even before then, in about 1972, we set the target of producing no less than one ruble in consumer goods in the republic per ruble of wages. Based on this target, the enterprises worked on the establishment of a products list and studied the demand and we in Gosplan organized the corresponding work. It was also performed at the enterprises, where military orders were placed. Their specialization in consumer goods was determined—household and kitchen appliances. Another one was added after the accident at Chernobyl—radiation meters for the population.

[Gubanov] So under the state order, the enterprises receive targets in monetary terms, in value, "gross" volumes, and then they fill these volumes with specific content themselves or with the help of republic agencies?

[Baraznenok] Yes, we are basically oriented toward local authorities for consumer goods. They know better what the regions need. And we ourselves study the situation through our channels.

[Samtsevich] We are striving to have the orders drawn up for the long term so that they will not be a passing thing.

[Baraznenok] One must bear in mind that there are needs for a broad range of goods. But the aim of some production system or other depends upon very many factors, not only technological but also economic and cost-accounting factors. It depends upon the level of prices, for example. It is simpler if there is no analogous production. But if there is an analogy, then the situation becomes more complex. Take, for example, that same electric meat grinder. The price-setting agencies say that there is an analogy that is the basis of the price and it must apply to your output as well. The set price is 44 rubles and the result is that we lose 23 rubles on each item. The price does not cover the expenditures for the assimilation period. Will we have an interest in producing this item in large quantities? Of course not. We need a more flexible price-setting system that takes into account the degree of saturation of the consumer market with a specific output, the magnitude of the demand, etc.

[Gubanov] As long as the incomes of enterprises depend directly on the level of prices rather than the reduction of expenditures, the price-setting system will be forced to register only an increase in prices. Whether it is more quickly or more slowly is a different question.

[Baraznenok] There is still another problem, the greatest one. It is a matter of direct cooperative ties and material-technical supply. There are monopoly enterprises. With the transition to self-financing, they are simply engaged in extortion. We, for example, would like to increase the production of mixers by 100,000 units but the suppliers are providing us with only enough metal for an increase half that size. And to overcome this situation, we have to resort to different measures, including the transfer of economic incentive funds to them just so that the problem is solved. We are thereby guided by our own interest because if we are not we will lose more. Still, it is

necessary to establish discipline in economic ties because otherwise they will destroy us.

[Samtsevich] The situation is more complex with respect to procurement. Practically everywhere, in all enterprises of the republic, there is inadequate procurement and not enough physical resources for an additional increase in consumer goods. We are forced to organize the production of many completing items here in the republic. This is so, for example, for liquid crystal displays, electric motors for household appliances and the like.

[Gubanov] What relative share of procurements do you receive beyond the borders of the republic?

[Baraznenok] The predominant share, about 70 percent at our plant.

[Gubanov] Perhaps it makes sense to raise the relative share of cooperation within the republic?

[Samtsevich] This is very difficult or practically impossible for the entire list of consumer goods. But we are thinking about this, especially since the enterprises located in zones of social tension began to let us down on account of the interethnic conflicts. All of this is complicated. After all, a certain national economic specialization has already developed and it is extremely difficult to change it. Some departments have begun to study this question but as far as I know they have not yet come up with any specific results. We think that there should be a network of standby plants on the basis of zones. There could, let us say, be those working for northwestern or central regions, etc. By the way, this may not only be the way to raise the dependability of material-technical supply but also to provide for competitiveness, to overcome the dictates of the producer and to make possible a choice of suppliers.

[Gubanov] What overall increase in the production of consumer goods is planned in the conversion program for the current year in the republic?

[Samtsevich] It must be noted that the increase will be brought about not only through conversion. Conversion is just one factor. And because of a number of peculiarities, it cannot be said that it is the decisive factor for our republic either. We made the appropriate estimates and tried to separate out the factors and determine what portion of the increase will be attributable to conversion. According to our calculations, it turns out that it will be about 90 million rubles in retail prices for consumer goods. And it will be more than 40 million rubles for technical output. This estimate will be refined. Overall, here in the republic as well as in the country as a whole, a large increase is foreseen in the current year. I will give a few figures. Whereas in 1989 the planned increase was 135 million rubles, it is 320 million rubles in 1990. The planned indicators were in fact exceeded last year and we are doing rather well in the first months of the current year.

[Gubanov] What is the amount of consumer goods and services in the republic in monetary terms per ruble of wages paid out?

[Samtsevich] We count in the form of the monetary balance of the incomes and expenditures of the population in comparison with the volume of the commodity turnover. Overall this ratio is not bad, about 2 to 1. But very many goods are exported beyond the borders of the republic under different pretexts. They are taken out by people who come to the republic and under the instructions of ministries and departments in exchange for that which we lack. In exporting consumer goods, we must import an equivalent quantity to maintain a balance. But it is still not being achieved.

[Gubanov] How did the progressive tax on the increase in the wage fund work out? Did it link the remuneration of labor more closely with final results and did it interest people in increasing the production of consumer goods and services?

[Baraznenok] In my opinion, if we do not hurry and repeal it, we will not obtain that increase in consumer goods for which it was intended. The fact is that the producers of materials and completing products for consumer goods are not obtaining benefits from taxation, because their output does not belong among consumer goods. In the end, however, we are interested in increasing these volumes. But how? This is impossible without an increase in the necessary physical resources. So this measure is clearly poorly conceived. The enterprises will more likely reduce the number of workers (natural turnover of personnel) than increase the production of output. In addition, it is necessary to bear in mind that as a rule labor-intensiveness increases in conversion and in the assimilation of new output. There are also expenditures for the reorientation and the technological preparation of production.

[Gubanov] The problem of conversion is inseparable from the problem of the restructuring of our economy and cannot be examined unrelated to the transition to full cost accounting. I would like to learn your attitude toward the prevailing forms of cost accounting. What, in your view, are their prospects?

[Baraznenok] It must be said that cost accounting has so far reached the level of enterprise management. There have been no changes below that. And so far all of these contract forms remain mostly on paper.

[Krupenko] Theoretically, perhaps, these forms are justified. But they do not work in life. A basic force—the working person—has not yet been involved in the reform. The attitude toward labor is the problem of problems.

[Baraznenko] Many methods have been written up and many recommendations have been issued but they are not the main thing. If we speak of cost accounting within production, then how can we determine the individual contribution to the overall final results? It is an infernal

labor. But there will not be any cost accounting at the enterprise without this. Let us suppose that a shop produces printed circuit boards. But there were about 15 to 20 operational sections. The printed circuit board passed through them and accordingly there as well it is necessary to break down and individualize the contribution of each section. In each operation, however, there are also industrial wastes from the production of this output. And it is a very tedious job to consider and calculate everything. Someone ought to write a dissertation on this. Today it is necessary to weigh the entire mass of norms and standards carefully and in part to establish them so as to make a fair distribution of incomes among all sections, production systems and, finally, workers. It is under this condition that internal cost accounting will really work.

[Gubanov] One technology today, a different one tomorrow.

[Baraznenok] Well, then it is necessary to account for things dynamically. In addition, price-setting for the final products of the entire enterprise must also consider the dynamics of production.

With the transition of enterprises to financing from their own sources, there were numerous refusals to accept output, because previously they took more for stocks than now. Still, now they have begun to count. And they moderated their appetites. The producer diminishes output but there is a customer and direct ties remain. And you cannot get away from them. The output is reduced but expenditures are higher and the producer suffers a loss.

This year, for example, we are producing 2,000 products. Next year it will be 1,000 or 500. But everyone knows that with the reduction of production volumes expenditures per unit of output increase. This means that the price must also change so that it will be advantageous to maintain production under smaller orders. But our prices are list prices and strictly fixed. And we cannot change them expeditiously, independently of the level of expenditures and the existing demand. This system of price-setting must be flexible. For this reason, the capitalist says: "If you want, I will make one item for you but it will be more expensive. If you order a thousand, however, it will be less expensive." But here they wrote it into the price list and that is it. The price no longer depends upon the quantity of the produced output. This system needs to be changed.

[Gubanov] The fact that prices do not cover actual expenditures clearly must be explained not so much by the low level of prices as by the excessively high level of outlays beyond any bounds. It is possible, of course, to take the course of "adapting" prices to expenditures. But where does it lead? Practice has already shown where. The most reliable way is the continuous reduction of outlays and the raising of the quality of output. Does the current economic mechanism help so that enterprises will take precisely this path?

[Baraznenok] The production cost can be lowered only as a result of the improvement of the technical level of the enterprise, mainly through the use of new technology. It is a very complex matter to raise the technical level with the quality of our domestic equipment. It frequently becomes more expensive without providing for a corresponding increase in productivity. It is one thing, of course, if it is possible to overcome this situation with the help of joint enterprises. But there is a danger here. In general, it is possible to rely on foreign technology and become dependent upon it. As for domestic equipment, the comprehensive reequipping of production is practically impossible on its basis through self-financing (with the current rate of inflation and the decline in quality and reliability).

[Penkrat] In connection with the fact that the ministry is setting excessive deduction standards, the enterprise is left with a profit that is inadequate for the rapid technical renewal of production capacities. If 1990 becomes the basis for the entire five-year plan, no enterprise will make a very great effort because of the danger of ruining the next five-year plan for itself. The existing economic mechanism does not encourage the uncovering of all reserves. Of course, but in the case at hand we mean the very idea. Let us suppose that today they dictated that 70 percent of the profit is subject to taxation and 30 percent remains. But where did this come from? On what basis do they set precisely this standard? There is no objective criterion. But there ought to be one in the form of those same social standards. In my opinion, if there were equal standards for the taxation of profit in the branch, they would force some to pull themselves up and others to rise still higher. It is important to organize production itself correctly and rationally and not merely the distribution of what is produced.

[Gubanov] Does the expansion of the republic's economic independence in 1990 help to resolve these questions and does it change anything with respect to the formation of economic standards?

[Samtsevich] It is permitted to deduct up to 20 percent of the profit of enterprises to the republic budget. The differentiation of the standards within this range depends on the contribution of the enterprise to the resolution of regional problems. This is the prerogative of the oblistpolskoms. Here we are taking only the first steps.

[Gubanov] What difficulties are enterprises encountering in the formation of the next five-year plan?

[Baraznenok] The main difficulty is that it is unknown what prices we will have at the beginning of the next five-year plan. We thought that the situation would clear up in 1990 but this did not happen and now we do not know what prices to use in calculating the projects of the plan—old or new prices. This is still unclear. It is necessary to redo the work that was done in the preparation and reform of wholesale prices. At the present

time, the conditions have already changed. The completeness on which we had counted is disrupted, because the prices for fuel and the rates for power and transport services have been changed. So it will again be necessary to recalculate the draft prices to reflect the changes that have taken place. In addition, there were changes in the deductions for social security and the prices for precious metals. Today this is affecting the production cost and the enterprises are losing profit and economic incentive funds. At our enterprise, profitability may decline in 1990 by almost half as a result of this. If, of course, there is no compensation.

[Gubanov] Current economic interrelationships between suppliers and consumers of output depend to a considerable extent upon how the joint effect is distributed among them. Are there, in particular, forms of such a distribution that give the manufacturer an interest in raising the quality of output and its consumer qualities?

[Baraznenok] Here as well, the price and price mechanism bear the basic load. Today, if there are significant changes in the parameters of production and a substantial improvement in them, then in principle the State Committee for Prices agrees to an increase in the price. I would not say that the mechanism has been worked out to the point where there is nothing to be done toward its further improvement. In principle, however, there is a mechanism. Let us say that if we increased the reliability of a product and its full operating time from 500 to 700 hours, then the increase is approved. In addition, if the consumer received a great effect, then he can even transfer means from economic incentive funds and thereby share them. He can also allocate foreign exchange and part of foreign exchange receipts. The enterprises have this right today. It is another matter that they are not always able to take advantage of it.

There is the possibility of helping one another. I already said that, on the one hand, in some places suppliers are dictating their conditions. But then, for example, the "Hammer and Sickle" Plant in Moscow asked our enterprise to allocate 5,000 rubles from the economic incentive fund to its benefit. It justified this through the fact that to fulfill an order it was forced to organize its work in three shifts. And only in this way can it guarantee additional shipments, that is, the increased deliveries of metal that we need to increase production of consumer goods. We did not go to verify whether this is so but we put ourselves in their place and transferred the money. We considered that we could lose more. Essentially we helped the supplier to get around the tax on the increase in the wage fund, otherwise he would not have been interested in providing additional metal.

[Gubanov] Mutual assistance is needed, of course. But it is difficult to attribute the case at hand to this. It illustrates more a forced extortion through a poorly conceived tax than mutual assistance!

As we heard here, the number one problem is to get cost accounting to the workplace. We have been restructuring

for five years but perestroika has not reached the level of the shop or brigade. What is the matter here? How are you resolving this problem?

[Baraznenok] A person always senses the results better and sees them more clearly when he works in a small collective. Then it is easily apparent who is working and conflicts do not arise. The distribution of wages takes place normally. But if the distribution involves 400 to 500 people or a shop, then conflicts are inevitable. A discussion begins on who worked more and who less, whose contribution is more important, etc. We do not yet have an objective criterion through which we can determine and calculate and compare in figures who did how much. No one is certain that a person working in some section that he cannot see is as diligent as he is and for this reason it is absolutely necessary to bring cost accounting to small collectives, where everything is visible to everyone. It is very difficult to take stock. But what kind of cost accounting can there be otherwise? After all, today we cannot, for example, keep track of the use of water and power in individual brigades. This is not a construction brigade that has its own individual objective. The expenditure of tools, equipment, physical resources, electric power and water needs to be considered. But this problem has not yet been resolved—you cannot put up partitions within a shop. There is much work to be done here and naturally it must be done.

We took such a course here in the association and organized production and technical complexes. We close technological chains either in homogeneous output or in a technological cycle. We created a complex for printed circuit boards, one for microelectronics and one for instruments. In general, we decided to operate on the basis of the deepening of specialization within the enterprise. Six such complexes have been established at the head plant. Today the task is to develop accounting prices for them and to guarantee the conditions for the transition to internal cost accounting. It will probably also be necessary to establish something like an internal clearing bank. There must be well-founded prices for the output of other shops, for supply services and for design, technological and auxiliary services and subdivisions. The economic mechanism will really work only when the accounting is worked out and there is responsibility for defects and poor quality of products.

[Gubanov] How do you measure the results of the work of the engineering and technical personnel?

[Baraznenok] Today there is practically no acceptable way. We measure them as follows: If, let us suppose, the department of the chief production engineer did not cause the stopping of production, we think that he worked well. This is our approach and it probably is this way for everyone.

[Krupenko] All of our sections have their own cost accounting indices in addition to the basic ones for the plant. Our approach is about the same as was said, only we have a fixed schedule for the assimilation of new

output and a fixed target for the reduction of labor intensiveness, let us say for the department of the chief production engineer.

[Baraznenok] In the final analysis, in my view, the work of engineering and technical personnel can be assessed most accurately only by the collective that they serve. If they will work for a specific production and technical complex, then achieve a specific effect there as well. We also have all of these indices. They are for the payment of bonuses. The engineering and technical workers earn bonuses according to these indices but all of this is not exactly what is needed. Here we also need some sort of objective criterion so that there will be no arbitrariness and subjectivism. We have a complex for the production of printed circuit boards, where we established a technological design department and laboratories. It is practically a closed cycle there. And if a problem arises at this complex that it cannot handle itself, then it will have to appeal for help, for example, from the department of the chief designer or chief production engineer. It will pay him for providing the appropriate assistance. Only then will it be possible to evaluate the contribution of engineering and technical personnel properly. That is, there must be a well-founded price for their services. Let us assume that today the department of the chief power engineer includes all the power facilities but no one knows how his services are evaluated.

[Gubanov] What do you think about the idea of the "destatization" of the enterprise and its output and their leasing, etc.?

[Baraznenok] It is probably simpler for us. We do not have to resolve this question. This does not threaten our enterprises. In my view, it is necessary to take a very careful approach here. We need a set of instruments and controls here, that is, a mechanism that would regulate the work of any enterprise, including a leased enterprise, in a unified system. Everything is interrelated and this must be considered. If an enterprise or its collective becomes an owner, then there will inevitably be group selfishness and they will be open only to their own interests. The interests of the state will concern them least of all. So there must be a comprehensive mechanism that would force the enterprise to work for public interests under any form of management. In my view, group ownership sometimes breaks down the collective. After all, the enterprise is established with a definite objective and through the efforts and means of the entire society. Its objective is written into its by-laws and there is it clearly set forth for what purpose this enterprise is established. And if it is turned over to ownership by a collective or is leased, then everything changes and it begins to search for what is most advantageous to it and ceases to be guided by its statutory objective. It may be immediately reorganized in accordance with temporary business conditions.

Here is one example. We invested 5 million rubles in one of our enterprises, essentially our branch enterprise, to remove foundry production from Minsk and to improve

the ecological situation in the city. This is a part of our technology and our technological process without which the association cannot exist, as we assumed at the time of its founding. But today this enterprise is quite capable of working and living without us, of beginning, let us say, to found gates on the side and to make wagons, etc. If we lease it, we will immediately have to build another plant, although in essence this is property created with our own resources and through our own efforts. Here we also see the imperfection of the Law on the Enterprise. It turns out that it is sufficient that the collective makes a decision—note well, a unilateral decision—and it can leave the association and become independent.

[Gubanov] But there is another way, the establishment of small enterprises, where you will be the founder and manage the enterprise in accordance with your investment.

[Baraznenok] In the current situation, however, you can manage it only in this way: this enterprise must make exclusively those subassemblies and parts with which it will not go to the market. Only then it will not go anywhere. One has to stand on the position that such enterprises should not be given final output. By the way, precisely such approaches are the basis for the interrelationships between large monopolies and small private enterprises under capitalism but very little attention is paid to this aspect and this mechanism. Hence the incompleteness of the decisions being made. In general, there is chaos: this is what it means to vote unilaterally to leave the association! Here the law is clearly ill conceived. Can you imagine that a labor collective of a brigade or section will vote to leave a shop? Clearly this is absurd. And then: Is the opinion of the association not really the opinion of the labor collective? Let us suppose that a labor collective votes against the departure of some enterprise or other from its body. Is this not a decision of the labor collective? Thus, it must also be in effect and be binding. Then any one-sidedness and any decision on leaving made unilaterally must be precluded and this must be reflected in the law so that there will be no conflicts. This is also a measure to protect public property. Provision needs to be made for a kind of veto right. In general, the law must be modified but not without the knowledge of the labor collective, as often happens here.

[Krupenko] Still, cost accounting must be simpler and more understandable, more intelligible precisely for the individual. Everyone must know that whatever he produces, if he works in a particular way, he will receive a certain amount and if he works differently, then he will get more or less. If we do not achieve this at a certain level, no matter what wholesale and accounting prices we establish, nothing will come of it, especially at such large enterprises as ours. Here, for example, is a product that costs millions of rubles. Try to take it apart down to the last screw. Break it down into norms and standards so that everything will be related and then determine fairly who should get how much. I have been working for 30 years but when I look at this cost accounting it is like

looking into space. The main problem is in giving everyone an interest in more and efficient output. Then we will be able to solve any task.

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Guseynov on Foreign Military Conversion

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[Article by E. Guseynov: "Swords and Plowshares: World Experience in Military Production Conversion"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Beat your shares into plowshares. This phrase, which has been immortalized in hundreds of classical symbols, is a universal slogan of demilitarization, disarmament, and peace. Few will remember that the phrase is borrowed from the book of Old Testament prophet Isaiah. Even fewer know that in the same Bible there is an opposite statement. Another Old Testament prophet—Joel—said, "Beat your plowshares into swords." This strange kind of opposition between two biblical sayings is applicable to the situation in which the world economy finds itself in the area of military conversion, that is, in beating our modern swords into plowshares.

Conversion, a topic that is hotly debated in our country, is a problem for more than just the Soviet Union. Substantial reductions in military production are either planned or in progress in most of the Western countries, particularly those that are members of NATO. There are a number of reasons. Heading the list is the global lessening of the military threat the world has been experiencing, with the ensuing reduction in state funding for military needs and purchases.

The armaments reduction process, which the Soviet Union has selflessly demonstrated on several occasions, has not been unilateral. It has also touched those whom we traditionally have considered to be our principal military and political adversaries. The Americans are serious in their cutting of military expenditures: The 1991 budget recently submitted to Congress by the Bush Administration proposes to cut military expenditures two percent a year for the next five years, and this without counting amounts that will be "eaten up" by inflation. This measure will make it possible to save 140 million dollars and, by the year 2000, bring the Pentagon's budget down to 150 billion dollars, compared with the present 306.9 billion. Great Britain is not far behind, for she has reduced military expenditures 10 percent in the last five years.

France, which is not a NATO member, also has plans to reduce military expenditures in the next three to four years by 0.5 to 1 percent of the gross national product, an amount of 20 to 40 billion francs.

Another factor coming into being in the military production "crisis" experienced by developed Western countries is the decreasing demand for weapons on the part of foreign countries.

As a result of the above, in various areas of the world this poses the threat of closing down many arms-producing enterprises that have been employing advanced equipment and a highly-skilled work force. In Western Europe alone in the last three years there has been a loss of 100,000 jobs in the military industry, with a doubling of this amount anticipated in the next three years. In France in 1987-1988 alone there was a loss of seven percent of defense sector jobs. According to estimates presented by NEW YORK TIMES observer L. Acitelli, up to 100,000 jobs will be lost per year in the U.S. in the 1990s. The economy of entire states will be delivered a severe blow. Some of them are California, which presently receives 15 to 20 percent of total military funding, and Missouri, Massachusetts, and Maryland, where the military industry accounts for more than five percent of the gross product. Of Eastern European countries, in Czechoslovakia alone the slow-down in armaments production at 111 enterprises producing military equipment will affect 100,000 workers and another 150,000 working in ancillary plants.

Lower armaments production and reduced arms trade affect the economies of various countries in different ways, of course. It is important to keep in mind that the military production volumes in most Western countries are negligible compared with production of civilian goods. For example, the FRG military industry employs a work force constituting only one percent of the total number of workers, while production of military equipment proper does not exceed 3.5 percent of the cost of the products manufactured by the industry so involved.

Much more painful is the effect reduced demand for weapons is exerting in France. According to official data, in 1988 the cost of foreign orders dropped by 37.5 billion francs—20 billion francs in 1989—to the lowest level recorded in the last 10 years. In this regard, the military industry, which incidentally is almost all nationalized, produced a net profit of 27.3 billion francs in 1989 (35 billion in 1988). Were it not for sales of weapons, the shortfall in sales of French industrial goods in 1989 would have amounted to 83.3 billion francs, not the actual 56 billion francs.

If the truth were to be known, weapons deliveries to third world countries in the next few years will apparently continue to be very profitable and will serve to compensate for loss of military orders on the part of industrialized countries, even with the large number of competitors and a decreasing demand. Part of this is due to fear on the part of many developing countries of losing a source of virtually cost-free weapons deliveries in the form of assistance from the U.S. and USSR, resulting in a possible heightened interest in trade in military equipment. According to a secret document recently presented to Congress by the U.S. Administration, in the next few

years it is planned to supply the Near East, as a prime recipient, with American weapons worth 30 billion dollars. The deals proposed for 1990 are valued at 9.8 billion dollars.

As implemented in many countries, conversion is a complex process that is not limited to a shift from military to other manufacturing. This is an all-encompassing system of economic compensation for losses suffered by society in connection with a fundamental change in the structure and amounts of military expenditures. In the system there are three components: 1- restructuring of military production into civilian production; 2- advantageous utilization of armaments, military equipment, and military facilities released from military applications; 3- improvement in military spending and structure of armaments purchased and produced. Present experience is not the same for all countries, due primarily to varying structures of the military industry and even different economic environments in the particular countries.

Let us take up first the military-industrial complex of the FRG. According to information published in the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, it employs 300,000 people and has an annual output worth 23 billion marks. In contradistinction to the defense complex of the U.S., where aerospace constitutes the major activity, in the FRG this distinction falls to armor. For this reason, with the reduction in military forces and funding for the military, 11 billion marks of which in 1989 were spent on direct orders from industry, with another three billion for research, the major effect there (and incidentally in other Western countries, and most likely eventually in our country) is on armor, artillery systems, and ammunition. The manufacturers involved—Diehl, Krauss-Maffei, and Rheinmetall—decided to take two routes. Some plants switched to manufacturing for the civilian market. In this connection, special studies indicated that, from the economic and technological points of view, it would be a mistake to manufacture military and civilian products using the same equipment. The result is that those facilities that produced ammunition in the past are now engaged in an expanding production of metal items. A facility producing rubber for tank tracks has been retooled for rubber or rubber-and-metal parts for the motor vehicle, aviation, and computer industries. The manufacture of parts made of steel sheets has been given a large boost in its application to motor vehicles. Devices that were designed for use in combat have been replaced by other devices and electronic equipment for use by industry.

On the other hand, the same companies plan to compensate for their reduced output of ammunition by substituting improved, higher-quality, more expensive types that may generate a demand. It is extremely important to keep in mind that the situation in the FRG, and in the U.S., which we will discuss below, will have a lesser effect on the aerospace and electronic military industries. These industries exhibit a great deal of interest in

shifting to the manufacture of high-quality, sophisticated military equipment, even at lower volumes, which of and by itself is a compensation for financial losses. The fact is that it is virtually impossible to set up profitable production of purely civilian items using the extremely expensive high-technology equipment in the plants. In addition, the FRG's industry cannot afford to waste its high intellectual and production potential just on conversion, which should be a lesson for everyone.

In the U.S., the conversion process ran into a set of problems. A major question there is how to make up for the loss of jobs not only in the military industry proper, but also as a result of the Pentagon's announced plans to close 120 military bases in the continental U.S. alone. This is a problem facing about 80 communities located throughout the country. The only solution is to proceed slowly and carefully in closing the bases. If plans are properly laid, these facilities may generate more jobs than the military. According to a 1988 study carried out for the Pentagon, in the past 25 years 100 former military bases have been turned into productive civilian facilities offering 130,000 jobs, even though 93,000 military jobs had been eliminated. However, this kind of planning requires time and money. This is one of the cardinal lessons to be learned from conversion: Some of its aspects cannot bring in an income at start-up; there may be a requirement for financial outlays that could be substantial. That is why the French—to take an example—prefer to simply maintain facilities as they are in military enterprises that are closed down. In Czechoslovakia, where it has been decided to make the complete shift from military to civilian manufacturing in the 111 above-mentioned defense plants, it is assumed that this step will require until 1993 an outlay of 300 to 360 million dollars, of which only a part can be provided by the government.

Now let us turn to another kind of conversion—one we may refer to as the Chinese version. According to official government data and the ILO, reductions effected in the Army and military expenditures and the process of conversion were carried out in an environment and using the methods of the administrative command system. Gradual demobilization of one million servicemen during 1985-1988 was effected by applying direct administrative methods to planned redistribution of the work force. Local organs of authority and economic institutions were required to assume part of the employment and housing problem by taking on the demobilized servicemen. In addition, a number of non-combat units were transferred from military control and placed under the control of civilian organs. The reduction of the Army alone resulted in a savings of more than 33 billion yuan.

Since 1979 more than 10,000 production lines and shops involved in defense production have been retooled for nonmilitary manufacturing. At least 60 military airfields, 300 specialized railroad lines, 29 docks, and 100 depots have been turned over to the civilian sector. As a result, output of civilian products made in military

plants has risen to 11 billion yuan. Its share of total defense enterprise production is two-thirds, whereas in 1979 it did not exceed 8.1 percent. Interestingly enough, the Army itself exhibited an enterprising quality. It organized about 2,000 farms and more than 1,600 small mines and factories. At the present time, the state budget pays only 70 percent of the total outlays of the Chinese Army. The remainder is covered by income derived from the Army's economic activity.

The reader can recognize the main feature of the Chinese version without difficulty. Defense enterprises and facilities were not transferred to the civilian sector in order to take up civilian manufacturing.

It is completely understandable that the Chinese had no choice in effecting their reform at the end of the 1970s, in the face of the totally disrupted economy and extreme shortage of resources, but to utilize any robust and well-organized societal forces, including the Army, to activate their economic power. However, we must not lose sight of the long-term effects of this step.

Large-scale economic activity on the part of an army in any country, not only in China, of course, can result in turning that army into a closed, self-contained, and self-sufficient structure. As it gathers momentum in its economic activity, this structure becomes decreasingly dependent on the rest of society. The end result is a kind of military economy which in reality is even more military than defense sector enterprises that at least superficially are subordinate to a civilian administration.

I repeat: The experience gained so far in conversion is incomplete, being in its initial stage. However, even its first steps are valuable for us, since our economic system is facing conversion and difficult problems of economic reform at the same time.

Conversion Leads to Need for Labor Exchange in City of Glazov

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[Article by S. Chugayev: "Why Glazov Needs a Labor Exchange"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] LABOR EXCHANGE. It has been 60 years since these words appeared in a sign located at the entrance to an official Soviet institution. We will see this in the fall in Glazov.

Everything seemed to be all right in this Udmurt city until a short time ago. Quality buildings were being erected, there was no shortage of goods in stores, and the residents possessed enough money to make purchases. The source of the well-being was two large enterprises of the "defense" kind around which the city had been built. All of a sudden conversion came along.

The next thing to happen was loss of state orders by the enterprises. Then there was talk of shutting one of them down, since it was doing harm to the environment. This year 400 secondary school graduates will not be able to find a job in town. Jobs that had been held by women on maternity leave were abolished. Next to go are highly qualified male specialists who are in the prime of their working lives. Estimates show that this fall there will be more than 1,500 of them.

It is not hard to guess what catastrophes can occur under these conditions. Facing an unenviable future, the Glazov city authorities turned to science for help. They arrived at an agreement with a group of scientists headed by I. Zaslavskiy of the NII [Scientific Research Institute] of Labor relative to investigating the situation. The scientists agreed to do this on their own time.

It was not long before they developed the idea of the city labor exchange, an unemployment compensation fund, and how to place controls on the worker release process to prevent laying off too many workers at one time. They not only developed plans: They implemented virtually all of them. In essence, the labor exchange already exists. It is housed in adequate quarters located in the center of town. The exchange is equipped with a computer and training classrooms. A total of six or seven persons will constitute the staff there. They will be given the status of a division of the gorispolkom. This means that there will be a regular salary arrangement that will attract qualified specialists.

All Glazov residents already know that they can register with the labor exchange in the event they lose their job. If the search for a job will require some time, the applicant may be offered temporary employment; directed to public jobs in town; offered work at an enterprise located out of town where there is a requirement for his line of work; or enrolled in retraining classes to qualify him for a new line of work. The choice is up to him, of course. In the event suitable work cannot be found, the applicant will become eligible to receive financial assistance in an amount equal to at least half his pay. The funding will be from a city unemployment fund. It is to receive monies from enterprises as manpower deductions, some from social security, and some from voluntary contributions. The local church has promised to do what it can. It is expected that in the future some input will be received from economic accountability activity of the exchange itself. Thus, the creation and activity of the city labor exchange did not require a single kopeck of state funding.

I cannot say that Glazov residents who lose their job will have it easy. However, now they are rid of a major worry - uncertainty.

What about people who live in other cities, where, as is the custom in our country, the authorities may be waiting for someone in the center to take care of things?

There are not enough independent experts for all cities, of course. However, we do have a substantial scientific

institution: the NII of Labor. But let us recall that a researcher from this institute worked on Glazov's problems on his own time.

Why not on official time? Is the USSR Goskomtrud, the institute's superior organization, not interested in unemployment problems? The point is that the residents of Glazov are not the only ones: Many persons are worried about losing their job in these changing times.

Strictly speaking, we should be receiving complete replies to these questions from specialists of the Scientific Research Institute of Labor. Why did the Glazov people prefer to deal with a team of independent experts? This is the question I posed in the institute.

I soon learned in my conversation with V. Dudkin, chief of the Manpower Department, that the institute carries out virtually no unemployment studies, for the simple reason that there are no unemployed, that is, it still has not been established who should be considered as unemployed. For example, of the million unemployed in Uzbekistan that were mentioned from the rostrum of the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, that figure included mothers having many children, respected peasants who grow vegetables and fruits on their own plots, and many others that have no intention of walking up and down a street wearing a sign reading LOOKING FOR WORK. This is something that makes a person wonder about to whom the figures actually refer. And what the basis was for figuring that about 4 billion rubles will be required to provide for full employment, if no one has a clear idea of how many unemployed there are now, how many there will be in the future, and who they are.

The institute carries out the research that is ordered by the superior organization - the USSR Goskomtrud. This is the first year that orders call for drawing up plans to predict employment under the new economic conditions and lay the groundwork for organizing a state-run employment service. It will be another year before problems of employment monitoring will be studied and plans made for a model of a state-wide employment data exchange service. I in my naivete was under the impression that all of this had already been researched and worked out. After all, officials of the USSR Goskomtrud said that unemployment was just around the corner.

What was the departmental service doing all this time we have been preparing for major changes in our lives? Primarily laying a theoretical foundation for the idea that yes, under socialism it is possible to have some unemployment of some sections of the population; that a labor exchange - something that is compatible with socialism - may come into being; and, most importantly, our unemployment and our labor exchange are not the same as under capitalism.

I cannot help but quote a portion of one of the scientific reports: "...Under socialism there is a market aspect, but it is opposite in nature to that under capitalism. In the labor market existing under capitalism, a man sells his capacity for work by offering the latter, while in the labor

market under socialism a man offers his capacity for work and receives from the state a part of the means of production, the latter in the form of collective ownership and use." An old joke comes to mind: The main difference between capitalism and socialism is that under capitalism you have exploitation of man by man, while under socialism you have the opposite.

I am at a loss to say how much good all this does for a person standing on the outside of an enterprise and looking in. For example, how much is he helped if it is made clear to him that: "The principle feature of the socialist labor market is the social orientation, humanity, and democratic nature of its efforts to discover the labor potential of the person?"

An unemployed person needs a job, and for this there is a requirement for a labor exchange that is geared to finding employment, not to "discovering the labor potential of the person." All in all, that is the kind of common sense that guided the Glazov people to bypass the NII of Labor.

Shortcomings in Conversion Program Detailed

90SV0052A Moscow *EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI*
in Russian No 8, Aug 90 pp 33-39

[Article by Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Rogovskiy, candidate of economic sciences, laboratory chief of the IEP NTP of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "The Economic Orientation of Conversion"]

[Text] The thorough restructuring of the USSR's economy, which has become necessary, presupposes performance of two large-scale tasks: the first is social reorientation of the economy, and the second is reestablishment of the optimum relationship among sectors, above all between the raw materials and manufacturing sectors. Performance of both is clearly dragging. This seems to be related to the excessive resource intensiveness of the methods selected earlier for achieving the objectives in question—long-range capital investment programs, one form or another of large-scale imports, etc.

What is essentially a unique opportunity to considerably speed up performance of these tasks has now emerged. It is related to the conversion to a peace-time footing of a portion of a powerful scientific-production potential that now exists, but is comparatively autonomous and is comparable in scale and level of development to the economy if not of Japan, then at least of Great Britain or France. The turn toward the doctrine of reasonable defense sufficiency is opening up favorable conditions for carrying out conversion. If conversion is to become an organic part of the general strategy of the USSR's economic development, an outline of optimum sufficiency of the defense industry needs to be adopted on the basis of that doctrine. In other words, a determination needs to be made of those directions for reconfiguration

of the portion of the defense production and scientific-design potential being made available which are the most effective from the standpoint of the national economy.

This is a complicated military and economic problem; its solution needs to be approached not from departmental positions, but with clear criteria derived from the objectives that determine the direction of economic development. To a decisive degree, the question of whether conversion will greatly speed up performance of the vitally important task of strategic social reorientation and profound structural revamping of the economy depends on how conversion is organized, planned, and carried out.

The Assumed Conduct of Conversion

The conduct of conversion is at present subject to administrative logic. The military-industrial complex (VPK) and the defense departments of Gosplan worked out the measures of which it consists. The initial prerequisite of administrative conversion is its direct linkage to disarmament. It is natural that its scale should also depend decisively on how the acute issues of military doctrine, of the defense industry's sufficiency and readiness for mobilization, are being resolved (or not resolved). Silence on these matters and the use of outdated schemes for dealing with them directly and substantially reduce the potential that could be tapped for the national economy within the framework of conversion.

Yet at present the most important problems of the new conception of the capacity of the defense industry for mobilization and the corresponding doctrine of the reasonable sufficiency of defense cannot be considered solved. For that reason, reduction of the production of arms and military equipment is accompanied as a rule by an enlargement of its potential for mobilization by mothballing the main processing equipment and raw materials. Data on the amount of metal to be made available, which is incomparably small compared to the amount consumed by the defense industry and the scale of disarmament, provide indirect confirmation of this point of view.

We can assume that the administrative conversion of the defense branches now being carried out and planned for the future mainly affects their personnel potential (what is more, preservation of departmental benefits is envisaged both for personnel transferred to the manufacturing of civilian products and also for other personnel, including those not presently employed in producing products with defense purposes).

Two programs covering the period 1989-1995 are now being carried out within the framework of conversion: one for the production of manufacturing equipment for light industry and the food industry and the other for manufacturing consumer goods. The VPK and defense departments of Gosplan have prepared a Plan for Conversion of the Defense Industry for the Period up to the Year 1995, but it was drafted using the outdated

methods of sectoral planning, which indeed predetermined its orientation toward preservation of that sphere's technological separateness. Organizing new civilian production operations in this sector that are far from the technological potential of the defense branches requires unacceptably large outlays of resources and money, including foreign exchange. The strategy adopted essentially calls for building a second economy in the defense departments.

Every ruble of military products being removed from production is now being replaced by 15-20 kopecks of civilian products. Assuming that in 1990 the latter figure rises to 30-33 kopecks, we can conclude that at this "rate of efficiency" of substitution of military output the size of the national income used will drop. According to preliminary indirect estimates, the reduction in the amount of military purchases, reflected in the national income used, will cause the latter to shrink by 5-6 billion rubles. If we take into account the planned growth of production of civilian products in the defense branches, the growth of its size could be 1.8 billion rubles in 1990. As a consequence, according to preliminary estimates, the national income will shrink by 0.5 percent.¹

In addition, we must note that the volume assignments for the output of civilian products at defense enterprises make those products considerably more expensive with no essential improvement of quality. Only a portion of the equipment supplied to the VPK is up to the world standard; a number of pieces of equipment are at present outdated and do not guarantee high productivity and reliability and quality of the products produced. The cost of the machines and units newly developed by the collectives of the defense complex frequently exceed several times over the cost of similar pieces of equipment manufactured previously.

But even the large scale of production of civilian products by defense branches does not guarantee a radical change of the situation on the consumer market. First, the planning targets for the defense industry do not affect the most important components of consumer demand—housing and automobiles, and second, even in the 14th FYP maintaining the country's sufficient defense capability at the new level of quality could make it necessary to reduce the output of consumer goods in defense branches.

What is more, this version of conversion requires incomparably greater capital investments and expenditures to finance defense scientific research institutes and design offices. When the assumed results and dates for their achievements are taken into account (developing and organizing the series production of civilian products and nonfood consumer goods, transfer of the scientific and technical advances of the defense complex to civilian branches, developing and organizing the production of fundamentally new types of equipment, resource-saving processes, and promising dual-purpose materials), it seems that these expenditures will be 2.5-3-fold higher.

A decisive deficiency of the conversion plan now being examined is that the measures it calls for do not look to the use of the gigantic scientific-technical and technological potential that exists in the VPK to perform the strategic tasks of economic development. We can hardly expect that carrying out such a plan will improve the quality of capital goods produced on a large scale or will reduce the resource intensiveness of the economy, nor will it be able to extricate the economy from its state of profound technological imbalance. This version of conversion sees the policy of social reorientation of the economy as transient and short-term. What is more, if conversion remains inefficient from the standpoint of the national economy even in the subsequent stage, when its scale expands, then the country will simply be destroyed.

Disarmament treaties will, of course, have an indirect—political—influence on conversion plans. But direct linkage of conversion to disarmament signifies in fact a substantial reduction of it. In this case, arms production remains the leading element of the production program of defense enterprises even if it takes up less than half of that program. The structure of production of civilian products is formed from below, from the enterprise, on the residual principle (for example, on the basis of equal labor intensiveness of production of the military-purpose product being withdrawn from production and the civilian product being put into production), and its orientation is not that of the national economy. Thus, conversion in the variant at which we are looking will not be able to justify the hopes which have been placed on it.

The Logic and Scale of an Economically Oriented Conversion

The point of departure in working out an alternative version of conversion is in my view an assessment of the technological requirements of the country's economy. The scale of administrative conversion is manifestly inadequate to normalize the technological structure of the economy and impart to it a strategic social orientation. What is needed is integration of the technological and design potential of the defense industry and the civilian sphere, and not according to the residual principle, but on the basis of need. This in my view is the only realistic strategy for overcoming the profound technological disproportions in our economy without substantially increasing the foreign debt.

This kind of conversion requires essential progress in guaranteeing the country's security by political means and also a corresponding correction of strategy toward optimization of the use of the military component of security. What does this mean in specific terms? First, arms reduction, which is at present a subject of negotiation; second, reduced production of military equipment, which would mean revising the conception of military construction and would be the subject of future negotiations on limitation of qualitative improvement of weapons (consequently, the scale of their renewal); third,

a new conception of the defense industry's capability for mobilization, of the readiness for up-to-date production of new types of weapons, a production that would be based on the entire potential of the national economy.

Economically oriented conversion can hardly be prepared in the defense departments of Gosplan and in the VPK: in their present form, given their organizational separateness, they give insufficient consideration both to political dynamics (the magnitude of upcoming agreements) and also the real needs of the economy.

The magnitude of upcoming political agreements necessitates a radical revision of military strategy and of the logic used in planning conversion, as well as identification of the technological directions of structural revamping of the economy, in which the potential of the defense branches could play a decisive role. In other words, administrative conversion needs to be renounced in favor of an economically oriented conversion.

Directions of Economically Oriented Conversion

Conversion, I am convinced, must be worked out and implemented as a **multipurpose state priority program**, that would include the following goals.

1. Shaping a steady trend toward improving the production technology of consumer goods in the civilian sphere of the economy thanks to very rapid expansion of industrial cooperation with the defense industry focusing on prophesies and products. Emphasis in developing the production of consumer goods should be placed on the civilian sector of the economy, but flexible cooperative ties with the defense industry would be expected to become a principal reserve for rapidly overcoming the heterogeneity of machinebuilding technologies and their departmental separateness and for bringing about the material and organizational prerequisites for developing machinebuilding as a unified and ramified technological process.

2. The rapid growth of civilian products, goods for the people (above all medical equipment and electronics) not requiring large capital outlays, but science-intensive, thanks to the technological potential of the defense industry and its involvement in international industrial cooperation.

Conversion's contribution to the performance of social programs will reach its maximum not thanks to direct partial conversion of the capacities of defense plants to produce goods for the people, but through reconfiguration of large and technologically generic production operations to the output of high-quality equipment (instruments and the like) for the branches of the social sphere and for export. For example, conversion of a number of tank plants entirely to the production of new generations of high-quality agricultural equipment, aside from the direct impact in agriculture, would make it possible even in the 13th FYP to reconfigure many tractor plants and agricultural machinebuilding plants (which are in need of radical reconstruction anyway) to

the volume production of inexpensive automobiles. The growth in the output of cars could be achieved quickly (in 2 or 3 years) with substantially smaller capital investments than if new plants were built.

In determination of the new list of products of the defense branches, the point of departure should not only be an increase in the share of consumer goods, but also selection of those products whose production could be quickly organized and this done almost without additional outlays. The criterion of efficiency here must be the overall conservation of resources, which, in my view, is the only thing that can make socially oriented structural revamping of the economy stable and long-term in nature.

3. Creation of a system of environmental protection (including the production and application of the necessary materials and equipment) through reorientation of the scientific research and design potential of the defense branches. The practical performance of such an exceedingly important task as normalizing the environmental situation in the country might be taken on, for example, by Minsredmash. It would be able to carry out such large-scale measures as designing a monitoring system, production of automated complexes for neutralization of effluents, etc. Within the framework of conversion we might develop mobile pieces of equipment for continuous monitoring of the state of the atmosphere and begin to produce them with the help of the CEMA member countries. And that would make it possible not only to satisfy the needs of those countries, but also to export that equipment jointly.

All of this could substantially reduce the cost and speed up performance of the urgent tasks of economic development without losing the scientific-technical and technological potential of the defense complex. The impact of conversion toward economic recovery must consist, I think, not of restricting the financing of the defense branches, but of saving resources of the national economy in the civilian sphere. Conversion will become effective only when its design is closely linked to other target programs. They would include an environmental program, a program for improvement of industrial safety and the quality of capital goods produced in volume, and a program for foreign economic relations.

This seems to be a good place to say that at the present time a number of large industrial and banking corporations of the West have shown an intention to invest capital in conversion of the Soviet defense industry monitored from outside. Various forms of international cooperation in finishing scientific-technical advances of the defense complex (applications, experimental design and development, marketing) with a view to their civilian application and with an orientation toward the Soviet and world markets offer the most promise. The foreign capital could use the potential for innovation concentrated in the defense complex (computer-aided design systems, testing stands, jigs and fixtures, tools, and so on) to update the product assortment of civilian

machinebuilding, bypassing departmental and technological barriers. I will enumerate those areas for the application of foreign capital which seem most promising in my view:

- projects based on the isotope industry (centrifuges) in order to obtain materials of high purity, above all for electronics, optoelectronics, as well as for the electrical equipment industry;
- reorientation of the technological potential of rocket chemistry and radiation chemistry toward the development of science-intensive small-scale chemical production operations (catalysts, activators, plasticizers, etc.);
- use of the machinebuilding capacities of the atomic and space industries to produce a broad range of technological equipment and instruments for the chemical industry;
- study of world demand for helicopters with a view to their purposive refinement and production in large numbers;
- industrial cooperation in the production of civilian aircraft based on Soviet glider design, equipping them with engines and control and navigation systems that meet international requirements;
- the use of composite materials and reinforcing and protective coatings;
- use of lasers in civilian-purpose systems (cutting metal structural elements, medicine, environmental protection);
- design and production of equipment to use unconventional energy sources (including autonomous sources).

Measures To Carry Out Economically Oriented Conversion

As is well-known, the State Program for Conversion of the Defense Industry in the Period 1991-1995, which the government is to present for consideration to the USSR Supreme Soviet by the end of this year, determines the specific distribution of defense capacities made available. We have already spoken about the deficiencies of the draft version of this program, but we would like to add the following. The draft contains those same volume indicators (both for military output and civilian output) which are broken down by ministries on the basis of the principle of equal labor intensiveness of the previous product and the new one being put into production. The technological principle is thereby cast away, outdated sectoral methods are used that are based on superficial figures from balances that have not been grouped from the technological standpoint. In my view, this draft is unsatisfactory.

In order to draft a multipurpose program of economically oriented conversion, it would seem advisable to immediately form a permanent group of experts that would not depend on the VPK and defense departments of Gosplan. It would outline the basic principles of the program before, not after, conclusion of an agreement similar to the Veys plan. The commissions of the USSR

Supreme Soviet and USSR Academy of Sciences which have been created do not have the tasks and capabilities for carrying out that kind of interdepartmental project, nor do they even possess the necessary information.

I think that defense enterprises carrying on economic activity independently must actually have two target programs: for the production of defense products and for the production of civilian products, and they would be closely interlinked both in time and in technology. The functions of the ministries cannot fail to undergo change.

The VPK ought to assume the functions of scientific and technical management of conversion, define the effective directions for technological shifts in the economy, form a kind of demand for conversion and orient it accordingly. As a matter of fact, the diversity as to quality, technology, and design of elements of science-intensive equipment at the present time predetermines the incredible complexity of the cooperative ties among thousands of economically independent enterprises. Probably only the VPK is capable of the centralized organization of this industrial cooperation on the basis of a target program to produce specific end products.

A centralized plan providing for the conduct of economically oriented conversion without harm to the military-industrial complex nor to the country's defense as a whole is also necessary because the market now taking shape in the country is so far unable to perform those tasks. In addition, the cause would be aided by an authoritative and highly qualified expert evaluation, independent of the VPK and defense departments of Gosplan, of both the individual directions of economically oriented conversion and also of its program as a whole, an evaluation that would have the right to cast doubt on decisions which have already been adopted for implementation. Such a body of experts should probably be created under the USSR Supreme Soviet.

While the VPK would be left a portion of scientific-technical policy and the functions of organizing multi-level cooperative relations among enterprises, it would be advisable either to deprive it entirely of the right of "off-budget" financing of the production of arms or to substantially reduce the scale of that financing. Altering the functions of the VPK would contribute to reorganizing the defense ministries, reducing their number, and ultimately forming a number of multiprofile independent concerns mainly manufacturing science-intensive dual-purpose products.

It is high time to transfer to the Ministry of Defense the functions of ordering all defense-purpose products so that their development and production would be financed exclusively out of funds appropriated from the country's budget to the Ministry of Defense for those purposes. That presupposes renouncing covert and overt subsidies traveling through other channels and resulting in a substantial lowering of the prices of arms and military equipment. The transition to real prices that fully take into account all the costs of production

(including R&D), tests, preparation of production, depreciation of expensive equipment, and so on, prices that would be comparable to prices of civilian-purpose products, would provide a basis for most of the defense enterprises to operate without loss under the new economic conditions and would help to give economic incentives for continuous qualitative renewal of the products produced.

Among the centralized measures necessary to carry out economically oriented conversion, I would also like to mention the following: 1) the gathering and analysis of information pertaining to the technological potential of the defense and civilian spheres of the economy and also pertaining to the organization of cooperative relations; 2) allocation to the defense industry of earmarked capital investments providing for the development of machinebuilding as a whole and creation of conditions for prompt redistribution of decentralized capital investments from civilian machinebuilding (where they cannot be efficiently assimilated) to defense branches that possess their own high-quality investment resources; 3) inclusion in the state order of the relevant subbranches of the defense industry services related to increasing the output of consumer goods in the civilian sector of the economy, assuming the prices of such services would be set so as to take into account the overall effect of the cost saving for the consumer.

In addition, it would be worthwhile to allow outside organizations to acquire from defense enterprises unnecessary equipment and nondisposable items at negotiated prices. It would also be advisable to allow in shops and production operations modernized by their own efforts the payment of wages not only based on the output quota, but also out of the capital investments allocated for modernization.

Footnote

1. It is not difficult to see that these calculations do not coincide with the estimate of the benefit from reduction of defense expenditures and the personnel of the armed forces and from the influx of the discharged military personnel into social production that was published in the newspaper PRAVDA on 10 November 1989. Judging by that article, the measures being carried out even now make it possible to augment the country's national income by a minimum of 1.8 billion rubles, and the total economic benefit of conversion will be 12 billion rubles.

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China's Experience in Defense Industry Conversion Noted

90SV0009A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 35, 29 Aug 90 p 15

[Article by Igor Yegorov: "Conversion: Chinese Experience"]

[Text] Vuchetich's sculpture "Beating Swords Into Plowshares" has stood before the UN building in New York

for over three decades. But only now, after the end of the "cold war," has the United Nations Organization been able to hold in Moscow the first international conference entitled "Conversion: Changes In the Economic Sphere In the Age of Arms Reduction."

Satisfaction with the forum's undoubted success—at last the whole world has come together to discuss how best to "beat swords into plowshares"—is giving way to concern: What a mountain of problems has to be tackled, how sagacious and wise our Soviet strategists of conversion must be!

In this respect, the experience of conversion in China is no doubt of special interest to the Soviet Union. For all our differences, we are in many ways similar. Conversion, decentralization of economic management, and the introduction of market mechanisms are proceeding in tandem both in our country and in China. The points of departure are similar: a socialist, relatively inefficient economy that lags markedly behind the world leaders. Enormous and very unevenly developed territories. Both countries are concerned for the fate of entire cities that work for the defense industry. Colossal armies are being reduced in both countries. But China began somewhat earlier and has already cut 1 million soldiers. Already, one third of Chinese defense enterprises' output is of a nonmilitary character. And China has already succeeded in halting the flight of highly skilled specialists from enterprises subjected to conversion.

Here are just a few pieces of practical advice that Tszin Chzhude, chairman of the Chinese Association for the Peaceful Use of Military Industrial Technology, shared with me.

The state must above all see to it that enterprises subject to conversion thoroughly study the market and carefully consider the choice of their future civilian output.

The state helps enterprises during the transitional period by giving them three- to four-year loans until they get on their feet. These loans meet just half of their expenses; the enterprises get the rest of the money themselves in the form of loans from local authorities and banks.

Where possible, the military makes surplus army equipment and installations available for joint operation with civilians. More than 10 military airfields have already been opened in China, and restrictions are being lifted on ship calls at certain ports. In addition, the air force and navy have set up their own civilian airlines and a steamship line and are earning money to supplement the military budget.

Here it is, a quite unexpected way of dismantling Aeroflot's odious monopoly! Perhaps we ought to try it.

Profitability of Industrial Conversion in Market Conditions Discussed*90SV0072A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 37, Sep 90 pp 8-9*

[Roundtable materials prepared by V. Lvov and V. Yurteyev: "Defend the Defenders"]

[Text] Conversion, from which we expect the market to be saturated with consumer goods and the standard of living to rise, may at the same time lead to a decline in the standard of living for hundreds of thousands of people connected with the production of military goods. That is why today our very defenders—the creators of our mighty nuclear missile shield and other formidable battle technology—require protection.

How can we avoid possible negative consequences in the transition from defense to peacetime production? This was the topic of our roundtable in the editorial offices of PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK. We invited workers from the ministries and departments, leaders of defense enterprises, scholars and representatives of public organizations to discuss the complex social problems of conversion.

Participating in the discussion were: Yu. Andreyev, academic secretary of the Peace Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, member of the Soviet national conversion assistance commission; A. Kireyev, senior reader for the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee; Ye. Pershev, deputy head of the Chief Economic Administration of the USSR Minoborprom [Ministry of the Defense Industry]; L. Popov, department head of USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems]; V. Salo, deputy head of the combined department of USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee]; E. Seredyuk, head of the Chief Economic Administration of USSR Minobshchemash [Ministry of General Machine Building]; A. Strelkov, deputy general director of the Ramenskiy Instrument-Building Industrial Association.

[Ye. Pershev] When people started talking about conversion, many people hoped that in the coming years the country would receive billions of rubles in economies from the defense branches. But no one took the time to think it all through to the end, and once conversion had already come to the enterprises, it turned out that, on the contrary, billions of dollars had to be spent on reequipping the industry and retraining personnel.

[A. Strelkov] Let's be frank: the conversion we are now carrying out will entail losses for us because we're all carrying it out, crudely speaking, in a half-assed way. Why do I think that? Here's what enterprise directors say, for instance: if we were shown the ministry's entire "basket" of civilian orders, then we could choose what was most profitable for us and the government as well. And then all the costs and losses involved in reequipping and retraining would be much less for us. It must be

clearly recognized: at the initial stage, conversion is going to cost society more than it gets back.

[Yu. Andreyev] How much are the social aspects of conversion going to cost for the entire period of program implementation, up until 1995? According to Gosplan's prognosis, it's going to take at least a billion rubles. This seems low to me. That is a very small sum for resolving the entire complex of social issues in conversion. The cost of conversion is going to grow above all on account of the social element, which according to our calculations will come to 2-3 billion rubles.

[Ye. Pershev] Right now the enterprises have virtually no economic interest in carrying out the conversion. Preferential credit for just this year is not a solution to the problem. We need conditions like that for at least four or five years. We need guaranteed preferential credit in order for the enterprises to be able to rebuild.

Imagine a factory that used to produce tanks. Now we are forcing it to make washing machines. Tell me how that entire industry is going to rebuild—in structures 1.5-2 kilometers long, where 80 per cent of the equipment is specialized—in a single year?

[A. Strelkov] Let's take a look at conversion through the eyes of the worker, whose interests we are all looking after here. He is used to working hard and being compensated accordingly, and now people are telling him: "Dear comrade, we don't need you any more as an assembler of metal vessels. Go retrain, make steam tables for the food industry, for example. The qualifications there are lower, there isn't any extra vacation for hazardous conditions, well, and you won't be eligible for all sorts of privileges. . . ." Well, fine, for six months we maintained his salary, "retrained" him from a class-8 all-round craftsman to a class-5 metalworker. What next? What are a man's thoughts if he doesn't make up his earnings, if he loses the privileges he was used to getting from the department for decades? These are complicated social problems that need to be solved immediately.

[L. Popov] If we proceed from the fact that the entire conversion is directed toward the good of people, then the standard of living of workers in converting branches should not decline. This means that people should not lose out in salary. All payments from the social development and material incentive funds must be maintained for them. And finally, the enterprises' social development program—construction of clinics, sanatoria, dispensaries—all this must be implemented on the scale laid out before conversion.

But how are we to ensure other social guarantees? While we were preparing the government conversion program, we at Goskomtrud carefully studied the proposals of the enterprises and ministries. First of all we began by resolving the legal issues and approving appropriate documents. Thus, we resolved the issue of maintaining the special pension for workers who have not worked long enough in hazardous industries to get a special

pension. A decision has been made to maintain the average salary for workers and specialists during their retraining.

Funds for economic stimulus have been maintained to the maximum for the defense ministries for 1990. The government has already allocated for them out of the budget 350 million rubles for conversion-related nonproductive expenses (supplemental payments up to the average salary for workers training for new production, maintenance of the average salary while retraining during a break from production, and so on).

[Comment] Many enterprises during the transition to production of mass consumer goods have asked that their average salary be maintained indefinitely.

[L. Popov] All enterprises have the right to maintain their average salary for half a year, while mastering new production. We consider this sufficient for the specialized retraining of workers as well.

There has been a proposal to maintain the tariff rates and official compensation for workers in the defense branches of industry in the transition to the production of mass consumer goods and civilian production. But there is generally no problem here: everyone who both before and now in the defense industry enterprises was producing mass consumer goods gets a salary according to the tariff rates and salaries of the defense industry—those privileges are maintained for them.

In connection with the conversion, many enterprises have already seen their plan profit diminished by half. That is the situation in the Ramenskiy Instrument-Building Industrial Association and dozens of other enterprises. How are they going to ensure their social safety net?

[V. Salo] Here you are saying that the ministries have lost their material incentive funds and that this, you say, will affect the workers' social safety net. But there is, after all, a system that both in the past and this year has allowed us to defend all the collectives of enterprises and especially their material incentive funds. It consists of the fact that these funds should earn rather than receive. It's time to get out of the habit of thinking that we are going to keep on receiving the way we used to. It's time to toss the term "entitlement" out of economists' vocabulary. These means must be earned. Of course, due to the decline in the volume of industry, in order to maintain the material incentive funds, for all the ministries, deductions in the budget were lowered. We have tried to maintain the social development funds as well.

[L. Popov] In our view, the standard of living achieved should be guaranteed only to those workers and specialists who are needed for business, for industry. The others should be dismissed, retrained, placed in jobs in other enterprises. By the way, that will allow for maintaining the standard of living for those who remain.

Conversion sharply poses the problem of worker dismissals. In this year alone in the defense branches 500,000 people are going to be dismissed. Mass consumer goods will "cover" only 27 per cent of the volume of military output taken out of production. And for labor demand—already 93 per cent of fillable production. This means that about 50,000 people in defense enterprises are going to receive unearned money. Clearly they could be of greater use in other branches of the economy.

[Ye. Pershev] But can we talk about dismissing workers, say, in our branch, when the labor demand of the new output for agricultural-industrial and mass consumer goods that we are starting up is in some instances five to six times higher than for the manufacture of defense goods? That production was specialized, regulated, serial, whereas now for the agricultural and food industries we are equipping once rather than serially, at a cost that cannot be compared to our former output. So what kind of worker dismissals can we expect?

Today the ministries of the defense branches still somehow can help enterprises in redistributing profit. But what are we going to do in 1991, when the ministries are going to be simply "cut out" of this matter? Right now at Minoboronprom, 35 per cent of the enterprises overall do not have sufficient profit to assign funds. And in the new system of taxation 76 per cent of defense enterprises have already become unprofitable.

[Ye. Seredyuk] And how will the conversion program work under market conditions? Won't the converted enterprises be tossed on the waves of the market economy without any "lifesaver," so to speak, on common grounds?

[V. Salo] There are two scenarios for the defense complex's entry into the market. The first is another subsidy from the government, which, in my view, is logical. In the second the government would act both as a consumer and a contractor for military equipment.

[Comment] So what, will the government acquire this equipment at market prices?

[V. Salo] Here it must be remembered that even under market conditions the defense industry will remain a monopoly of the state, and that means that prices for its output will also be set centrally. Right now the ministry does not have the functions of redistributing means; the central economic organs do that for them. Therefore Goskomtsen [State Committee on Prices], the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Defense, and the supplier ministries must work out the issue of surcharges, which will give the enterprises an opportunity to work under conditions of a market economy.

[Comment] But how does the Defense Ministry look on this?

[V. Salo] Very simply. If it agreed to prices for the goods it needs, that means Gosplan and the Finance Ministry have to correct the Defense Ministry's budget allocations

for the purchase of equipment and arms. On the whole, I think that during the stage of transition to the market, the government conversion program will render the defense enterprises invaluable service in the selection of civilian output and partners.

[Yu. Andreyev] I don't share the optimism of the Gosplan representative, that all aspects of the workers' social safety net during the conversion will be fully coordinated with market relations. If we are going to a regulated market, then the ideology that was put in the government conversion program is already out of date and does not subscribe to market relations. Therefore, if this program does not undergo significant changes, difficulties will arise in its implementation.

[L. Popov] During the period of transition to a market economy the enterprises and organizations of the defense complex will find themselves with respect to the workers' social safety net in a worse position than other branches of the economy. The point is that they will not be able to utilize fully the advantages of the transition to other forms of property. Due to the disproportionate weight of the government as client for defense production, and, consequently, the effects of established wholesale prices in these enterprises, contractual relations with the consumers of the output will not be developed. All this requires supplemental measures for the workers' social safety net in the defense branches.

[A. Kireyev] The paradox of the current situation is that conversion is being carried out in the transitional period from a command economy to a market economy. I have studied the West's experience in planning and implementing conversion in sufficient detail and therefore from my point of view the current conversion program and those social enterprises it envisages suffer just as the governmental program for transition to market from the very same and, I would say, key deficiency.

What is it? A command economy starts with production and is regulated above all by production. A market economy starts from the sphere of circulation and is regulated precisely by the sphere of circulation. In the concept of the transition to the market there is great detail on how we should reorganize production but virtually no word is said about trade. But after all, without fundamentally altered trade there will be no market at all.

The conversion program talks at length about for whom, what, and how we need to produce—right down to the last bolt. And once again there is virtually nothing about circulation. Herein lies, from my point of view, the fundamental misfortune of the program.

The market, including the defense sphere, consists of three blocs: the correlation of demand and supply; government regulation; the social safety net. And if government regulation and the social safety net are left out,

there simply won't be a market. That means the conversion program, or the social safety net under conversion conditions, must be inserted into precisely these market conditions.

[Comment] Excuse me, but it's hard to agree with that. After all, we representatives of the defense branches are already monopolists by nature. Therefore is there any sense in creating in the country analogous independent competing enterprises for putting out, say, the same type of arms?

[A. Kireyev] Of course, there is! Here it must be understood that a market economy consists of two parts. There is the civilian market economy, and there is a military, but also market, economy. In the West it is not for nothing that there exists the harshest competition for military orders. In the United States, England, France, and West Germany, sometimes several dozen firms fight for the right to make a given bomber or bomber components. Of course, the biggest firms, which give the government the best and cheapest ideas and proposals, win. But this fighting goes on, not abating for an hour. The same kind of competing market economy must be created in our military sector as well.

[Comment] But this means in our conditions creating competition for producers, say, of the modern heavy tank? This means that not in one plant but in two or three, and maybe even five, they will be working on developing and producing their own models and modernizing and improving them. Figure how many billions of rubles that will cost the public! And after all, those rubles are coming out of the taxpayers' pocket. Therefore we have to be cautious about the experience of Western competition, where there are many firms that have already been competing with one another for dozens of years, and not apply that experience mechanically to our soil.

[A. Strelkov] Naturally, market relations will have an influence on military production. But in the first place they will affect the defense complex's output of civilian production. And if we are talking seriously about a market economy, then in it government orders for civilian production must be profitable enough for that enterprise that it simply cannot afford to reject it.

But for the time being we aviation builders are designing virtually from scratch and making lines for the production of gelatine, bonemeal. Tell me, why can't we buy all that with the dollars we get from potential clients for our basic production? Why must we do production "on our knee" that is going to cost the government five to seven times more than what we could buy licensed abroad? Why are we departing from the reality of the international division of labor?

[Ye. Pershev] We made all kinds of suggestions which seemed to have been accepted but were in fact rejected. Let's say, can our enterprises be leased? No, they can't! Although according to the law this status seemed to have been applied to us. But there it's written that in a lease

the owner of production is the labor collective. So it turns out that the factory can become the owner of a strategic bomber? Probably not. But at the same time our enterprises are eager to lease, and we have to look for some kind of solution here. Otherwise, tomorrow our enterprises could prove to be at a disadvantage in comparison with civilian enterprises. The turnover of personnel last year in many enterprises already grew by a factor of 1.5-2. Whereas in our branch we always took pride in the stability of our labor collectives. The law on conversion could have foreseen the paths for resolving all these problems.

[Yu. Andreyev] It is our country that first proposed to the world community the idea of conversion, and here the draft bill for it was given life more quickly in the United States, where they've already been studying and drafting legislation on conversion, developed by Weiss, for three years. And that legislation, by the way, deals above all with the social aspects of conversion. Our national conversion assistance commission, along with many USSR people's deputies, has come out in favor of the country's parliament examining and confirming such a law resolving the social issues of conversion.

[Ye. Pershev] Yes, for these problems the basic document should be not a resolution of the Council of Ministers or the Supreme Soviet but precisely the USSR law on conversion, in which everything must be laid out clearly: the benefits to enterprises during conversion and the specifics of their activities under market conditions.

[L. Popov] Of course, such a law is essential. But we must look on it soberly: we are placing inordinate hopes on laws. Moreover, as practice shows, they take a long time to come about. Right now alone there are dozens of urgent laws in line.

What is to be done? Stand in line in the hope that sometime in the next year the draft bill will be considered? No, I think that we need to resolve the most pressing issues today, without waiting for a law, including via government resolution. Most important here is launching the social defense mechanism in the converting enterprises as soon as possible. All this, of course, does not negate the necessity for passing a union law on conversion. If we are talking about the serious resolution of the issue, then such a law is essential, for in the draft government program on social guarantees it is still stated very vaguely: "to oblige such-and-such persons not to allow a decline in the standard of living . . ." Well, and if it does decline, what then? The facts show that such a decline has already begun. We need a USSR law on conversion that would obligate specific officials to guarantee the social safety net for workers in converting branches. Right now preparation is under way of a draft of such a law. In September it is supposed to be considered in the Committee on Issues of Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet. And there is hope that many of the worst problems, about which this roundtable has spoken, will be resolved.

Shipbuilding Plants Conversion Highlighted

90SV0055A Moscow VODNYY TRANSPORT
in Russian 6 Sep 90 p 2

[Interview with Nikolay Nikolayevich Rodionov, chief of the Baltsudoproyekt Central Design Bureau, by L. Malyarov, VODNYY TRANSPORT correspondent: "The Prospects for Direct Ties"]

[Text] Leningrad is well known as one of the country's major shipbuilding centers. It is no secret that for many years, mainly defense products have left the building berths of its shipyards. Because of the conversion, Leningrad shipbuilders are being reoriented toward world needs.

Our correspondent visited the Baltsudoproyekt Central Design Bureau and interviewed Nikolay Nikolayevich Rodionov, its chief.

[Malyarov] Nikolay Nikolayevich, how will the Leningrad shipbuilders make the seamen happy in the next few years?

[Rodionov] Orders of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet are now being fulfilled at the yard in Leningrad. Severnaya Verf will build "ro-ro" type ships with a deadweight of about 7,000 tons. The prototype—the "Sergey Kirov"—was turned over last year and is operating in the Baltic Shipping Company. Severnaya Verf will build one more ship of this type, and next there is a plan to modernize it, to fulfill an order at the Baltic Shipyard and turn over the prototype next year. We are designing a timber carrier with a deadweight of about 5,000 tons. It will be built in Leningrad Oblast at the Vyborg Shipyard. A large series of these timber carriers is to be built, beginning in 1992, for the Northern Shipping Company. We have already completed the engineering design and are now drawing up the blueprints.

In addition, our Central Design Bureau is designing a container carrier for approximately 500 containers for the Far East Shipping Company. It should be built at Severnaya Verf.

In conjunction with the Baltic Shipping Company and the Baltic Shipyard, we have begun to design a passenger ferry, estimated for 400 passengers and 600 motor vehicles. This work is already in progress, and its further development is proposed, in collaboration with an FRG firm. The Baltic Shipyard will build the entire ship, its machine units, steering gear, pilot bridge and other items. The ferry will then be transferred to a West German berth, where the fitting out of the passenger and service facilities will be completed. These are our future prospects for the Leningrad region. I shall not touch upon all the rest of the plans which we are making for other yards for the MMF....

[Malyarov] One can say that this is also a contribution of the Leningrad workers to supplementing the fleet.

[Rodionov] Of course. Today the Kherson Shipyard is building tankers of the "Pobeda" type for the Novorossiysk Shipping Company in accordance with our designs. They are partially for export.

[Malyarov] Where?

[Rodionov] Libaek and Partners A/S from Norway is purchasing them and will then sell to various ship-owners. In addition, tugs are being built from our designs by the Gorokhovets and Yaroslavl shipyards for the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet.

[Malyarov] Is the output of civilian products at the Admiralty Shipyard contemplated?

[Rodionov] There are so far no such relations with the Admiralty Association, but we anticipate working out the design for a new tanker with a deadweight of about 45,000 tons for export, not for the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet.

[Malyarov] What is now the main problem in domestic shipbuilding?

[Rodionov] The shortage of completing equipment. With the weakening of ministerial pressure, relations with plants scattered throughout the country, which supply equipment for shipbuilding, have weakened considerably. An agreement has now been reached with the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet on allotting currency to acquire completing equipment. When a yard builds ships above the minimum program agreed on, the ministry, in addition to this, will pay a certain amount of currency for its development. Baltsudoproyekt will also obtain a little from this for production development and the purchase of computer equipment.

[Malyarov] Has the material-technical base of our shipbuilding enterprises changed for the better?

[Rodionov] Yes, because the yards are obtaining currency and have the opportunity of purchasing equipment. If you compare the technical equipment of our building berths and those of foreign ones, however, ours are unquestionably lagging behind with respect to a number of indicators. We need greater currency infusion for our shipyards to emerge on the foreign level.

[Malyarov] Are you quite familiar with world experience in design?

[Rodionov] We have contacts with foreign firms. We are placing great hopes on designing and building the passenger ferry that I mentioned, in conjunction with a West German firm. This will make it possible for us to become more closely acquainted with their experience. In our country, after drawing up the plan, a long and complex system is in operation, in which it is examined by a sequence of ten organizations of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry. In my opinion, everything should be done very simply: we drew up the plan in accordance with the purchaser's instructions, we came to an agreement with him, the Register and the shipyard—that is all. It is done that way throughout the world. In our country, though, all the others grow fat on this affair and hinder those who are doing the work.

[Malyarov] Do orders for the construction of new ships presently go through the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet?

[Rodionov] The order for the passenger ferry comes directly from the Baltic Shipping Company, bypassing the ministry. This is because of the great independence of the Baltic Shipping Company. We are increasingly beginning to work directly with the shipping companies. For example, the engineering design for the timber carrier, without waiting for anyone, we examined directly at the technical council of the Northern Shipping Company and approved it there. In my opinion, it is precisely such direct connections that are the most promising.

Impact on Draft System of Shortage of PCs

90UM0603A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 May 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Dolgikh, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Where to Obtain a Computer"]

[Text] "It is, of course, necessary to introduce professional and psychological selection of inductees, but it is not receiving material support. Today the results of PPO [professional and psychological selection] are being reflected in four forms, each of which requires a minimum of 20 minutes to decipher. And this, I note, is for only one inductee. And what if there are thousands? Thus, we cannot get by without computers. But where can they be obtained?"

From a letter to the editor by Maj Klets, department chief, Oktyabrskiy RVK [Rayon Military Commissariat], Mogilev.

Yes, one can understand the workers in the military commissariats. After all, the country's industry produces only approximately a million personal computers a year, and the requirement is on the order of 28-35 million. Buy them abroad? They are costly—40,000-50,000 for each. What is the solution?

First, this problem cannot be solved without building up overall state capacities, and, second, without the initiative of business people.

Recently I visited the Elin cooperative, where computers by that name are produced. Yes, genuine personal computers, and equal in quality to foreign models. This is indicated if only by the fact that in two years of operation not a single complaint about product quality has been sent to the enterprise. And several thousand machines have already been produced.

"The fact is that our computers consist of components manufactured at Soviet and foreign firms that have already recommended themselves well," states Z. Chitav, chief of the Elin design office. "Monitors, for example, are from the Khromatron factory in Moscow, and are the latest models; the printers carry the brand of the Panasonic firm, etc. Yes, and the [word omitted] of each machine are no less than 200 hours.

Nevertheless, what is the advantage of cooperation with Elin? First, their computers are relatively inexpensive—15,000-20,000 rubles; second, the cooperative accomplishes unfunded deliveries, and within a week; and, third, it guarantees both service and software. For this reason, apparently, its clients include numerous nationally known industrial and scientific centers.

However, a program, say, for the medical and epidemiological service is one thing, and for those military commissariats is quite another.

"Our programmers are ready to listen to any requirement of a customer and satisfy it," answers Zaur Shalvovich. "Moreover, we are even willing to start by computerizing one of the commissariats at no charge. Let the specialists work with it for a few months, and they themselves will appraise its value."

Here the question may arise: And where are the military commissariats to obtain money to acquire such costly equipment? Here is how Col V. Dobrovolskiy, department chief, Moscow City Military Commissariat, answered:

"Today responsibility for the material and technical equipping of the commissariats is borne by the ispolkoms of the local soviets. And, I must say, where contact has been set up between the employees of both organs, everything is going normally. The matter usually is based not so much on financial capabilities, as on the question of where to obtain something or another."

And, in conclusion, the address of Elin is: 121019, Moscow, Number 4, Malyy Afanasyevskiy Lane, Room 9.

'Alarming' State of Draft in Republics

90UM0677A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 22,
May 90 p 16

[Interview with Major-General of Justice L. Zaika, first deputy Main Military Procurator, by Viktor Litovkin: "Neither a Soldier Nor a Worker"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are SOYUZ introduction]

[Text] The spring call-up is continuing. This year it is being carried out under difficult conditions, which are exacerbated by the interethnic crisis. However, this is not the only problem affecting the preparation of youths for military service. What is standing in the way of our society in its attempt to produce a capable generation, one that is morally and physically healthy and ready to assume both military service and labor in the national economy?

These questions are discussed by Major-General of Justice L. Zaika, first deputy main military procurator, and our correspondent.

[SOYUZ] Leonid Mikhaylovich, the Main Military Procuracy Collegium recently reviewed the experience gained in applying the "USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation" and other legislation related to training youth for the service. I am aware that sometime previous to that your comrades and officers of the General Staff, other military institutions, Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Committee for Public Education, central committees of the DOSAAF and the VLKSM [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] examined the state of affairs in various localities. What did they determine as a result of their inquiries?

[Zaika] In a word, the situation is extremely alarming. Our groups spent some time in the Baltic, Caucasus, Central Asia, Moldavia, and the Western Ukraine. Analysis of the resulting data indicates that the performance of the local management organs and military commissariats in the area of preparing youth for military service and providing the Armed Forces with new personnel that are socially and physically fit is very poor. This work is being highly adversely affected by the sharply increasing anti-army and pacifist sentiments and worsening of the interethnic and intra-union relationships.

The Supreme Soviets of the Baltic republics, Georgia, and Armenia have passed laws that are anticonstitutional with respect to defense construction. Military patriotic nurturing of youth has been curtailed almost everywhere in those areas. This process is accompanied by single-minded anti-army acts, including interfering with the activity of military commissariats, attempts to frustrate the call-up, keeping draftees from leaving the boundaries of the republic, and generally transforming the call-up campaign into an anti-Soviet political demonstration.

The impression created is one whereby some of the leaders in the republics in a pursuit of political advantages are willing to ruin the future and mar the lives of young people that are about to start a life of their own. Judge for yourself. Thus, for example, on 4 April Lithuania's Supreme Soviet Chairman Landsbergis appealed to the republic's youths to refuse to enter military service, promising that the courts will not punish those who refuse to serve in a foreign army. Several days later, when he realized the possible consequences of this refusal, he made the statement that it was up to each person to decide whether to serve or not. In other words, he divested himself of the responsibility of any decision that may be made under his leadership.

The country in general has suffered a noticeable increase in the number of young people refusing to register and report for call-up for active duty; there has also been a substantial deterioration in morale of draft-age youths.

Let me cite some figures. Last year there were 6,647 citizens that refused to report for call-up, as compared with 1,044 in 1988, i.e., the increase was by a factor of 6. The increases were particularly high in the following military districts, in factors: Leningrad (from 33 to 602), almost 20; Baltic, 24; Carpathian, 10; Kiev, 23; Volga-Ural, 25. The data, as yet incomplete, indicate that the trend is continuing this spring.

The above information means little to the territorial law enforcement agencies; they do not institute searches for draft dodgers, and they do not file criminal charges. In the year 1988, 144 persons, i.e., 13.8 percent, of all draft dodgers were brought to trial, while last year the figure was only 292 (4.4 percent). In Estonia, of 174 cases of "refuseniks," only one was brought to trial. Of the 245 persons in Lithuania committing this criminal offense, only three had charges filed against them.

This of course is not a simple matter of "catch and put behind bars." In the final analysis, the issue here is not restricted to military service, to a "narrow departmental interest" that is causing us such serious concern. An eighteen year old lad is about to start his adult, independent life. He is about to study, work, start and feed a family, take care of his children and parents. What kind of moral and law-abiding lesson are we teaching him by such a display of indifference?!

We are especially alarmed by the growing trend toward crime among youth; the spread of alcoholism, drug addiction, and other antisocial phenomena and detrimental habits; and the drop in general educational level of youths. If you have not grown weary of hearing so many figures, I can tell you some more.

Thus, USSR MVD data indicate that in 1989 there were 223,940 crimes committed by minors—a 21-percent increase over the year before last. Right here you have the roots of future "hazing of new recruits." Health agencies have records of more than 300,000 minors aged 15 to 17 that suffer from nervous disorders. These disorders cause many of them to commit offenses, thus exerting a negative influence on others of their age group. Nevertheless, there is virtually nothing in place to isolate these persons for the purpose of providing treatment and re-education. The country is devoid of specialized health and nurturing type institutions for teen-aged offenders afflicted with nervous disorders.

General morbidity among boys discovered as a result of medical examination incidental to registration for the draft and call-up has risen almost 30 percent in the last few years. This includes the following increases: nervous disorders, 50 percent; diseases of internal organs, 40 percent; vision, 33 percent.

The above figures represent our work force, not only future soldiers. This is something to think about.

[SOYUZ] Yes, Leonid Mikhaylovich, the facts and figures you cite are indeed depressing. As we ponder them, we must wonder: Who is to blame and what are we to do if we are to halt such an unfavorable trend?

[Zaika] I am afraid that it would be very difficult, in reality impossible, to find a guilty party here. This apparently is something that has to do with the general state of our society—with how civilized it is, so to speak.

Specialists are of the opinion that the steady increase in incidence of illness among adolescents is attributable to the following causes: a greater number of persons suffering from congenital defects of physical and moral development; the spread of alcoholism, drug addiction, and injurious habits; poor hygienic conditions in preschool children's institutions and schools; insufficient physical activity on the part of lads; shortcomings in providing proper therapeutic facilities; total disinterest by some youths in living a healthy lifestyle. This is most grievous.

Last year 15,000 adolescents were dropped from military rolls for health reasons, with 160,000 declared unfit for peacetime service. This means trouble not only for the Army, but for society as well.

It is up to us all to resolve a whole set of problems associated not only with therapeutic work, but also with basic military training and the preparation of specialists for the Armed Forces, and this involves the future with respect to industrial production in organizations and schools of the DOSAAF; registration of youths for the draft; and the resolution of other problems of a political, economic, and legal nature.

[SOYUZ] Let us discuss one of them in greater detail. You mentioned basic military training. In society there is a growing feeling that it is obsolete and should be abandoned. Is this not the same as driving a car on a road that we know goes nowhere?

[Zaika] I am aware of that point of view. As a matter of fact—and do not be too surprised at my saying so—in many respects I support the idea that basic military training in its present form does no one any good, including our boys or the schools, because it often amounts to nothing more than monotonous and pointless marching, constant picking on boys for having long and uncombed hair, and assembly and disassembly of obsolete weapons. In other words, it is nothing more than a waste of time and a play on nerves—a misuse of the people's money.

Once again let us cite figures and delve more deeply into what they mean. There are in the country 73,700 instructors of basic military training, but 3,500 of them have never served in the Army. About 14,000 are noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel in the reserves, 6,500 are older than 60, and only 11 percent have completed suitable training and acquired a specialized education. Hence the poor quality of military training. Last year only one general school in the union received a good rating in this subject; all the others could hardly make it to a "three" rating. About half the schools were rated "unsatisfactory."

Let us not forget that the quality of instruction also depends greatly on availability of equipment. In January of 1987, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the decree "Organization of Defense-Oriented Sports and Health Camps for Youths Undergoing Basic Military Training." Since that time, of 26 camps that were planned for the Moldavian SSR, for example, only three have seen the light of day. In Semipalatinsk Oblast of Kazakhstan, not a single one has been built. Only slightly more than a quarter of defense-oriented sports camps are provided with a complete line of training equipment.

The trouble is that existing legislation has nothing to say about specific responsibilities assigned to ispolkoms and leaders of enterprises, schools, organizations, and departments relative to basic military training. No one other than military commissariats is responsible for it.

The military commissariats do not possess the authority to select training officers, train the officers, and set up the proper facilities.

Therefore, the way in which basic military training is being administered cannot satisfy the Army, society, or the needs of the country's defensive structure. Nevertheless, I am definitely against doing away completely with the training as it now exists. I am firmly convinced that the school should help bring up a lad to become a man, something that for some reason is not being done by the family. He needs to be taught to develop physical endurance; skill in overcoming difficulties; how to light a camp fire in bad weather, erect a shelter of branches, and ford a river; take on the responsibility of making a difficult decision and carrying this through to successful completion; and the ability to stand up for himself, protect the weak, and put an obnoxious fellow or cad in his place.

And is it too much to ask a girl—a future woman and mother—to learn how to render first aid, dress a wound, and stop bleeding? Our schools are obligated to teach all this.

Let the subject be given another name, something other than military training—defense-oriented physical training, for example. That is not important. The main thing is for general schools to offer a subject that would have as its purpose the nurturing of physically strong and socially responsible people. This is of even greater importance to civilian life than to military service.

I understand that the USSR State Committee for Public Education and the Main Staff of the Ground Forces have requested the USSR Supreme Soviet to take action with respect to changing certain articles of the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation; and have made suggestions relative to the responsibility to be carried by ispolkoms and departments for accomplishment of this work, and to insure that youths not engaged in full-time study be made subject to defense-oriented physical training with leave from work, with the training to be administered in defense-oriented sports and health camps.

There are many suggestions that pertain to provision of youth training for service in the Army and Navy by schools and organizations of the DOSAAF and other legislative initiatives.

[SOYUZ] Let us name some of the most important ones. I believe that they can be safely listed here, for our readers—including those in military service—have a great need to know what future changes are awaiting them. They undoubtedly have their own opinions relative to various questions.

[Zaika] We have no intention of keeping our legislative suggestions from society. We welcome challenges or corrections in this regard.

A number of initiatives refer to questions of active military service. The Main Military Procuracy Collegium is contemplating the adoption of a law on alternative (noncombatant) service—one whereby no weapons are involved—in construction units, for reasons of health, political or moral persuasion, religious conviction, and on other basis.

Hold call-up for active military service once a year, in the fall; institute the same term of service for seamen and warrant officers as for ground troops personnel of the same age group; cancel the USSR Ministry of Defense decision to permit 25 percent of a republic's incoming personnel to remain on the territory of that republic, on the basis of inapplicability of that decision. Make provision in the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation for a yearly pass for men in compulsory service; in addition, establish a system of monthly payments to families of men in compulsory service with a baby, in an amount equal to that determined as the minimum standard for the country. Modify Article 72 of the law so as to guarantee the job and average pay of cooperative members and the payment of monthly compensation to persons who labor as individuals or participants in a rental arrangement, for the time that they are undergoing inactive duty training, testing, or special military muster.

The need has arisen to institute criminal liability on the part of citizens for refusing to register for the draft; and administrative and other liability on the part of officials and other citizens for the commission of acts intended to frustrate registration for the draft and call-ups for troop duty, inactive duty training, and special musters. Employ the legislative process to resolve problems of financing of call-up campaigns, payment for technical personnel hired to participate in the campaigns, and defraying of expenses incurred in rental of motor vehicles by military commissariats for the purpose of transporting draftees. Submit, via the USSR Procurator General, to the President of the USSR in accordance with Article 22 of the USSR Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR the question of cessation of anticonstitutional legislative acts on the part of the Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, Georgian, and Armenian Soviet Socialist Republics with regard to questions of defense construction.

There are other suggestions. However, they cannot all be cited in such a brief discussion.

[SOYUZ] Thank you. Where are suggestions and comments to be sent?

[Zaika] To the USSR Supreme Soviet, Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security, or the Main Military Procuracy. Our address is: 103160, Moscow K-160. We welcome letters from readers.

On Future, Current State of Pre-Draft Training

Interview with Education Deputy Chairman Kutsev
90UM0680A Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 24, Jun 90 p 12

[Interview with G. Kutsev, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Public Education, by Ya. Penkov: "Instead of an Official Reply: The Teaching Point of View"; date and place not given.]

[Text]

[Penkov] Greetings, Gennadiy Filippovich. During a recent press conference, Gennadiy Alekseyevich Yagodin, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Public Education, stated that the committee stands opposed to offering NVP [pre-draft training] in schools, and at best, this should be done at camps for senior secondary school students. He also suggested that UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA interview you.

[Kutsev] It is generally known that the term of army service was shortened in the 1960s. As a result, an attempt was made to compensate for this by introducing basic military training into schools. I tell you without hesitation that the results are not acceptable to us. Why? Because since that time (20 years have passed), we cannot set this on a professional basis, no matter what we do. There are no real teachers. Very few! However, the problem goes beyond that. When the military is asked the question: "What problems are you having with draftees?", their reply is unanimous: "They have not had sufficient physical training." Well, if we proceed from this point of view and look at our senior secondary school students, we begin to see the reason—only two physical training sessions a week. That is why the USSR State Committee for Public Education feels that serious thought should be devoted to combining physical training and basic military training for youth into one course. This would take four hours a week of student time. The greater part, definitely the greater part, I repeat, should be devoted to physical training. Judge for yourself. The paradox is that senior secondary school students in their last two years have physical training two hours a week, while first year higher school students receive four hours a week. I ask you: Do first year higher school students have a greater need for physical fitness?

After we analyzed the problem, we arrived at the conclusion that what is needed is a single physical training program, to be set up at the expense of NVP. The goal would be to develop in youth strength, endurance, and agility. Therefore, preference should be given to skiing, cross-country running, and exercises involving the use of gymnasium equipment. What do we have instead? Studying regulations, marching. I believe that this should be thrown out of the schools. Everything that NVP is supposed to do in two years can be achieved in one week in special-purpose camps. This probably would do away with the need for a drill ground, firing range, and weapons at each school. It is even impossible to have all

those things. We will make the recommendation that military training centers be set up in cities and rayons.

[Penkov] Who will be in charge of them?

[Kutsev] Those persons who are responsible for training pre-draft youth, primarily military commissariats and public education organizations. This kind of center could function on the basis of a school, DOSAAF club, or military unit in which young people can be administered military training along the lines of the Draftee Day method. An alternative would be to organize camps for senior secondary school students at the end of the school year.

[Penkov] UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA is sponsoring the discussion "Should Basic Military Training Be Taught in Schools?" How do you feel about this, Gennadiy Filippovich?

[Kutsev] Thanks to the newspaper, we are closely following the matter. It is important to speak from the standpoint of teaching expertise. When someone foists on us an NVP program, clings to the old administrative command methods, or brings army procedures into schools, that is when we part ways with such a sorry lot of teachers.

[Penkov] How much time will be required to reorganize the NVP? Will the program for the new subject—defense-oriented physical training—take shape in the new school year?

[Kutsev] Reorganization is already under way. We must move away from orders that entail sameness. Take stock of your capabilities; look for the best ways in which to train pre-draft youth for army service. This kind of authority will be granted republic ministries of public education.

[Penkov] Gennadiy Filippovich, may UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA consider this interview to be an official reply by the committee?

[Kutsev] Yes, indeed.

Maj Gen Kreminskiy of Ground Forces on Pre-Draft Training

90UM0680B Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 24, Jun 90 p 12

[Article by Major-General V. Kreminskiy, deputy chief of a Directorate of the Ground Forces Main Staff: "A New Approach"]

[Text] The Main Staff of the Ground Forces has considered suggestions made by the councils of ministers of the Union Republics and by interested ministries and departments of the USSR in its action to replace the existing instructions for administering basic military training for youth (prescribed by USSR Council of

Ministers Decree No 785-260 of 1980) with drafts of normative acts on implementing pre-draft training for youth.

The pre-draft training for youth reflects the socio-political changes, school reform, and humanization and democratization of the educational process taking place; it incorporates new styles and methods that are to be employed for the organization and conduct of this training.

Generally speaking, the drafts of the new normative acts are intended to administer: the conduct of pre-draft training, but only for youths that are suitable for military service, utilizing the facilities of secondary schools as well as those of pre-draft training centers that are as a rule set up by public education organizations at a school or defense-oriented sports and health camp offering adequate instructional facilities and conditions conducive to the development of this training. This will make it possible to reduce the material and monetary expenditures incidental to setting up and equipping each academic secondary school and vocational and technical school. It will also lower the outlays for staffing by military training officers (the number of which may be cut down to 30,000 or 40,000 men)

Administration of the pre-draft training will proceed in the manner chosen by the public education organizations and school principals, i.e., it may be offered on a daily basis of one to two hours duration, or on a monthly basis, employing the Draftee Day method lasting five to six hours, or by a combination of the two methods.

Relative to pre-draft training of youth that hold down a job, the plans call for discontinuing the present practice of holding sessions at training centers without leave from work, substituting instead the use of defense-oriented sports and health camps with leave from work. This will enhance the quality of youth training and eliminate the expense of maintaining training centers (about 1,000 of them).

Changes have also been made in the camp training procedure for youths undergoing pre-draft training. It is planned to cancel the present requirement for administering basic military training during camp sessions in the time of the summer vacation, a practice which conflicts with the interests of students and their parents. Under the new procedure, students will attend pre-draft training classes while school is in session, during time set aside for this purpose, for a duration not to exceed six days, immediately prior to their graduation.

A new approach is proposed to the organization of defense-oriented sports and health camps. Their start-up will not require additional expenditures, since they can be set up at existing pioneer camps, labor and rest camps for secondary school students, training centers, boarding schools, boarding houses, DOSAAF schools, military commissariat induction stations, military units, and military schools, thus reducing to a minimum equipment and maintenance costs. The more than 2,500 of these

camps that have been set up to date have provided field training sessions for more than two million secondary school students. The favorable results obtained attest to the need for this kind of field training session.

The pre-draft training program for youth was developed jointly with and approved by the USSR State Committee for Public Education, USSR Civil Defense staff, USSR Ministry of Health, State Committee for Sports, and USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. It provides for hero and patriotic, psychological, defense, and physical training for youth, as well as for integrated exercises in the form of various games, relay races, and competitions pursuing various goals.

The program of instruction proper is designed to provide 140 hours of studies, of which 30 percent is intended for applied physical training (general physical exercises, obstacle courses, hand-to-hand combat, etc.); 17 percent, for small arms training, including competitive shooting; 19 percent, for civil defense, with emphasis on coping with accidents and natural calamities; four percent, for health and hygiene instruction stressing rendering first aid to oneself or a buddy in the event of shock, fractures, burns, wounds, accidents, and poisoning; the remaining 30 percent of the time, for basic military subjects and testing for retention of instruction received.

The program is structured so that it encourages instructors to exercise initiative, utilize their experience and

knowledge, and make broad use of new styles and methods in their conduct of pre-draft training of youth.

In our opinion, the new pre-draft training will make it possible to instill in youth moral and psychological determination; it will impart a sense of duty as a citizen of the USSR, and will prepare the trainee morally and physically for service in the Army long before he enters the service, as well as for his labor activity when he returns to civilian life.

In addition, this will improve the quality of training and halve the cost incidental to the training.

For the present, before guidance for the training is published, it is necessary to modify the basic military training arrangement so that as of 1 September 1990 and 1991, at the start of the school year, it will conform with the pre-draft training program.

The draft of the joint order of the USSR minister of defense and the chairman of the USSR State Committee for Public Education has been coordinated with the interested ministries and departments. It remains for the USSR State Committee for Public Education to take action.

At a recent meeting, responsible personnel from military district staffs, USSR Committee for Public Education, USSR Civil Defense headquarters, USSR MVD, and Central Committee of the All-Union Lenin Young Communist League reiterated their support of the need for administering the pre-draft training of youth as prescribed in the drafts of the new normative acts.

One-Time Pacific Fleet Loss of Nuclear Warhead
91UM0006A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Oct 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank (reserve) M. Khramtsov: "The Time Has Come to Tell: Sunken Warhead"]

[Text] It happened many years ago. But in the intervening years there have been few, other than the initiated, who have learned about that very dramatic accident in the Pacific Fleet. It was not customary to "upset" the society.

I recall that on that night I went to bed late. I was detained at work. But I had barely fallen asleep when a telephone call awakened me.

The senior commander was on the line.

"Are you aware what happened with our neighbors (our neighbors were a unit of nuclear submarines—author)? Go immediately to the escort 'Storozhevoy.' You will learn everything there. The command to prepare the ship for combat and for a cruise has already been given, and a vehicle has been sent for you."

I had not yet been able to dress when again the phone rang.

"Mikhail Petrovich, are you still at home?" Rear Admiral A. Skvortsov, the deputy commander, roared reproachfully into the phone. "Hurry and get to sea. The rest may not be said on the phone."

"I am leaving," I answered, having noticed light from the headlights of an approaching vehicle sliding about the windows of the apartment.

Soon I was on the "Storozhevoy." I meet Capt 3d Rank (now Rear Admiral) A. Pechkorin, the ship's commander, at the gangway. Having taken his report, I go to the force operations duty officer's room.

"You need to phone the commander," he informs me.

I phone. The vice admiral, judging by his voice, is calm, but extremely curt:

"Unmoor when the ship is ready. Go to the area and meet the damaged submarine. You are the senior officer present. That is all."

The commander of the "Storozhevoy" reports that the ship is ready for combat and cruise. I give the go-ahead to weigh anchor and unmoor.

Now Pechkorin is in charge on the bridge. He is a good commander—experienced, decisive. Slightly overconfident, it is true.

And "from above" they are being urged on. The operations duty officer incessantly comes out for messages. And he understands that it is necessary to hurry, but not to overdo it. Steady, steady.

Finally the anchor is clear. We hurry to the rendezvous point.

Having arrived at the indicated area, we receive the command from the operations duty officer to wait. We heave to. Finally the running lights of some vessel appear. We go to meet her. But she is not a submarine, but a torpedo recovery boat. Representatives of the submarine force come aboard, led by Capt 1st Rank Vdovin, commander of a submarine of the same type as the damaged one.

Again we stand at anchor and wait. We learn the details. It is a serious matter—an accident involving a ballistic missile carrying a nuclear warhead. This is why it is necessary to move the submarine away to a safe area. Capt 1st Rank Vdovin says: "Through the fault of the group commander of this submarine, the missile maintenance instructions were violated. Upon ventilating the tube, air under pressure which exceeded many times over that permissible was admitted. As a result, the airtightness of a compartment with fuel components was destroyed. The situation became threatening."

Finally the damaged nuclear missile submarine appeared. There was a trail of smoke above the room. We begin to convoy. I knew Capt 1st Rank A. Brichkov, the submarine commander. We went to the academy together; he to the resident and I to the non-resident section. And what a situation had brought us together again.

We pass through the narrows successfully. We convoy the submarine to a combat training area of shallow depth, so that divers can work, should the need arise. Later this took place.

When we came to the indicated area the submarine began to maneuver, making tacks from west to east and back. We took up a position on her beam, 45 cable's lengths to the south. We observe her, maintain communications, and report the situation to fleet headquarters. Suddenly a cloud of smoke rises up over the submarine. Immediately we receive a report: The warhead of the damaged missile has been jettisoned! What a turn of events! In essence, a nuclear bomb is now lying on the bottom of the Pacific Ocean!

"Navigator! The exact location! Mark it on the chart! Our position and that of the submarine." I command my navigation officer. He immediately determined our position and got bearing and distance to the submarine.

"Commander of the 'Storozhevoy!'" Prepare to place bouys and stakes!

At full speed we set out for the place where the submarine "fired" the warhead. We place all the buoys and stakes that we have. This was the only correct decision. Jumping ahead, I will say that we found and raised the nuclear warhead at precisely the marked position. Had we delayed even a little, we would not have been able to

place the buoys and stakes so precisely. And to seek a warhead in a large area is more difficult than to find a needle in a haystack.

We take a water sample at the place where the warhead dropped, scrupulously observing safety measures. We readied a clean container, fastened a reliable end to it, and Capt Lt I. Keshkov (now captain 1st rank, and a surface ship commander), the ship's executive officer, and a small group of personnel dressed in chemical protective clothing and wearing gas masks, take the water sample. Without lingering we transfer the container to the transport. The men operate calmly, with great self-possession. Like a real owner, Capt Lt I. Keshkov even demands that the transport return the expendables and guides to him.

By this time around 15 warships and other vessels had already accumulated, to secure the area. A strong storm begins. We are ordered to stand at anchor on the roadstead. But it is impossible to stand. The ship rolls from side to side. Dishes are smashed, boxes of spare parts break out of their fasteners. We request permission to weigh anchor, and begin to "storm" [ride out the storm], as we say in the Navy. We "stormed" all night. Only by morning did we arrive at the nearest bay. A bit earlier Brichkov's submarine arrived and stood at anchor in the deep water of the bay.

Soon a launch approached the side of the "Storozhevoy." On the launch were Admiral N. Amelko, who had commanded the Pacific Fleet for many years and was at the time representative of the USSR Ministry of Defense; Admiral V. Maslov, Pacific Fleet commander; Rear Admiral D. Shigayev, first deputy chief of the fleet

political administration; and several civilians (important scientists, it was later learned).

The commission went to the wardroom to work. Soon I also went there: It was necessary to send a telegram from the fleet operations duty officer to the fleet commander about the accomplishment of a missile firing by a coastal missile regiment. It is true that after my report I again left the wardroom.

After the meeting the commission members left on the launch for the submarine. More than a day had already passed from the moment the warhead was jettisoned, but the tube of the damaged missile still continued to smoke. After returning from the submarine, Admiral N. Amelko conversed with the scientists for a long while in the conning bridge. They discussed the accident report to the USSR Minister of Defense. All during the work of the commission reports went up the line.

The most prominent specialists in the country and the Navy were collected to search for the warhead. Ships, submarines, aircraft, divers, etc., were put into action. I was replaced by Rear Adm A. Skvortsov. Later Vice Adm E. Spiridonov (later an admiral and Pacific Fleet commander, who was killed in an airplane accident) became senior officer in the area.

The crew of the SKR [escort ship] "Storozhevoy" participated actively in this lengthy and difficult search operation. The warhead was found and brought up, but not a single man received an award. By the way, we did not expect awards. Just thank God (as the saying goes) that it did not come to grief. Brichkov had to bid farewell to his submarine. He was assigned to shore duty.

On the way back to the base all the participants were strictly ordered not to say a word to anyone. In the times of glasnost the time has come even to talk about this.

Commentary on Current U.S. Defense Appropriations

90UM0630A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 May 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by D. Klimov, candidate of historical sciences, under the headline "Budget Battles": The Ongoing Discussion of U.S. Military Expenditures]

[Text] A large budget deficit and the change in the world's political climate has prompted American leaders to look at U.S. military expenditures in a new way. It will be recalled that at the beginning of the 1980s, a sharp increase in military appropriations was observed and a forced buildup of military might took place. During those years, the American press compared U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger to a boy with an enormous sum of money, who went into a military toy store and bought up everything in sight.

But during the second half of the 1980's, U.S. military expenditures stabilized as a result of the normalization in Soviet-American relations, a relaxation of military confrontation, and the tough stand taken by Congress in combating the budget deficit. This trend is also observed today.

The Bush administration has submitted a request for military requirements totaling \$305.5 billion for fiscal year 1990. Taking inflation into account, this signifies a zero growth military budget. In Congress sharp debate raged around this version, which provided for appreciable reductions in a number of items as compared with the one that the Reagan administration had previously proposed for the current year. In the end, the overall scope of the military budget remained unchanged. During the budget adjustment process, the administration's requests suffered cutbacks in some of the most important programs, for example, SDI and the B-2 Stealth bomber. Congress reinstated appropriations in the Pentagon budget for the research and development of the Osprey aircraft, which combines the characteristics of an airplane and a helicopter, and for the purchase of 18 F-14 Tomcat fighters for the U.S. Navy.

As is generally known, in autumn 1989, U.S. Secretary of Defense R. Cheney advanced an initiative to reduce the military budget by \$180 billion in five years. According to data presented in the WASHINGTON POST, it is planned to reduce the ground forces from 781 thousand men in 1989 to 580 thousand in 1996, to reduce the number of carrier battle groups to 12, to decommission 54 of the present 542 ships, and to limit the number of nuclear submarines (SSBNs) with Trident ballistic missiles to 18.

Since this initiative is rather unusual for the Pentagon boss, the question arises, was the initiative advanced with the secret purpose of intimidating Congress with the probable consequences of this process (the loss of jobs for their constituents, etc.) and to force Congress to

treat the administration's requests more favorably. Be that as it may, Cheney's proposals reflect a widespread opinion in the U.S.A in favor of reducing military appropriations and against ambitious and expensive military construction projects.

Taking this trend into account, the administration submitted a request for \$303.3 billion in military requirements for fiscal year 1991. As compared with the current fiscal year, this represents a two percent reduction of the military budget.

However, even this rather trimmed down draft budget was criticized. Thus, L. Aspin, the chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, stated that it totally disregarded the obvious "decrease in the military threat" on the part of the Soviet Union, therefore, from a strategic point of view, the draft defense budget for the upcoming fiscal year was "completely out-of-date". A report by a democratic party research group drew attention to the discrepancy between the actual positive processes in the international arena and the administration's intention to increase appropriations for the development of state-of-the-art strategic weapon systems, including the B-2 Stealth bomber, the "Star Wars" program, missile carrying submarines, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

At the same time, the democrats' research group criticized Cheney's proposal to close a number of military installations in the U.S. and abroad as a dual attempt: to divert the legislators' attention from the need to fight for a real reduction of expenditures on specific new weapon systems development programs and to undermine the Democrats' position among the voters. It is a fact that out of the 21 military bases that are projected for closure, 19 are located within election districts that sent representatives of the democratic party to Congress. It is calculated that 41.6 thousand people would lose their jobs as a result of these base closures.

The House of Representatives Budget Committee approved a plan proposed by democrats and providing for an \$8 billion reduction of the military expenditures requested by the administration. In the opinion of L. Panetta, the chairman of the committee, this represents "a recognition of the realities of a changing world, in which the test for our country's leaders will not be the threat of war, but the task of getting rid of the huge debt and solving our society's numerous problems".

J. Sasser, the chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, S. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and others support drastic reductions in the military budget. The debate on the military budget for fiscal year 1991 is in the initial phase, therefore it is rather difficult to say what its specific outcome will be. However, the majority of the observers in the U.S.A. itself feel that the possibilities of further growth in military expenditures have been completely exhausted, especially when one takes into account the changing situation in the world.

Afghanistan Veteran Officers Reflect on War, Current Problems

90UM0622A Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 9, May 90
(Signed to press 23 Apr 90) pp 48-55

[Discussion with war veterans moderated by KVS correspondent Col. A. Nekrylov: "And I Keep Dreaming About the Damned Thing"]

[Text] Bitter Lessons of the Afghan War and Our Time

Afghanistan... Our pain, a wound that does not heal. More than a year has past now since our troops returned from that war, but talk of it does not die away, and assessments of it are contradictory. In the newspapers MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, in the journal OGONEK, certain politicians and writers call it hidden, secret, closed, adventuresome. Opposing viewpoints clash, passions boil up over what it was and what it was not. This is often done by people who do not know the war, who judge it by hearsay, from the mouths of others.

But the truth about Afghanistan cannot be selective or approximate. This is best understood by those who were in that war. This is the subject of the talk between our correspondent, Col. A. Nekrylov, and soldier-internationalists currently studying at the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. Lt. Col. Korchagin, Anatoliy Vasilyevich, former detachment commander, awarded two orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star, the Distinguished Combat Service Medal; Maj. Vorobyev, Vladimir Fedorovich, former detachment commander, awarded two Orders of the Red Banner and the Order of the Red Star, Major Goroshko, Yaroslav Pavlovich, former company commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, also awarded two Orders of the Red Star and the Medal of Valor.

The "Afghaners" have reacted in different ways to the assessment given to the combat action of our troops in Afghanistan. Not from a political standpoint, but from a moral one. There is bitterness, pain, resentment. They are aroused by the fact that today, at a time when pacifist hysteria and general self-flagellation reign, it would appear that many do not want to hear of the gallantry, the exploits, the glory of the soldier internationalists. An "Afghaner" need only remind others of his existence, and at once he will hear the harsh: "We didn't send you there." So I would like to know, what you think of that war?

"How Well Did We Fight?"

[Korchagin] Indeed, who is not talking and writing of the Afghan war. At times using the words of others, on the basis of doubtful sources. Here you can spot one general tendency: each one believes it his duty to condemn and run down. Believe me, it is odious sometimes to read an article by some homegrown "moralist" who starts

judging us without knowing the essence of that war, and indeed, with only a vague idea of what exactly Afghanistan was. Yes, we soldiers, officers, believed that we were following the will of our people. Although I will not hide the fact that many there wondered in what way they were worse than their contemporaries, who at the same time were not freezing in the mountains, and were not dying of thirst or being killed by Dushman bullets. Here is a serious moral question, and surely a political one as well.

As for those who sent us to Afghanistan, I believe that the Fatherland sent us, and this means all those who live in it. Including that very functionary who now directs offensive rebukes at us. After all, it was also with his silent consent that we found ourselves there, beyond the Chernaya River... Well fine, pain and offense can be removed or borne. But there is something else which is unacceptable. Denial of the truth of the "Afghaners." We fought because there was a real war going on. Our comrades died, and their zinc coffins were sent back to the Motherland, and at first they wrote of us in the papers that we were helping the Afghan peasantry raise cattle, grow crops, and build roads, and in the breaks, we were involved in combat training and participated in exercises. We were betrayed, it's as simple as that. And where? At home.

But what was the reality? We escorted columns with food and clothing for the residents of villages, we swept roads of mines, we cleared away roadblocks, and opened the way to blockaded peaceful settlements.

[Nekrylov] Incidentally, more than once I have had occasion to hear that it was precisely the presence of the Soviet Army that lit the flame of civil war in Afghanistan. I still don't know what mostly motivates this, evil intent or ignorance. But it is common knowledge, after all, that some armed Afghan groupings began the war against the government back before the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] came to power, and some of them had even been fighting during Zahir Shah's rule. Supply lines for weapons, equipment, and indeed everything else necessary for war were well organized over the mountain trails. Did you happen to run across such caravans?

[Vorobyev] Of course. And here is one more example. We got word that a large weapons caravan was coming inland from Pakistan. There were no Afghan troops in the path of the caravan. We had to accomplish the task of destroying it. The team of twenty men was headed by the company political officer, Sr. Lt. Trofimov. It flew off in helicopters on a search mission. The caravan was detected in one of the canyons. At a rough estimate there were up to two hundred pack animals, and thus even more rebels, no fewer than three hundred men (drivers and security). Their superiority was enormous. Trofimov decided to land on the crest of a hill, pin down the Dushman in battle, and await the approach of reinforcements. And that is what he did.

When word reached the detachment staff that the team was already fighting, the detachment commander A. Korchagin, decided to send another group as reinforcements, also around twenty men. I flew with it. Later another few armored groups were sent out. But still the strengths were unequal. When we arrived at the site, Trofimov's team was defending with its last ounce of strength, one could say. He himself was injured, snipers were firing on our troops, and the rebels were attacking continuously. They also met our landing with fire, and tried to get at our rear to shoot us. Lt. Klimenko guessed the maneuver in time, raced to intercept them with a squad of soldiers, and pinned them down with fire. The battle was a long one. Nevertheless, under the cover of fire of helicopters and the approaching armor groups, and the fire of our artillery, we managed to capture the caravan.

[Goroshko] I cannot, I do not want to agree with the comments we hear aimed at us now, after our withdrawal from Afghanistan. We did our international duty; we helped people. In the process we did not spare our own lives. Here is just one episode showing how we fought there. In the province of Kandahar, in the region of the built-up area of Manhajiri, an Afghan food column fell into a rebel ambush. The Mujaheddin set the first and last vehicles on fire. This was a regular tactic: "cork up" the column, shoot up the security with impunity, and destroy food meant for peaceful villages. There was an airborne company nearby under the command of Capt. Vladimir Dyuba. The company had a mission completely unrelated to the battle being waged. But the commander could not leave his Afghan comrades in the lurch.

There were several times as many rebels. They left the column and threw themselves in a frenzy on the company. The battle that developed was a very hard one for our troops. The company suffered great losses. But it won back the food column and returned it to the Afghan authorities. My good comrade, Sr. Lt. Gennadiy Borovikov died then, and Sgt. Gerasimov, Pvt. Kuzmenko... Many, including the company commander, Capt. Dyuba, were wounded.

These were regular episodes from our life at war. And I will never forget how the populace of the cities and villages, with flowers and happy smiles, greeted us unwashed, unshaven, soldiers, smelling of powder and gasoline. They set up tables and heated water so that the Shuravi, i.e. the Soviet soldiers, could clean up. You see, the people knew, they understood the great price we paid for the bread they received.

That's how it was, this "incomprehensible" war. And it seems to me that the song "We are Leaving" said it very well and seemed to sum up what it was like in Afghanistan. It has these lines: "Farewell, mountains, you saw what we were made of in that far-off spot//Let us not be judged one-sidedly by the armchair expert."

[Nekrylov] You mentioned Sr. Lt. Trofimov, a deputy company commander for political affairs. About how he successfully commanded a team that flew in search of a rebel weapons caravan. There are so many attacks now on political workers, and "demands" are issued for their abolition. It is said that they aren't needed in the Army. How did the political workers do in Afghanistan?

"One Privilege: To Go First To the Fray"

[Vorobyev] Only people who do not understand the importance and do not know the essence of party political work could say that political workers are not necessary. But one point they should consider is dealing with this local populace. This was hard work. You had to know the culture and traditions of the Afghans, know and allow for local customs and respect them. Our troops were not prepared for this. We had to correct this gap on the spot. Whose job was it? The commander's and his political officer's. But primarily the political officer's. So he himself was obliged to know a great deal and to work with the populace. For example, we had very close ties with local activists and Afghan soldiers. We organized very good assistance to one another in battles. Primarily thanks to my deputy for political affairs, Maj. Klovov, and the secretary of the party bureau, Capt. Tukmakbetov.

[Goroshko] We commanders could feel the help of the political workers very well. I can say with complete justification that their role was especially great during combat action. While the commander is involved directly in organization of the battle, the political worker not only must help him in this as his deputy, but also organize the party and political work.

And how important is the personal example of the communists in battle; without them political work is quite inconceivable. There were around thirty communists in the subunit I commanded, and not only officers. Soldiers and sergeants were also CPSU members and candidate members. Most of them joined the party there, in Afghanistan. So I would say that in battle, in life, and in service, I have always relied on the party organization. For example, I recall Sgt. Andrey Gurov, a young communist. He was wounded in the leg in one battle. He came back to the unit without having fully recovered at the hospital. We were just preparing for an operation against a large rebel band. For half a day he kept at me, requesting that I take him along, saying he would be in his "beteer" [APC], that nothing would happen to him. We took him. And what do you think? When the subunit came under heavy fire from an ambush, his vehicle was immediately knocked out and set on fire. Gurov received another wound, from shrapnel. He could have saved himself from the gunfire and taken shelter. Seeing that the driver, Pvt. Kramarev, was left in the burning vehicle, he raced over to assist. Gurov burned his face, his hair, his hands, but he dragged his comrade from the burning "beteer," and saved his life.

And do you know why I could rely on each communist there as I could on myself? It's because they joined the party there, knowing full well that there wouldn't be any privileges. With the exception of one, which by no means everyone knows: to be the first to enter the fray.

[Nekrylov] In short, experience puts everything in its place and makes the sole correct conclusions of the viability of a particular precept. In this regard, one must ask: You were in the war, and as no one else you understand what combat proficiency is. You have full basis to judge how the combat situation tests the level of our peacetime training. What thoughts do you have in this regard?

Should Training Really Be Like That?

[Korchagin] In my view, Afghanistan showed that in very many respects our peacetime combat training does not correspond to the requirements of modern battle. In almost every unit you will find Lenin's words in a most conspicuous place: "Genuinely learn military affairs." But what do we come across very often? The lion's share of training time is spent on tasks in no way related to combat training. And naturally this made itself felt during combat action. For instance, we immediately encountered the low proficiency of specialists. The tactical proficiency of junior commanders and officers was far from perfect, and no need to even mention physical toughness. Imagine having to climb two or three thousand meters into the mountains. The air is heated to fifty or sixty degrees, and there's not enough oxygen. On your back, a load of no less than thirty or forty kilograms: ammunition, gear, rations. Can everyone do that? It's impossible to make up for physical weakness with high awareness, enthusiasm, and fighting spirit. Everyone has his limit. Therefore, if we are training to protect the Motherland, we have to do it professionally.

[Nekrylov] It has been remarked that when extreme situations arise in the country (remember Nagorniy Karabakh, Fergana, Baku...) even the most zealous liberals and pacifists remember the Army, demanding its protection. But as soon as the situation normalizes, instead of gratitude the military gets a stream of abuse. They are said to be parasites and such, they are spoiled. Reduce the Army, professionalize it. And they begin to write about this. Even those who do not have the slightest inkling of what a professional army is. What do you think of this, as specialists?

[Goroshko] With respect to the attacks on the Army, the lies and slander heaped upon it, one can only deplore that. I am sure that this is beneficial to those who would like to sow chaos in the country and extract their own gain from it. After all, today the Army is the most politically cohesive and morally healthy force in society.

As for a professional Army... Of course, if I had professional soldiers, it would be easier to fight. It is one thing when a soldier serves eight or ten years, for example, and already has acquired everything, and quite another when

it is a youth who has been trained for six months, and that in the breaks between economic work.

[Vorobyev] However we have no guarantees that in going over to a professional Army we will not again work "according to the tradition" which has grown up among us in the Armed Forces, i.e. for example raising cattle or building houses. And we will have to pay twenty or thirty times as much for it. Where will we get the money? And then, in an unstable economy, how do we plan to create such an Army? A professional soldier must be fed, clothed, shoed, given good gear, provided with housing and many other items which, let us be frank, are hard to come by in our country now.

[Nekrylov] I am sure one would have to agree. I myself had occasion to visit Afghanistan, and repeatedly heard the complaints of officers and soldiers about the shortage of good shoes, uniforms, equipment. And this was in war, where they should have the necessities first of all.

Of Cartridge Pouches, Shoes, Sleeping Bags, and Other "Trifles"

[Korchagin] Unfortunately, things reached the point where the soldiers bought themselves running shoes out of their own meager pay. They bought them to fight. There were few hiking boots, regular shoes were uncomfortable, and they did not last long in that heat. And take our equipment and clothing. For example, for several years the wear time for equipment for the personnel of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was based on peacetime figures. Despite the fact that we were fighting, crawling through the mountains, tearing our jackets and trousers to shreds.

[Vorobyev] And the quality of our gear. Each man going into battle generally took no fewer than nine or ten loaded magazines for his assault rifle. This meant you had to have three ammo pouches, plus grenades, canteen, entrenching tool... And all of it at your waist. This was heavy and very uncomfortable, in battle it restricted your capability of maneuvering. We repeatedly wrote and talked about the need to produce vests that could accommodate the magazines and grenades (that was what the rebels did; they knew how convenient it was, but in contrast to us they reacted very quickly), but it had no effect. And our sleeping bags? In the mountains at night, even in the summer, it was very cold and damp. The cotton bag would soak through and grow much heavier. Just try carrying one. But the Dushman had special goose down bags; they were easy to carry on relocations...

[Nekrylov] Incidentally, how do you assess your former opponent today? I mean his proficiency, morale, and finally, the disposition of the Mujaheddin.

[Goroshko] They generally train in Pakistan. They have many bases there, under the supervision of Pakistani and American instructors. Their training period is from two to six months, depending on specialty. Of course they are trained by professionals who are veterans of Angola and

Vietnam. And then, you have to consider that the war lasted for ten years. Our soldier and officer served his required one-and-a-half or two years, and was replaced, while their so-called opposing forces accumulated experience and became professionals in their work. As for the tactics of action, basically that was terrorism and sabotage, which are not characteristic of an army. And also manhunts. They captured or kidnapped our soldiers and officers. You see, their "masters" paid the rebels well for prisoners.

[Nekrylov] Some newspapers and journals write that many of those who were taken prisoner became prisoners because of "hazing." They allegedly couldn't stand the abuse and they left their subunits. And then there would be a rebel ambush or patrol. Is this not an attempt at indirect justification of the unconditional amnesty of former criminal service members, including even deserters, which is unpopular among the "Afghaners"?

"Not All Prisoners Are Alike"

[Vorobyev] I believe that we must look well into this question. Let me describe one incident. A group of our troops were on a combat mission and were lying in ambush. It was their third day blocking a trail over which, it was assumed, rebels who had attacked a column would have to return to their canyon base. The situation in which the raiders found themselves was a difficult one. On the one hand, they did not know how many rebels might descend on them, or whether they could withstand the onslaught, and on the other, their rations and food were running low. So then, under these conditions, Sgt. Yankovskiy committed an official crime. He drank the rest of the water by himself. Then he tried to justify what he had done; he took a canteen and crawled to a "green spot" where a stream was flowing. He never returned. Eight months later we exchanged him for a bandit chieftain at Jelalabad.

[Korchagin] I would like to add something. It seems to me that some of our publications at times do very great harm to the cause of educating the soldiers. This same incident with Yankovskiy. It was so played up in our press, they practically made the former sergeant a national hero. He was awarded a combat order, allegedly for heroic behavior in captivity. But you know, at all times, in all armies, capture is considered a disgrace to a soldier, which may be washed away only by blood.

[Nekrylov] In this regard a question arises: The Army cannot live cut off from the life of the people. It is like a mirror, reflecting all the ills and sickness of society. So the result of this poor educational work among the "civvies" cannot help but make itself felt in the Army. You have had occasion to run up against this, I am sure.

[Goroshko] Unfortunately. Let me tell you about Jr. Sgt. Khlan and Pvt. Rykov. They arrived with the regular replacement troops. In the very first days it was learned that Khlan and Rykov were drug addicts. They had gotten addicted to the poison before the Army. Well, in Afghanistan at that time we dealt very simply with drug

addicts. We tried to persuade the soldiers during work, through the force of Komsomol influence. But unfortunately urging helped little, and we essentially had no other means of influencing them. Then, conspiring together, Khlan and Rykov committed the following crime: they betrayed the Motherland and their comrades. Taking their weapons, they went over to the bandits. Soon we learned that Rykov was performing on the radio station "Voice of America," telling of his former comrades. Here he did not spare the black paint, and tried as strongly as possible to besmirch the Soviet soldiers fighting in Afghanistan. But later on it was found that they were not adapted to life in the West. No one would pay them any money, and besides, they were drug addicts, and there were already plenty of those. In short, they were turned over to our authorities. You handle them, they said. But then one of our newspapers again built up these two traitors practically into heroes. We who know the story read it and felt ashamed for the paper.

[Korchagin] Now we are pardoning all prisoners. This was announced quite definitely at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. But not all prisoners are alike. I believe that we should look into each case of captivity individually. In order not to shame ourselves before the fallen who did not betray their oath, who did their duty until the end. What do you think, they didn't want to live? All sorts of things can happen in war, truly. But after all, some of our comrades committed outright treason and fought with the bandits, at times even became their chieftains and killed their own former comrades. At Kandahar one former sergeant commanded a detachment of Dushman RPG men, and burnt out more than one fighting vehicle. Or take the former reconnaissance chief of a division deployed in Shindanda, a lieutenant colonel. He murdered a soldier, got into a BRDM [armored reconnaissance vehicle], and went over to the "Dukhi." Can we really pardon that?

Truly this is something to think about. But there is another aspect to the Afghan war, to which I would like to draw your attention. The editorial office receives many letters that make it clear that many officers, among them many "Afghaners," have lost interest in military service. And have even submitted requests for discharge from the Armed Forces. As you see it, how can this be explained?

"We Don't Want Your Experience"

[Korchagin] I think that the main reason is that they simply cannot bear it ethically. They cannot reconcile themselves to a situation which is developing in the troops with respect to combat training, or to the social vulnerability of officers. I have heard roughly that from many officers. After Afghanistan, again to pave roads and paint borders? No. We want to be officers, and not foremen in economic work. Recently I heard, for example, that one of my former subordinates, a captain (I will not give his name) who was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for able leadership of personnel in

combat operations, submitted his request for discharge. The reason? Humiliation from a senior officer in the presence of subordinates. This is not hot-headedness, this is principle.

[Goroshko] I would like to add a little bit about the reasons for the discharge of "Afghaners" from the Armed Forces. Understand, after returning to the Union, the officer feels intense disappointment, I would say, shock. No one wants his knowledge and combat experience.

[Vorobyev] I know many lieutenants who landed in Afghanistan immediately after military school, and plunged into military work. And that means they also had to train. If an entry was made in the combat training log that they had taken a class, then they had taken it. Nothing pro forma about it there. And then they came from there to our peacetime combat training and ran into utter formalism in combat training. It is written down that they fired at the range, but in fact they have been painting borders, laying asphalt. This they could not ethically put up with. It is not only that no one needs their experience, they feel the unimportance of their work, the unnaturalness of everything occurring in combat training.

[Nekrylov] It is offensive of course, when what has been gained with such labor suddenly is no longer wanted by anyone. But I think the offense is doubled when just about everything that was done in a good cause, for which blood was spilled, is publicly run down. I am sure you have seen certain publications with photos from the Baltic region showing orders and medals thrown on the ground. The captions say that this was done by soldier internationalists as a sign of protest against the war in Afghanistan. How is this viewed in your circle?

[Vorobyev] I had little contact with individuals from the Baltics, including in the subunit which I commanded. Also, we did not see a single order thrown on the ground in those photos. Anniversary medals, memorial badges. But a combat commendation, earned with blood, not many would discard that.

[Goroshko] I am often asked why I got the Gold Star. Well, probably for everything together. For the fact that I commanded my reconnaissance company well. Besides which, I had to directly participate in battles. For instance, one day the reconnaissance group of Lt. Oleg Onishchuk ran into a large weapons caravan. Eleven of our troops against two hundred and fifty rebels. And the Dushman had six DShK [heavy machinegun] crews, two crews of mountain AD mounts, six mortars, and two recoilless rifles. You can understand yourself that Onishchuk could not hold out against such strength.

I was awakened by the alarm. We flew off in two helicopters with a small assault force to assist Onishchuk. But we were too late. The group had perished. Later on we learned that Sr. Lt. Onishchuk and Sgt.

Islamov had blown themselves up with grenades. Nevertheless we landed. Six of us found ourselves immediately between a rock and a hard place. To the left was a group of Mujaheddin, about sixty men, and in front about thirty. A fire squall opened up on us. What could we do? First of all it became clear that if we did not take up a favorable position we would be very quickly destroyed. But the opponent had the favorable position, so we had to take it by force. I ordered two machinegunners to deliver continuous fire so that the rebels did not dare raise their heads. And I myself and three soldiers, Solomatin, Notaliyev, and Kurolbayev, threw ourselves on their position. First we hit the enemy with grenades, and then practically joined in hand-to-hand combat.

And I am not ashamed of my commendation. I am certain that if one of those who today throws his medal on the ground had looked death in the face even once, had been poised between life and death, in short if he had earned his commendation with blood, he would prize it.

[Nekrylov] And here's another point. Somehow in Afghanistan I especially understood the yearning of officers and warrants for their families. Years without family and loved ones, work without days off, the sort in which danger dogs your every step, these are, after all, very hard things. I recall that one captain openly admitted at the Salang pass: "I dream mostly of returning home whole and intact, embracing my wife and son, and saying 'Hello, I'm home.'" Only now I have to hear from many "Afghaners" that on their return they do not have even the most elementary things. No normal housing, and it is impossible to order their family lives. And all this after deprivation and suffering...

From Afghanistan To "Makeshift Barracks"

[Vorobyev] Many of our battalions which returned from Afghanistan are garrisoned at places that are simply mind-boggling. No housing, no water, no food. The men had better conditions in the war. But this is like punishment, is it not? No I do not mean to say that no one thinks of us and no one wants us. It is something else. The corresponding decrees have been adopted ordering benefits to "Afghaners," but they generally are not operative. Here is an example. Our Maj. Viktor died. And although there is a relevant order of the USSR Defense Ministry regarding the granting of housing to the families of dead officers and warrant officers, the pettifoggers at the local level have found thousands of reasons to scoff at people and demonstrate their omnipotence. Lt. Col. Korchagin had to make a special trip to the Kiev military district, shuttle back and forth between various authorities, and prove that the family of the dead officer had the right to housing. It was a painful and terrible thing. It turns out that your life is necessary when you can fight and do your duty. But if something happens to you, no one has time for your family.

[Goroshko] Our subunit went to the Carpathian Military District from Afghanistan. A soldier's barracks was

assigned for the families, and of course was not modified in any way for that purpose. No way to prepare food normally (one kitchen for twenty families), no way to rest. Communal apartments seem almost palaces by comparison. So it has been for two years now, with no improvements in sight to this point. Imagine how this affects the morale of the officers and warrant officers, and their families. And you know, this battalion was one of the best in Afghanistan. It has many brilliantly executed operations to its credit. The subunit was repeatedly commended by the command and the USSR Defense Ministry. And this is how they "thanked" us. Basically we came from Afghanistan to makeshift barracks. Now this "Afghaner" battalion is in Baku. Of course, when an emergency arises, all of a sudden they remember us...

[Nekrylov] At the All-Army Officers' Assembly, the idea was voiced that many lieutenants earning 200 rubles are refusing to protect the peaceful labor of cooperative owners who earn a thousand rubles a month. How do you feel about this?

[Goroshko] Our opinion on this is unequivocal. The officer's labor cannot go thankless. Otherwise nothing sacred will remain in our souls. And in this regard I would like to say that Afghanistan lit up something in our souls that had long slumbered there. It woke up some hidden corner of our awareness. I had a Pvt. Lukyanov in my company. He was seriously wounded one day in battle with the rebels. He was treated at the Hospital im. Burdenko in Moscow. Only, without being fully recovered, the soldier ran away from the hospital. Somehow, God only knows how, he made his way to Tashkent, and flew from there (hidden in the cargo hold of a plane) to Afghanistan. A bolt right out of the blue. He fought, was wounded again, and commended. Then he was discharged, and lived and worked in Moscow. What more could he want?

Then one day he suddenly turns up at my home (I was serving here by this time, in the Union) and he says: "I can't do it, Yaroslav Pavlovich. I fall asleep and I dream about the damned thing. I see our platoon, our boys, living and dead, I see the hard crust of bread that we shared at the pass..." Soon Lukyanov went off to military school. He's already an officer now. I still haven't been able to get his words out of my head: "I dream about the damned thing." And from time to time I wonder, what will happen to us if the war does not let us go? Is this not because, somehow bereft of a spiritual compass, we have grown wild and coarsened in our peacetime lives, is it not because we were better off there, where there was a kind comradely word, where there was a feeling of fellowship? Better off despite the fact that it was unbearably hard and dangerous. Still, I guess that is not the most terrible thing, in comparison with isolation...

From the editors. Many urgent and burning issues were raised in the course of the discussion with the "Afghaners." They do not all fit into the boundaries of the already prevailing stereotypical opinion of the Afghan war, and probably not everyone will care for them. But they contain the truth, they contain the pain of what was borne and suffered. And this frankness forces us to ponder our past, present, and future. To ponder ourselves.

Today it is very important to realize what is happening to us. Despite the unsatisfactory state of combat training, for years nothing has changed. The honor and dignity of the soldiers of our Army and Navy are being debased. That which even yesterday was sacred to many of us, on which we were morally raised, is being consigned to oblivion. We would like our readers to share their thoughts on this also. We invite them to a frank and honest discussion.

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